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Women’s Property Rights in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul 
Mohammad Hadi Hosainy, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
Supervisor:  Denise Spellberg 
Co-Supervisor: Abraham Marcus 
In this dissertation, I examine the methods that Muslim women used to protect 
and manage their property rights in Istanbul in the second half of the seventeenth century. 
The flexibility of Islamic law permitted women to choose among the existing legal norms 
in order to possess, own, and manage their properties; to negotiate their relationship with 
natal and matrimonial families; and to strategize for their inheritance. Through the 
examination of sharia court records and endowment deeds, I demonstrate the changing 
patterns in Istanbulite women‘s relationship to property, their strategies in using the 
sharia court, and their mechanisms in transferring their properties to the next generations. 
By the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a series of 
administrative transformations that led to further expansion and centralization of the 
Ottoman legal administration in general and the expansion of the sharia courts in 
particular. This study investigates sharia court records in order to trace both continuities 
and changes regarding women‘s property rights in an era when the economy was 
increasingly privatized and monetized. While the amount and proportion of the properties 
to which women were legally entitled increased over the course of the seventeenth 
 viii 
century, this dissertation demonstrates that Istanbulite women continued to prefer the 
ownership of cash and movable properties to that of real estate. Yet, this preference did 
not mean that they gave away their properties; rather, these women transferred one form 
of property to another in order to meet their immediate needs. Istanbulite women also 
turned their real estate into family trusts, which provided relatively secure 
accommodation for their children and descendants. These women were particularly 
concerned about the devolution of their estates to their female descendants, a 
phenomenon that was especially apparent in the gender-egalitarian approach of female 
founders of family trusts. The sharia court proved to be an important ally for Istanbulite 
women in realizing their strategies for protecting property rights and securing the well-
being of their nuclear families. 
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Introduction 
The Ottoman Empire of the long seventeenth century (1564-1703) has been called 
the ―sultanate of women.‖1 The political role played by imperial women reached its 
zenith under the Queen Mother Hadice Turhan (d. 1683), who acted as the regent of her 
child sultan Mehmed IV. Through her ostentatious processions in the capital and her 
influence on viziers and pashas, she served as both the actual and symbolic ruler of the 
empire. She erected the most significant architectural monument of the Ottoman Empire 
in the second half of the seventeenth century, the Yeni Valide Mosque, which became a 
permanent reminder of a woman‘s sultanate on the skyline of the imperial capital.2 
Historians have discussed the history of imperial women, including that of Hadice 
Turhan, since the late nineteenth century.3 Yet we know less about the women who lived 
outside the royal household. 
This dissertation examines the history of the understudied ―ordinary‖ women of 
the capital who lived during the same period as Hadice Turhan. Did the transformation of 
gender dynamics in the imperial dynasty correlate with an increase in women‘s access to 
                                                 
1 The exact periodization of this ―women‘s sultanate,‖ which traditionally ended in 1656 with Hadice 
Turhan‘s relinquishing of her political prerogatives to the grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed, is now challenged 
by new research. This scholarship demonstrates not only that Hadice Turhan continued to play a significant 
role in shaping Ottoman politics in the post-1656 period, but also the existence of other significant Queen 
Mothers such as Gülnüş Emetullah, the mother of Mehmed IV. See Leslie P. Peirce, The Imperial Harem: 
Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Betül İpşirli 
Argıt, Rabia Gülnüş Emetullah Sultan: 1640-1715 (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2014). 
2 Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, Ottoman Women Builders: The Architectural Patronage of Hadice Turhan 
Sultan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).  
3 In addition to the abovementioned citations, see for example Ahmed Refik (Altınay), Kadınlar Saltanatı, 
four vols. (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1916-23); Ülkü Bates, "Women as Patrons of 
Architecture in Turkey," in Women of the Muslim World, ed. Lois Beck and Nikki R. Keddie (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), 245-60; Pars Tuğlacı, Osmanlı Saray Kadınları (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 
1985); M. Çağatay Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985).  
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property, and therefore power? How did non-royal women act as legal and economic 
agents in order to optimize their options within their marital life? What did marriage and 
the formation of new families mean to women? What were the impacts of women‘s 
socio-economic status on their decisions to litigate in the sharia court about their marital 
rights? How did women‘s status as freeborn or freedwomen influence their roles within 
their families? By examining Istanbulite women‘s property rights, this study analyzes the 
patterns of legal actions taken by ordinary women to secure their rights pertaining to 
marriage, divorce, business transactions, familial ties, and family formation.   
The subject of this study is what I call the ―ordinary women‖ of intramural 
Istanbul in the second half of the seventeenth century. Ordinary women, in this study, 
consist of all Muslim inhabitants of the capital except for two categories: the royal 
women and the very poor. The commonality between these two groups was their absence 
in the sharia court, albeit for different reasons. The royal women benefitted from the 
executive power of the royal household, rendering them exempt from judicial and legal 
supervision by local courts. The very poor were underrepresented in the sharia court 
records because they had fewer assets and contractual relationships that might bring them 
to the court. Furthermore, the court fees might have encouraged the very poor to use 
alternative venues of dispute settlement.4  
And what of those in between? The ordinary women of the capital, those who 
were neither royal nor destitute, were a diverse group. Since women were almost 
                                                 
4 For a list of the court fees in the mid-seventeenth century, see Hezarfen Ahmed Çelebi, Telhisül'beyan fi 
Kavânin-i Âl-i Osman (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998), 264.  
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categorically barred from the employment market, we can trace these women‘s social 
status as family members of their male relatives who were urban artisans and merchants, 
religious functionaries of endowments, college students and professors, and military 
officials and bureaucrats of the empire. Istanbul also had a large population of domestic 
female slaves, many of whom acquired their manumission and managed to integrate 
within society.5 As active members of society with legal and economic agency, 
freedwomen reproduced the dominant social hierarchies of the imperial capital. Some 
were and remained imperial women; others, who did not benefit from the support of their 
patrons, fell to the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy. The majority of them, 
however, added to the pool of the ordinary women as wives and mothers of Muslim men 
in the capital. Like their freeborn counterparts, these freedwomen used the sharia court to 
secure their marital and financial rights and settle disputes. This broad category of 
ordinary women, therefore, was highly stratified and ranged from individuals of 
relatively humble backgrounds to women from aristocratic households with large 
numbers of real and movable properties.   
The power relationship between men and women in Istanbul underwent a tangible 
transformation over the course of the seventeenth century. The increasing visibility of 
women in the seventeenth century was not limited to imperial women. The anxieties of 
seventeenth-century moralists about the increasing intermingling of men and women in 
public spaces reflected actual shifts in gender roles. Ottoman chroniclers in the mid-
                                                 
5 Said Öztürk observes that 26.5 percent of the women registered in the estate inventories of the 
seventeenth century came from slave background. Said Öztürk, Askeri Kassama Ait Onyedinci Asır 
İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995), 106. 
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seventeenth century criticized royal women‘s increasing power over a mad sultan 
(İbrahim, r. 1640-48), who was replaced by a child sultan (Mehmed IV, r. 1648-87). A 
later generation of chroniclers ascribed the military victory over Candia in 1669 to the 
martial characteristics of Mehmed IV, who had successfully reinstated the authority of 
the sultan over the women of the palace.6 Similarly, the fundamentalist Kadızadeli 
movement, that vehemently protested any form of religious heresy, condemned women‘s 
presence in public spaces. Their spiritual leader Birgili Mehmed emphasized that the 
proper place of women was the home and that their appropriate work was cooking and 
cleaning. God‘s angels, he maintained, would curse the women who went outside the 
home with non-relatives (nâmahrem) until they returned.7 In the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries, the anonymous author of the Risale-i Garibe constantly 
complained about the presence of women in public spaces.8    
Despite the existence of a large body of scholarship on both imperial women and 
non-royal women of other Ottoman cities, our knowledge about the roles of ordinary 
Istanbulite women as buyers, sellers, creditors, borrowers, and endowers is still very 
limited. This study focuses on ordinary women‘s property rights in this era of 
transformation and anxieties about gender roles. ―Women‘s Property Rights‖ not only 
explores ordinary women‘s daily interactions within the family and in the market, but 
                                                 
6 Marc David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter seven. 
7 Mehmed Birgivi, Tarikat-i Muhammediyye Tercümesi, trans. Celal Yıldırım (Istanbul: Demir Kitabevi, 
1981), 478. For more on Birgivi and the Kadızadelis see Madeline C. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety : The 
Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800) (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), chapter 
four. 
8 Hayati Develi, XVII. Yüzyıl İstanbul Hayatına dair Risale-i Garibe (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2001). 
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also contributes to two significant debates around women and property in the Ottoman 
Empire: women‘s empowerment and the practice of Islamic law.   
PROPERTY, POWER, AND FAMILY 
In Istanbul in the second half of the seventeenth century, women‘s property rights 
were tightly interwoven with their familial ties. Family was both the source of women‘s 
wealth and the destination of their investments. The notion of family, however––like that 
of gender––was flexible. This dissertation contributes to post-Orientalist scholarship in 
arguing against a uniform or static conception of the Middle Eastern or Muslim family. 
Despite the fact that Middle Eastern family history is still at a nascent stage, contributions 
by urban and gender historians have added much to our understanding of the diverse, 
dynamic, and flexible nature of family in different parts of the Middle East, and have 
effectively challenged the static notion of the ―traditional‖ and extended Muslim/Arab 
family in pre-modern times.9 In this dissertation, I explore both the continuity and 
transformation of family in seventeenth-century Istanbul.  
In some ways, Istanbulite Muslim women were bound to a set of kinship 
definitions inherited from Muslim societies of earlier centuries. However, Istanbulite 
women in the second half of the seventeenth century also developed their own notion of 
kinship. Although the nuclear family was the predominant form of kinship in Istanbul, 
membership did not require ties by blood or marriage. Freed people, step-children, and 
                                                 
9 For a relatively recent contribution on Middle Eastern family history, see Beshara Doumani, ed., Family 
History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003).  
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adopted children all found their way into the families formed by Istanbulite women in 
this period.  
With their critical role in contributing not only to the material well-being of their 
family members but also in defining membership in a family itself, Istanbulite women 
jealously guarded their property rights. Scholars have long debated the correlation 
between women‘s access to property and their empowerment. While an earlier generation 
of scholars has established the fact that Ottoman women independently controlled their 
properties,10 some more recent research has problematized the correlation between 
women‘s access to property and their actual power within their families. Two particular 
studies on sixteenth-century Aintab and modern Palestine have emphasized that women 
gave away their properties to acquire social capital, i.e. support from their male family 
members. In many cases, these studies argue, taking and controlling properties proved to 
be counterproductive for women, who would then lose the love, care, and financial 
support of their male family members. These authors do not see women‘s dispossession 
as a sign of their powerlessness; rather, they view it as a form of women‘s agency that 
                                                 
10 Ronald C. Jennings, "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records––the Sharia Court of 
Anatolian Kayseri," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 18, no. 1 (1975): 53-114; 
Haim Gerber, "Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-1700," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 3 (1980): 231-44; Abraham Marcus, "Men, Women 
and Property: Dealers in Real Estate in 18th Century Aleppo," Journal of the Economic and Social History 
of the Orient 26, no. 2 (1983): 137-63. The pioneer works of these three scholars based on court records 
encouraged another generation of scholars in the 1990s to significantly contribute to the literature on 
Muslim/Middle Eastern women. See for example the three edited volumes: Madeline C. Zilfi, ed., Women 
in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era (Leiden: Brill, 1997); Amira al-
Azhary Sonbol, ed., Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1996); Gavin Hambly, ed., Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, 
and Piety (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 
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prioritized the support of kin over access to property.11 Although these studies have 
represented a significant contribution to our understanding of women‘s active roles, their 
observations reveal much about the structural limitations on women‘s access to property. 
In order to maintain the support of their families, women had to give up their properties 
in Aintab and Palestine. In short, debates about the connection between access to the 
sharia court and women‘s agency are far from settled.12   
My research on Istanbulite women in the second half of the seventeenth century 
differs in important ways from these observations of women of sixteenth-century Aintab 
or modern Palestine. Although Istanbulite women in this period contributed financially to 
their natal and marital families, they were careful to use communal witnesses and/or the 
sharia court to make sure their contributions were noticed and recorded, either on paper 
or in the memory of the community. Exchanging real capital for social capital was a 
luxury only elite aristocratic women were willing to entertain. Women who lacked the 
familial and/or financial resources of their aristocratic counterparts viewed property as a 
means to either meet their immediate needs or to provide for their family members. 
Providing for family members, however, created a power dynamic between giver and 
receiver. Female founders of family trusts, for example, did not leave their properties 
under the management of their male relatives. Instead, they remained in control of their 
family trusts during their lifetimes. They carefully selected their own family members, 
                                                 
11 Leslie P. Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2003), 226-32; Annelies Moors, Women, Property, and Islam: Palestinian Experience, 
1920-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
12 Madeline C. Zilfi, "Muslim Women in the Early Modern Era," in The Cambridge History of Turkey: 
Volume 3. The Latter Ottoman Empire, 1603-1639, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 241-42. 
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including non-kin, who would benefit from the family trusts in generations to come. 
Having done that, they named themselves not only as the benevolent matriarchs of their 
families but also as the founders of new families. Istanbulite women in this period had 
access to property and effectively used their property rights to found new families and 
maintain and support existing ones.    
PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC LAW 
Islamic laws pertaining to marriage and inheritance entitled women to certain 
property rights. One debate in the scholarship on Middle Eastern or Muslim women is 
about whether or not women actually controlled property to which they were legally 
entitled. A great number of studies suggest that many Muslim communities, in both pre-
modern and modern times, actually ignored the laws that gave women certain property 
rights. Societies with strong patrilineal traditions did not tolerate the transfer of property 
to women of their conjugal families.13 Other studies, particularly those of Ottoman urban 
centers, suggest that Muslim judges never tolerated any systematic departure from 
Islamic law that could lead to women‘s dispossession of their properties.14  
                                                 
13 David S. Powers, "Law and Custom in the Maghreb, 1475-1500: On the Disinheritance of Women," in 
Law, Custom, and the Statute in the Muslim World: Studies in Honor of Aharon Layish, ed. Ron Shaham 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 348-67; Emrys Peters, "The Status of Women in Four Middle Eastern Communities," 
in Women in the Muslim World ed. Lois Beck and Nikki R. Keddie (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 
1978), 311-51. 
14 Among this group of scholars, Haim Gerber is the most emphatic supporter of the idea that Islamic law 
was actually practiced almost in all matters including women‘s property rights. See Haim Gerber, State, 
Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994); 
"Anthropology and Family History: The Ottoman and Turkish Families," Journal of Family History 14, no. 
4 (1989): 409-21. Other scholars to varying extent supported the argument. See L. Margaret Meriwether, 
The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840 (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1999); Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "The Role of Women in the Urban Economy of Istanbul, 1700-
1850," International Labor and Working-Class History 60 (2001): 141-52. 
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This study adopts a holistic view of Islamic law. Debates on the legality of 
women‘s possession or dispossession of property often assume a static set of legal norms 
that do not take into account the diverse social practices among Muslim societies across 
time and space. In addition to the feraid rules, which fixed men‘s and women‘s 
inheritance rights, Islamic law also recognized and legalized intra-familial negotiation. 
Although women were entitled to certain shares in inheritance based on the feraid rules, 
mechanisms such as bequests, gifts, and family trusts could substantially modify and 
often increase women‘s shares in inherited properties. Even if a person died without 
making such inheritance arrangements, male and female heirs did not passively follow 
the feraid rules. Islamic law permitted heirs to leave the estate undivided for a 
considerable period of time, and even when heirs wanted to divide the estate, Islamic law 
permitted amicable settlements (sulh) which would divide the estate in ways different 
from what the feraid rules prescribed. 
Women‘s rights to inherited property were neither fixed nor guaranteed. 
Disinheriting women was as legal as the equal distribution of properties between men and 
women. Islamic law was comprehensive not only because it covered almost all aspects of 
human life (including rituals, transactions, and crimes) but also because it integrated 
various rules that might lead to different outcomes for the same legal problem. Within 
this legal system, individuals could choose from among the available legal solutions to 
optimize the result. In the same manner, legal norms did not always prescribe a particular 
method for the redistribution of wealth among family members and left the family 
members largely in charge of settling the division of inherited properties. 
 10 
The law, however, still mattered to women for two reasons. First, it set forth some 
important theoretical rights for women. Intra-familial negotiations or litigation over 
inheritance that followed the death of a family member, for example, used the feraid rules 
as a point of reference. Women might still be dispossessed of their inheritance, but only 
after a process of bargaining. Second, and probably more importantly, Islamic law‘s 
attitude toward the ownership and management of properties was genderless. Once a 
woman‘s rights to certain properties were secured, she could use the sharia court to settle 
disputes. The court applied the same set of evidentiary rules for all of its clients––male 
and female, Muslim and non-Muslim. Although Islamic law did not dictate the method 
for the distribution of familial properties, it did provide security for all men and women 
whose legal property rights had been already set. My study demonstrates that the use of 
the feraid rules to divide inherited property in the second half of the seventeenth century 
was not a preferred method for Istanbulites, yet women‘s access to property was strictly 
within the boundaries of the law and protected by it.  
TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RELATIONS 
Although Istanbulite women in the period under study shared the diverse socio-
economic backgrounds of their sisters in other urban centers of the empire, the fact that 
Istanbul was the seat of the imperial elite had a significant impact on women‘s access to 
property. A significant portion of ordinary Istanbulite women had their wealth and 
income connected, through their male relatives, to the imperial army, bureaucracy, and 
pious foundations. The greater Istanbul area, consisting of the walled city and three 
 11 
surrounding cities, was the home of some 300,000 people, with more than half residing 
within the city walls.15 Although many families in the three surrounding cities were 
involved in different forms of agricultural activity—primarily for the provision of the 
city‘s large population—the majority of the residents of the intramural city were directly 
connected to the state for their livelihood. The walled city was the seat of the imperial 
palace, which had thousands of functionaries. By the seventeenth century, the judiciary 
had become highly centralized in the capital. The central bureaucracy expanded in the 
seventeenth century in order to have more effective control over taxation. This led to the 
creation of a number of new specialized offices in the capital and a sharp increase in the 
number of their employees.16 The most prestigious positions within the judiciary were 
assigned only to the graduates of colleges in the capital. The number of medreses in the 
walled city doubled over the course of the seventeenth century, accommodating more 
professors and students on the payrolls of the imperial foundations.17 Tens of thousands 
of Janissaries (members of the central army) resided within the capital; together with 
their families they formed about a third of the city‘s population.18 The walled city, 
therefore, accommodated the largest concentration of those who were on the payroll of 
                                                 
15 Halil İnalcık, "Istanbul," in EI2, 4: 230-39. 
16 Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 (New York: Brill, 1996), 45-46; 71-79. 
17 Zilfi, The Politics of Piety : The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800), 195-212. 
18  mer Lutfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Bütçelerine Dair Notlar," İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 17, 
no. 1-4 (1955-56): 214. To this number should be added thousands of other members of the army, including 
cart carriers and armorers (cebecis), who helped the Janissaries in siege warfare, the halberdiers (baltacıs) 
employed in the imperial gardens in Istanbul, the novices (acemi oğlanları), and others (ibid., 215). Gülay 
Yılmaz, in her detailed study on the archival documents on the Janissaries of Istanbul, estimates the 
population of the Janissaries in the capital to be 35,000 in early seventeenth century. She estimates that 
there were around 18,000 Janissaries in the capital who had married and resided in different neighborhoods 
of Istanbul. See her "The Economic and Social Roles of Janissaries in a 17th Century Ottoman City: The 
Case of Istanbul" (Doctoral dissertation, McGill University, 2011), 84, 110-34.   
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either the central treasury or the imperial endowments. The Ottoman policy of 
periodically rotating executive and judicial officials meant that at any given time, a large 
army of temporarily unemployed high officials were involved in a web of political 
networking in the capital to secure their next appointments. The wealth that the central 
state‘s treasury and endowments distributed among these bureaucrats and officials was 
then redistributed among male and female members of their families through marriage 
and inheritance.  
Women‘s shares in the wealth amassed in the capital increased over the course of 
the seventeenth century due to another set of transformations associated with the rise of a 
market economy. On the one hand, an increasing number of imperial (miri) lands were 
distributed as private property to Ottoman officials.19 On other hand, many sources of 
revenue previously in the hands of the Ottoman cavalry in the form of fiefs (timar) were 
farmed out to private entrepreneurs. Although the iltizam (tax-farm) was introduced in 
the late sixteenth century, it was not until the second half of the seventeenth century that 
budget deficits, brought about by prolonged wars, accelerated the transformation from 
tımar to iltizam. The process reached its zenith in 1695, when the Ottomans introduced 
the malikane system, which permitted the investors to hold their tax-farms for life.20 The 
                                                 
19 The seventeenth-century Ottoman scholar Koçi Bey (d. 1650) viewed the privatization of miri lands, 
inter alia, as a source of the corruption of the Ottoman land-tenure system leading to its decline. Ali 
Kemali Aksüt, Koçi Bey Risalesi (Istanbul: Vakit, 1939), 7. Faroqhi observes that during the course of the 
seventeenth century in Kayseri, the majority of miri land was transformed into privately owned agricultural 
properties. Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen in Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food 
Production in an Urban Setting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 264. For the rise of the 
privatization of miri properties in the seventeenth century, see also Mehmet İpşirli, "Temlikname," in 
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, 40: 353-55. 
20 Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," Archivum 
Ottomanicum, no. 6 (1980): 328-33; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," in An Economic 
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transformation from tımar to iltizam, and later to malikane, resulted in the privatization of 
economic resources. Women, who could not inherit imperial lands in the form of tımar, 
were now legal heirs to the wealth amassed through privatized economic resources.  
Although owners of privatized lands as well as tax-farmers lived in almost every 
city of the empire, Istanbul was particularly attractive to this new class of moneyed 
people. After all, being close to the political networks of the capital would increase one‘s 
chances of winning the competition over the limited sources of revenue in the empire. 
The court records of 1659–1661 demonstrate that many entrepreneurs who had tax-farms 
in different locations of the empire, such as Anatolia and Rumelia, resided in the capital 
and subcontracted their farms to local businessmen. Wealth accumulated in the capital 
was often reinvested either in privately owned urban residential properties or in pious 
endowments which supported philanthropic causes as well as the family members of the 
endowers. While women were traditionally barred from participation in investments as 
tax-farmers, they largely benefitted from the concentration of wealth in the capital when 
wealth and profits from such investments were redistributed through women‘s natal and 
conjugal family ties.  
The economic transformations in the empire brought about an expansion in the 
legal system. The judicial system had already been institutionalized in the sixteenth 
century under the supervision of the imperial chief mufti Ebussuud. The privatization and 
marketization of the economy, however, needed the expansion of the sharia courts to 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, ed. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 567; Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi," in 
Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, Metinler-Tartışmalar, 8-10 Haziran 1973, ed. Osman Okyar and Ünal 
Nalbantoğlu (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 1975), 244-45. 
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record business transactions and settle disputes. After all, the sharia court was, in 
Doumani‘s words, ―above all else, the guardian of (mostly urban) property.‖21 Intramural 
Istanbul had its own share of the growth of the judicial system. Two new deputy 
judgeships (Ahi Çelebi and Bab) were created towards the middle of the seventeenth 
century.22 Around the same time a specialized form of court records (sicil) developed—
the Evkaf Muhasebeciliği—which helped record the incomes and expenditures of, and 
settle disputes over, the numerous pious endowments in the city. Furthermore, the 
number of the records each court kept gradually increased since the mid-century. For 
example, Evkaf-ı Hümayun Müfettişliği (inspection of imperial endowments) and Kısmet-
i Askeriye (the division of the estates of the members of the askeri) as well as the Istanbul 
sharia court witnessed a sharp rise in the volume of their records by the mid-century. It 
seems that deeds of and disputes over various financial transactions were increasingly 
recorded and supervised by the sharia courts around the mid-seventeenth century. After 
all, the regulation of the increasing amount of private property and endowments in the 
capital was exclusively under the jurisdiction of Islamic law as practiced by sharia courts.  
The role of sharia courts vis-à-vis women‘s property rights, however, was 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the sharia court applied the basic principles of Islamic law 
to disputes over property ownership regardless of the gender of the owner. On the other 
hand, it did not intervene in intra-family arrangements and settlements, which might 
                                                 
21 Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 10-11. 
22 The exact dates of the establishment of these two deputy judgeships are not known. The first surviving 
registers from Bab and Ahi Çelebi courts correspond to the years 1652 and 1665, respectively. Mehmet 
İpşirli suggests that the Bab court was founded sometime in the seventeenth century. Mehmet İpşirli, "Bab 
Mahkemesi," in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, 4: 362. 
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bring about a wide variety of outcomes including the dispossession of women. In this 
regard, by studying the sharia court records, historians can connect the legal and social 
worlds.  
A seemingly unique aspect of the connection between legal practice and social 
norms was the widespread use of perpetual leases of endowed properties in this period. 
Istanbulites invested large amount of their properties in the form of large and small 
endowments. One problem with endowing properties was their exclusion from the 
market. Once endowed, a property could not be sold or even modified without the 
permission of either the endower or the sultan. Endowed properties could generate 
income by renting them out. Hanafi law, however, prohibited leases longer than one year 
for endowed urban properties and three years for agricultural ones. The law was 
impractical. People with already limited options for investment in private properties (due 
to the high number of endowed properties and therefore lower number of properties for 
sale) were interested in reliable investments in the long run. That is why perpetual leases 
became widespread, at least as early as the second half of the seventeenth century in 
Istanbul, despite the controversial aspects of their legal validity.  
The introduction of perpetual leases had a significant impact on women‘s 
property rights in the second half of the seventeenth century. The few studies on 
perpetual leases indicate that they were not commonplace in other urban centers of the 
empire until the nineteenth century.23 Works on perpetual leases in the nineteenth 
                                                 
23 Abul-Karim Rafeq, "The Application of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Courts in Damascus: The Case of 
the Rental of Waqf Land," in Dispensig Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgments, ed. Muhammad 
Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David Powers (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 411-25. In her study of 
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century, however, focus on the detrimental impacts these leases had on endowments.24 
One neglected aspect of perpetual leases is the radical innovation they brought to the 
inheritance system. The possession of perpetually leased properties would pass 
exclusively and, more importantly, equally to the sons and daughters of a deceased 
tenant. In this regard, the legal recognition of nuclear families and the gender equality in 
their inheritance rights could be dated back to about two centuries before more modern 
nineteenth-century legislation.25   
The trend in the inheritance of perpetually leased properties can also be traced in 
the egalitarian approach of Istanbulites (particularly women) to designating beneficiaries 
of their family trusts. Although the laws of perpetual lease left little ambiguity about 
women‘s equal entitlement to their parents‘ leased properties, the Hanafi laws of family 
trusts granted the founders an absolute freedom in choosing the beneficiaries and their 
shares of endowed properties. The fact that Istanbulites predominantly chose to leave 
their properties to their biological children––and, in their absence, their adopted or step-
children––demonstrates a particular notion of nuclear family during this period. 
Furthermore, female founders always designated equal shares to male and female 
beneficiaries for following generations. This choice demonstrates that the egalitarian 
                                                                                                                                                 
seventeenth-century Kayseri and Ankara, Faroqhi observes that endowed properties were leased for short 
terms. Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen in Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an 
Urban Setting, 246. 
24 Gabriel Baer, "The Dismemberment of Awqâf in Early 19th-Century Jerusalem," Asian and African 
Studies 13, no. 3 (1979): 220-41; Miriam Hoexter, "Adaptation to Changing Circumstances: Perpetual 
Leases and Exchange Transactions in Waqf Property in Ottoman Algiers," Islamic Law and Society 4, no. 3 
(1997): 319-33. 
25 The 1858 Ottoman Land Law reformed the inheritance of miri lands. According to its provisions, both 
sons and daughters would have equal rights to the lands of their parents.   mer Lutfi Barkan, Türk Toprak 
Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 
360. 
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inheritance laws of perpetual leases did not necessarily come as a top-down state project. 
The ordinary women of the capital who came to the sharia court to register their family 
trusts chose such a gender-egalitarian approach themselves.  
SOURCES AND METHODS  
This study is based on the examination of three volumes of court records covering 
a period of 28 months from September 1659 to December 1661 as well as deeds of 
endowments founded in the second half of the seventeenth century (1650-1700). To 
examine the relationship between legal practice in the sharia court and legal norms, I 
consulted the fetva compilations of a seventeenth-century chief jurist, Çatalcalı Ali 
Efendi (d. 1693).  
Court records, the most significant source for early modern social historians, 
prove particularly fruitful in studying women and their property rights. First, women 
were omnipresent in the sharia court records. Although cultural and moral norms limited, 
or at least tried to limit, women‘s access to many areas of public space, their unlimited 
access to the sharia court was one of the exceptions that Ottoman officials honored and 
that Ottoman urban women took full advantage of. Similar to their male counterparts, 
women appeared in the court on a daily basis as plaintiffs, defendants, legal 
representatives, and sometimes witnesses. They also used the sharia court to register their 
transactions, contracts, and settlements of disputes. After all, sharia court was ―above all 
else, the guardian of (mostly urban) property,‖ which renders the study of its records both 
compelling and rewarding for a project on property relations. 
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Second, Islamic law and particularly Hanafi law viewed property ownership as 
the primary requirement for legal agency.26 Rights and responsibilities were almost 
exclusively defined in terms of material and financial exchange between individuals. 
Even crimes against sexual and bodily integrity were formulated in terms of the financial 
value of each body part.27 Civil law was almost exclusively financial. The marriage 
contract, for example, was based on the sale contract: the husband pays dower (mihir) 
and maintenance (nafaka) to purchase the right to his wife‘s vulva. Legal justification for 
limiting married women‘s movements outside of the home was predicated on the fact that 
such movements were considered an infringement on the rights of the husband who had 
already paid to have unlimited access to his wife‘s body. A disobedient wife (nâshize), 
who left home without her husband‘s permission, therefore, was not entitled to be 
provided for.28 This strict financial definition of marriage, however, left married women 
in control of their property. Although marriage was a financial contract, it was not a 
financial union. Women remained the owners and managers of their property regardless 
of their marital status. As such, time and again, the women of Istanbul used the sharia 
court to register the money they lent to their husbands in the period under study. 
Using court records, however, has its own limitations. One significant limitation 
of the sharia court records is the underrepresentation of certain groups of women such as 
                                                 
26 In Baber Johansen‘s words, ―proprietor became the prototype of the legal person in Hanafite law.‖ See 
his Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 191.  
27 Elyse Semerdjian, Off the Straight Path: Illicit Sex, Law, and Community in Ottoman Aleppo (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2008), 19; Colin Imber, "Women, Marriage, and Property: Behcet'ül-Fetâvâ of 
Yenişerhirli Abdullah," in Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern 
Era, ed. Madeline C. Zilfi (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 81-104. 
28 Judith E. Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 63-64. 
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non-Muslims and extremely poor women. Non-Muslims, for example, who constituted 
about half of the greater Istanbul area‘s population, appeared in the sharia court records 
less frequently than their Muslim counterparts. Non-Muslim women in particular were 
almost absent. Similar to their Muslim counterparts, non-Muslim women‘s property 
relations were primarily with their family members or outsiders from their own 
confessional communities. Non-Muslims, particularly in matters of familial relations, 
preferred their own communal tribunals. This led to an almost total absence of non-
Muslim women in the sharia court records. This study therefore examines only Muslim 
women‘s property rights in the capital.  
Another limitation of the sharia court records is the fact they do not contain the 
detailed minutiae of court proceedings; rather, they are summaries drafted after the judge 
had heard the parties and issued his decision. The records contain nothing of the anger, 
excitement, disappointment, or satisfaction of, for example, married couples and their 
lives together. Each court case was recorded in strict legal terminology and each party 
made particular legal arguments to promote their cause. We don‘t know, however, if each 
of the involved parties had sophisticated knowledge of their legal rights or if the scribe 
formulated their shouting and whining into the calm language of the law.29 Using court 
records in order to deconstruct women‘s relationship with other men and women, both 
within the family as well as with outsiders, can prove a difficult task that requires a 
                                                 
29 For methodological questions and issues pertaining to the study of sicils see Dror Ze'evi, "The Use of 
Ottoman Sharīʿa Court Records as a Source for Middle Eastern Social History: A Reappraisal," Islamic 
Law and Society 5, no. 1 (1998): 35-56. 
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patience comparable, in Boğaç Ergene‘s words, to the suffering (çile) of a Sufi dervish 
before achieving enlightenment.30  
For this study, I examined court cases both to extract hard evidence for exploring 
certain social and legal trends as well as to read between the lines to analyze the 
relationships between different actors, institutions, and social and legal norms. I used 
court records because of their detailed information regarding different types of properties 
owned by women, their business transactions, their pious endowments, and their marital 
property rights. Finding answers to some other questions, however, proved more difficult 
given the summarized and formulaic nature of the court records. The records do not 
provide direct answers to the questions about some aspects of legal practice including 
those about the extent of women‘s actual acquirement of their feraid shares of 
inheritance, the existence of a systematic judicial bias against women, and the extent of 
women‘s knowledge about legal niceties. In my attempt to answer similar questions, I 
situated relevant entries within their contemporary social and legal context by conducting 
a detailed case-by-case examination and by consulting a contemporary mufti‘s 
jurisprudential opinions. For example, in order to answer the question of women‘s 
awareness about their legal rights and responsibilities, I examined their pre-trial activities 
of procuring male witnesses, which proved vital to winning a case within the oral 
tradition of seventeenth-century Istanbul. I also consulted a fetva about the necessity of a 
judicial decision before a wife could hold her absentee husband liable for his marital 
                                                 
30 Boğaç A. Ergene, "Legal History ‗From the Bottom Up': Empirical and Methodological Challenges for 
Ottomanists," in Political Initiatives ‘From the Bottom Up’ in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Antonis 
Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2012), 389. 
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responsibilities. The examination of the time-gap between a husband‘s desertion and his 
wife‘s application to the sharia court helped me answer questions about women‘s 
awareness of their rights and responsibilities. 
I consulted the first three volumes of the Istanbul sharia court records that cover 
an uninterrupted period of 28 months. The earlier six volumes that have survived cover 
roughly the decade of the 1610s. After a hiatus of four decades, the next volumes cover 
the second half of the seventeenth century starting from 1659. The period covered in 
these three volumes were marked by political and military stability under the Grand 
Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. The relative political stability of this period proved 
conducive for the purposes of this research, as ordinary men and women of the capital 
increasingly used the sharia court to settle disputes over mundane and routine property-
related affairs. This stability was counterbalanced by a disaster in 1660 that was dubbed 
the ―Great Fire‖ by contemporaries. The fire devoured a great portion of the capital‘s 
properties, followed by a period of repairing, buying, and selling urban properties. I used 
the court records of the periods immediately before and after the fire to examine women‘s 
preference in maintaining and/or relinquishing certain types of properties at the time of 
the fire. These records show, more generally, that periods of disaster accelerated the 
process of women converting real property into cash.   
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
Chapter one, ―Litigation and Property,‖ examines the most confrontational legal 
mechanism women used in the sharia court to protect their property rights: litigation. 
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Through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Istanbul sharia court from 1659 to 
1661, this chapter explores trends in women‘s litigation. Studies on Ottoman women‘s 
litigation have consistently observed that women were active litigants in the sharia court. 
In that regard, this chapter is a contribution to the existing literature.31 New lines of 
inquiry, however, have asked questions about the existence of certain types of judicial 
bias, most prominently the work of Kuran and Lustig who found the sharia court to be 
biased towards Muslims and against non-Muslim litigants.32 Since their starting point is 
the discriminatory rules of evidence against non-Muslims, in this chapter I pose the 
question of whether the sharia court was biased against women as well. Answering this 
question requires the examination of rules of evidence as practiced in the sharia court. 
The Istanbulite men and women procured oral testimony and rarely wrote documents to 
substantiate their legal claims and arguments. A significant number of litigations were 
finalized in a party‘s favor, however, with no evidence and simply through either the 
confession of the other party or the oath of the winning party.  
                                                 
31 Jennings, "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records––the Sharia Court of Anatolian 
Kayseri," 53-114; Gerber, "Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-
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Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine; Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman 
Court of Aintab; Suraiya Faroqhi, Men of Modest Substance: House Owners and House Property in 
Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Boğaç A. 
Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society, and Justice in the Ottoman Empire : Legal Practice and Dispute 
Resolution in Çankiri and Kastamonu (1652-1744) (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Beshara Doumani, "Adjudicating 
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the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender, ed. Beshara Doumani (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 
173-200. 
32 Their argument, however, is about non-Muslims, whose testimony, similar to that of women, did not 
have the same value as Muslim men. Timur Kuran and Scott Lustig, "Judicial Biases in Ottoman Istanbul: 
Islamic Justice and Its Compatibility with Modern Economic Life," The Journal of Law & Economics 55, 
no. 3 (2012): 631-66. 
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In addition to the question of bias, this chapter examines the impact of legal 
norms on women‘s integration within the larger society. This chapter argues that 
Istanbulite women took preemptive measures such as procuring witnesses to their 
economic transactions in order to prevent future violations of their property rights. In this 
regard, two aspects of Islamic legal procedure resulted in women‘s further integration 
into a wider public sphere. Oral testimony was the most authoritative form of evidence, 
and men‘s testimony was worth much more than that of women. This fact meant that 
women testified only in exceptional cases. Although in theory, such procedural laws 
might deter women from bringing cases to court, this chapter argues that it had an 
opposite effect in Istanbul in this period. Muslim women in Istanbul, similar to their male 
counterparts, procured respected and impartial men to witness and testify to their 
economic transactions with both relatives and outsiders. This law, in fact, encouraged 
women to go beyond the comfort zone of their family members to engage with a wider 
society.  
The sharia court‘s empowerment of women, however, had its limitations. 
Istanbulite women, like their counterparts in other cities of the empire, were more 
frequently sellers than buyers of real property. Unlike Faroqhi‘s observation in 
seventeenth-century Ankara and Kayseri, my findings do not suggest that women‘s 
properties were ―bought out‖ by their male relatives; I do observe that managing and 
maintaining real estate proved more difficult for contemporary Istanbulite women. 
Furthermore, within a legal system in which providing accommodation was primarily the 
responsibility of men, women who enjoyed natal and conjugal family support did not 
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have much incentive to keep their own real estate. Instead, they amassed their wealth in 
the form of cash, jewelries, and other movable property, which could be used to meet the 
immediate needs of themselves and their family members.   
The following chapters focus on particular aspects of women‘s control and 
management of their property. Chapter two, ―Matrimony and Property,‖ examines the 
conjugal family as a social unit which had a significant impact on the redistribution of 
accumulated wealth in the capital. Islamic marital laws rendered husbands responsible to 
pay a dower (mihir), maintenance (nafaka), and child support. My examination of 
Istanbulite women‘s marital rights corroborates the observations of other scholars for 
other Islamic societies.33 Not all women, however, benefitted from the sharia court 
equally in securing their marital rights. The same set of legal norms and procedures, 
which were universally applied to all married couples, did not mean that all married 
women had equal access to the available legal measures. In this regard, this chapter 
problematizes ―women‖ as a static unit of analysis. Women‘s decisions in resorting to 
particular legal actions were informed by a combination of factors including their socio-
economic status, their marital status, and whether or not they benefitted from the support 
of kin. Elite women coming from prosperous and well-established households mobilized 
their resources to make their husbands meet their marital responsibilities. They used the 
sharia court to appoint proxies to go after absent husbands. When their husbands were in 
the capital, they counted on their natal familial ties to settle their marital disputes and 
                                                 
33 Yossef Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
 25 
used the sharia court in order to record the final outcome. Women at the bottom of the 
social ladder, who lacked the familial and/or financial resources of elite women, had 
fewer options. Their primary way to settle marital disputes was to initiate lawsuits. The 
legal norms that rendered husbands responsible to provide for their conjugal families and 
permitted their wives to borrow on their behalf if they failed to provide, however, did not 
have much weight when the husbands of poor women deserted to other cities. Some 
women at this category had to face the hard decision of seeking either the support of 
other men through marrying while still married to absent husbands or fall to absolute 
destitution.     
Chapter three examines yet another significant source of women‘s access to 
properties: inheritance. Through a case-by-case examination of inheritance cases in the 
Istanbul sharia court in 1659-1661, this chapter provides an analysis of the trends in the 
transfer of property to next generation and their impact on women‘s property rights. The 
scholarship on Muslim women‘s inheritance rightfully asks the question of whether or 
not women received their inherited properties as prescribed by Islamic law. While sicil 
studies of different urban centers of the Ottoman Empire demonstrate that women indeed 
received their prescribed shares, ethnographic studies of rural and nomadic societies find 
women‘s disinheritance a common method. Amelie Moors, who benefitted from both 
Ottoman sicils and ethnographic observations, argues that the urban-rural dichotomy was 
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not necessarily the case for the modern Palestinian women. She argues that women‘s 
disinheritance was commonplace both in rural and urban areas.34 
In this chapter, I argue that despite the centrality of the feraid rules in the legal 
discourse on women‘s inheritance, Istanbulites in this period rarely divided their 
properties according to the feraid prescriptions. Properties often remained undivided 
between close family members. This was, however, not a method to dispossess women 
from their property rights. Instead, women reserved their legal rights for the moments 
when familial ties were strained. In those times, women used the sharia court to 
effectively secure what they were legally entitled to. Judges in Istanbul during this period 
used their discretion in favor of widows who had children, by granting them 
guardianship. As legal guardians, widows controlled almost the entire inherited property 
of their late husbands‘ estates. When male extended family members were entitled to the 
property of the deceased, the parties usually settled their dispute through amicable 
settlements, which generally preserved the greatest portion of the property within the 
nuclear family. Istanbulites in this period were already accustomed to some legal, non-
feraid norms, such as perpetually leased properties, which kept properties exclusively 
within small nuclear families.   
While chapters two and three focus on the methods by which women acquired 
legal and actual entitlement to property, the final chapter, ―Pious Endowments,‖ 
examines one common method through which women managed their property. Due to the 
flexibility of the Hanafi laws of endowment, the reasons for founding endowments 
                                                 
34 Moors, Women, Property, and Islam: Palestinian Experience, 1920-1990, 48-76. 
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demonstrated a remarkable variety across time and space. Some studies on endowments 
have demonstrated that endowments were used to disinherit women from their 
inheritance rights while others found that endowments had a positive impact on women‘s 
access to inherited properties.35 Endowments were also used to either cement household 
relations or break from an existing household in order to form independent new 
households.36  
This chapter demonstrates that women‘s kin support as well as social status 
played a role in their decisions to build different types of endowments and for different 
purposes. Although many women sold their real estate in order to have access to cash and 
movable properties, others kept control over their real estate not only during their 
lifetime, but also for their family members in next generations. Many women who chose 
to keep their houses in the form of family endowments, or family trusts, rather than 
selling them for cash and movable properties came from a particular background. They 
were relatively rich, but not from aristocratic families. About half of the female founders 
of family trusts studied here for the period between 1650 and 1700 were female ex-
slaves, who were detached altogether from familial ties. Their integration within the 
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imperial palace, their successful marriages with Ottoman officials, and their subsequent 
integration into the households of their masters often resulted in material prosperity. 
Whether freedwomen or freeborn, women who lacked strong ties with their own natal kin 
often chose to establish their own families. The absolute freedom that Hanafi law granted 
to the founders in both designating and prioritizing the beneficiaries of their family trusts 
provided a dynamic legal framework for defining and redefining kinship. While 
aristocratic women invested their properties to aggrandize the reputation of their existing 
families, women of weaker natal familial ties established family trusts to bring new 
families into existence. Another trend in women‘s family trusts in Istanbul in the second 
half of the seventeenth century was the egalitarian division of the right to use the 
endowed properties for male and female beneficiaries. 
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Chapter 1: Litigation and Property 
On November 10, 1660, the woman Ayşe bint Abdullah brought a debt lawsuit 
against a man named Abdi. He admitted that he had taken money from her, but argued 
that the money was payment for a job he had done for her husband. Ayşe‘s husband 
Mehmed had left Istanbul to reside in Edremid, a city located in Western Anatolia on the 
Aegean coast. Abdi had done some work for Mehmed with a labor cost of 2,240 aspers. 
Mehmed had told him to go to Istanbul and ask his wife Ayşe to pay the amount. Based 
on Abdi‘s statement, he had subsequently come to Istanbul to ask Ayşe to pay his labor 
cost, which she did. Now, in court, Ayşe argued that the money was debt and not the 
labor cost of Abdi. The judge (kadı) asked Abdi to provide evidence for his claim, which 
he could not. Abdi, in return asked Ayşe to take an oath, swearing on God that she did 
not make the payment for the labor cost. Ayşe took the oath and won the case. A judicial 
order was issued, asking Abdi to redeem his debt to Ayşe.37  
Ayşe‘s lawsuit was a typical example of Muslim women‘s litigation in Istanbul 
sharia court in 1659-1661. A significant proportion of women‘s litigations for their 
property rights involved male family members in various capacities. Most economic 
activities by women, particularly those about debts and the purchase or sale of movable 
property and real estate, took place within the family. In Ayşe‘s lawsuit, her husband had 
transferred a debt to her without her consent. Regardless of male family members‘ 
involvement in women‘s economic activities, women did not merge their finances to that 
of their male relatives, including their husbands. Ayşe, as the wife of Mehmed, acted 
                                                 
37 İŞS8: 38b, 7 Ra 1071.   
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independently as lender of money to a third person and refused to pay off her husband‘s 
debt.  
In this chapter, I examine women‘s litigation in the sharia court in order to 
analyze the legal methods they used to protect their property rights. In the past three 
decades, an increasing number of studies have shed light on women‘s use of the early 
modern sharia courts.38 This chapter aims to contribute to the existing literature through a 
quantitative analysis of Istanbulite Muslim women‘s litigations in the sharia court in 
comparison with those of men. Through comparing and contrasting Muslim men and 
women‘s litigations particularly for their property rights, this chapter seeks answer to the 
following questions: What legal methods did women use to win their cases in the sharia 
court? Did the sharia court act in a biased way against women? And what were the 
primary subjects of property-related litigations by women? 
PROPERTIED WOMEN OF THE CAPITAL 
The Istanbulite Muslim women studied in this chapter consisted of those who 
owned certain amounts of properties and could afford to come to the sharia court in order 
to register their deeds of sales and loans or settle their disputes. Therefore, women of 
lower social status were underrepresented in the sharia court records, which form one 
limitation of this research. There are some pieces of evidence to illuminate the economic 
                                                 
38Jennings, "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records––the Sharia Court of Anatolian 
Kayseri," 53-114; Gerber, "Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-
1700," 231-44; Marcus, "Men, Women and Property: Dealers in Real Estate in 18th Century Aleppo," 137-
63; Sonbol, Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History; Zilfi, Women in the Ottoman 
Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era; Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and 
Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine; Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman 
Court of Aintab.  
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activities of those who were at the bottom of socio-economic status. Those who were not 
entirely dependent on charitable support chose to work in fields which were particular to 
women such as keeper of women‘s public baths.39 The avret pazarı (women‘s bazaar) 
located close the complex founded by the sixteenth century queen Hürrem, held weekly 
gatherings where women sold and purchased many household materials including home-
made embroideries.40 Other impoverished women worked as prostitutes or other forms of 
entertainers in the capital.41 In this chapter in particular, I concentrate on propertied 
women who, unlike poor women, were fairly represented in the court records. 
Another category of women who are excluded from this chapter are female 
slaves, who did not have the legal right to own property and therefore did not use the 
sharia courts for related deeds and litigations. Ex-slaves, however, constituted a 
significant number of the Muslim women who came to the sharia court for their property 
related disputes. Their masters either married them or married them off to men of similar 
social status. Besides their names and some inheritance practices particular to freed 
people, these married and propertied female ex-slaves did not form any distinct group as 
far as the legal ownership or management of their properties was concerned. In this 
chapter, therefore, they are not singled out for their slave background. 
The fact that women of higher socio-economic status actually used the sharia 
court, sometimes by a representative and sometimes on their own, conflicts with the 
                                                 
39 Indeed in the entire twenty eight months of records studied here, only one woman was explicitly 
mentioned to have earned money through work, and she was keeper of a public bath. 
40 Ertuğrul  zkan, "Avrat Pazarı," in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, 4: 124. 
41 Marinos Sariyannis, "Prostitution in Ottoman Istanbul, Late Sixteenth-Early Eighteenth Century," 
Turcica 40 (2008): 37-65. 
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general understanding that gender norms of seclusion were strong among women of 
higher socio-economic status due to the fact that they could afford sending servants and 
slaves to run errands outside the home. Dina Rizk Khouri draws attention to domestic 
architecture in eighteenth-century Mosul, where the middle-class had inner and outer 
courts to segregate men and women while the elite could have a third court (haram). 
Haram, having a male guard at the entrance, was the domain of female members of the 
family.42 In her study of sixteenth century Aintab, Leslie Peirce observes that moral 
norms prevented the women of the old ―aristocratic‖ elite from appearing in the sharia 
court.43 
A detailed analysis of their economic activities as registered in the court records 
demonstrates that the prosperous propertied women of the capital did not shy away from 
coming to the sharia court to protect their property rights. Similar to fifteenth-century 
Aitanb, the elite women of Istanbul in the period under study usually sent their male 
proxies to the sharia court; unlike Aintabans, however, many elite Istanbulite women 
came to the sharia court in person. One example is that of Emetullah bint Mehmed 
Efendi, who appeared in the sharia court to manage her financial affairs with three non-
relative men, two of whom were administrators of endowments. Emetullah was registered 
as muhaddere, which was the highest title an elite woman could acquire in seventeenth- 
century Istanbul. She had acquired her status through her natal and marital ties. Her father 
was a member of the elite learned hierarchy and her deceased husband had served as the 
                                                 
42 Dina Rizk Khouri, "Drawing Boundaries and Defining Spaces: Women and Space in Ottoman Iraq," in 
Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, ed. Amira al-Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1996), 185. 
43 Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab, 155-56. 
 33 
governor-general of Anatolia. Despite that, Emetullah neither sent proxies nor asked the 
court to hold the meeting at her house.44 
Peirce correctly points out to the fact that elite women‘s legal representatives 
required their physical appearance in front of other men. The authenticity of any legal 
representation required the testimony of male witnesses who knew both the represented 
person and the appointed proxy. This chapter contributes to her findings through the 
examination of the wider socio-legal culture, one that prioritized oral testimony over any 
other forms of evidence in the sharia court. Similar to their male counterparts, Istanbulite 
propertied women in the period under study had their contracts and transactions observed 
by ―trustworthy‖ (‘udûl) men in a preemptive measure to use them for prospective 
lawsuits. This is a point that I will examine in more detail below.  
WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Islamic law, and particularly the Hanafi school, which was the official Ottoman 
legal school, treated men and women equally in terms of their agency in acquiring and 
managing their properties. Yet, the methods by which men and women gained access to 
property were different. Women were categorically prohibited from entering into the 
ranks of the military, political, and legal hierarchies. Women were also prohibited from 
entering into the organized artisanal guilds, which had a monopoly on the many 
economic activities of production and distribution. Women‘s limited access to the city‘s 
economic activities is visible in the relatively smaller sums of money they disputed in 
                                                 
44 İŞS9: 74b, 6 Z 1071; İŞS9: 81b, 6 Z 1071; İŞS9: 87a, 6 Z 1071. For another muhaddere who came to the 
sharia court in order to settle the financial issues of her deceased son, see İŞS9: 17a, 22 N 1071.  
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court as well as in their endowments, which were predominantly small family trusts 
consisting of one residential property (see chapter four).  
Women‘s access to property came primarily through their association with their 
natal and matrimonial families. It was family law pertaining to inheritance, maintenance 
(nafaka), custody, and child support that enabled women to share the accumulated 
property of their families. Yet, Istanbulite women in the period under study were not 
passive recipients of properties. They were active litigants in the court in order to protect 
their rights against transgressions by family members and outsiders. Despite their limited 
access to the methods of acquiring property when compared to men, Muslim women of 
the capital in the period under study were buyers and sellers in real property, lenders and 
borrowers in the finance market, founders and managers of endowments, and partners in 
business with men. This chapter consists of two sections. In the first section, I analyze 
Istanbulite Muslim women‘s litigation and methods they used in order to win their cases. 
In section two, I provide a thematic breakdown of women‘s litigations in comparison 
with that of men.   
Women and the Sharia Court 
Muslim women of the capital in the period under study were active litigants and 
knowledgeable about legal niceties, which enabled them to have a high rate of victory in 
their lawsuits. They could sue almost any resident of the capital, including men and 
women, relatives and outsiders, Muslims and non-Muslims, their (ex-)slaves, and their 
(ex-)masters. Through providing a snapshot of Muslim women‘s litigation in 1659-1661, 
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this section argues that the biases in legal procedure did not deter women from acting as 
independent legal agents. Indeed, the fact that men‘s oral testimony had a higher value to 
that of women created some incentives for women to engage the respectable men in their 
businesses and transactions as witnesses. Within a legal culture in which oral testimony 
provided the strongest form of evidence in court, women acted very similar to their male 
counterparts in their preparation for lawsuits which required the involvement of male 
witnesses.      
The Istanbul sharia court provided an accessible though uneven venue of 
litigation for male and female residents of Istanbul. Over the course of 28 months 
(September 1659-December 1661), the Istanbul sharia court registered some 475 cases of 
litigation out of a total of 2,174 entries (21.8 percent). In 7 cases, men and women acted 
as plaintiffs together. In the remaining 468 cases of lawsuits in which either men or 
women acted as plaintiffs, women appeared as plaintiffs in 106 cases (22.6 percent). 
Muslims appeared as plaintiffs in 360 cases, from which 98 cases were initiated by 



















Muslim Men 162 37 51 5 7 262 
Muslim Women 67 22 4 1 4 98 
Non-Muslim Men 21 1 70 5 0 97 
Non-Muslim Women 1 0 7 0 0 8 
Mixed-Muslim & Non-
Muslim 
0 0 3 0 0 3 
Mixed- 
Men & Women 
4 1 1 0 1 7 
Total 255 61 136 11 12 475 
 
Women appeared as defendants less frequently than they did as plaintiffs. From 
468 cases in which either men or women acted as defendants, women were defendants in 
72 cases (15.4 percent). Out of 316 cases in which either Muslim men or women 
appeared as defendants, Muslim women were defendants in 61 cases (19.3 percent). 
Female litigants in Istanbul in the period under study appeared in the court much more 
frequently than their counterparts in the nearby city of Üsküdar more than a century 
earlier. The relatively high rate of women‘s litigation in the seventeenth century was not 
limited to Istanbul. Ankara and Kayseri in the seventeenth century had female litigants at 
similar rates to that of Istanbul.45 A study of the eighteenth-century Anatolian towns of 
Çankırı and Kastamonu finds similar patterns in the rate of women‘s litigation.46 The 
seventeenth century, therefore, seems to have been a period when the sharia court became 
                                                 
45 Faroqhi, Men of Modest Substance: House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara 
and Kayseri, 185. 
46 Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society, and Justice in the Ottoman Empire : Legal Practice and 
Dispute Resolution in Çankiri and Kastamonu (1652-1744), 63. Beshara Doumani finds that women were 
litigants in 52 percent in Tripoli and one-third in Nablus in the eighteenth century. See his "Adjudicating 
Family: The Islamic Court and Disputes between Kin in Greater Syria, 1700-1860," 177-78. 
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more accessible to women, a trend that continued in the next centuries. More quantitative 
research on women‘s litigation in the earlier periods of different Ottoman cities would 
shed further light on women‘s access to the sharia court in the classical and post-classical 
periods. Regardless, the sharia court was the most accessible legal venue to settle 
disputes for female litigants.47  
The data on women‘s litigation demonstrates that many Muslim women in 
Istanbul used the legal system as an ally in order to protect their rights, particularly those 
pertaining to their property.48 They had a much higher chance of winning than losing 
their cases against their male defendants. From the 98 cases in which Muslim women 
acted as plaintiffs in the period, their winning ratio was three to one, regardless of the 
gender of the defendants (Table 1.2). They won 54 cases against their male defendants 
while losing only in 18 cases against them.  Almost the same ratio applies when Muslim 





                                                 
47 Another important location to seek justice was the imperial divan. Zarinebaf-Shahr found that the rate of 
women who sent petitions to the imperial divan was 8 percent, much lower than that of their litigations in 
the sharia court. Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Women, Law, and Imperial Justice in Ottoman Istanbul in the 
Late Seventeenth Century," in Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic Society, ed. Amira al-
Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 81-96. 
48 From the entire cases in which Muslim women appeared as either plaintiff or defendant, only four were 
related to crimes which did not involve property. For a thematic analysis of the litigation cases, see below.  
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Table 1.2: Muslim female plaintiffs in Istanbul, 1659-1661  
 
Female plaintiffs v. 
Male defendants 
Female plaintiffs v. 
Female defendants 
Female plaintiffs v. a 




plaintiffs won 54 17 1 71 
plaintiffs lost 18 6 2 26 
No final 
decision 
1 0 0 1 
Total 72 23 3 98 
 
The findings are striking when compared against the performance of male 
plaintiffs in court for the same period. Muslim men appeared as plaintiffs in 262 cases in 
the period under study (compare to 98 cases of Muslim female plaintiffs for the same 
period). Similar to female plaintiffs, male plaintiffs won in the majority of their cases. 
They appeared as winners in 182 cases while losers in 73 cases (a ratio of approximately 
2.5:1).49  
In keeping with female plaintiffs who won most of their cases against the 
defendants of opposite sex, Muslim male plaintiffs won in 26 cases against women while 
losing in 15 cases against them. This ratio, however, is lower than that of Muslim female 
plaintiffs winning their cases against men (3:1). Muslim women‘s superior performance 
in winning their cases is also visible in the total number of cases in which they appeared 
as litigants against men. In total, Muslim women won in 69 cases against their male 
                                                 
49 In the remaining seven cases, no parties won as result of lack of evidence.  
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litigants while they lost in 44 cases against them. The data suggests that Muslim women 
were not at any particular disadvantage against men in the courthouse (See Table 1.3). 






























26 150 5 54 17 0 252 
Defendants 
won 
15 56 1 18 6 2 98 
No 
decision 
0 9 0 1 0 0 10 
Total 41 215 6 73 23 2 360 
  
How should one explain the fact that Muslim female litigants had a higher rate of 
victory when compared to that of male litigants? An interesting study by Kuran and 
Lustig on non-Muslim litigants of the seventeenth century observed that non-Muslim 
plaintiffs had a higher rate of victory against Muslim litigants. While the fact that non-
Muslim litigants did well in the sharia court is not news to Ottomanists,50 Kuran and 
Lustig‘s explanation is radically different. ―If the evidence generating procedures of the 
Islamic courts were stacked in favor of Muslims,‖ they ask, ―how could their verdicts 
have been unbiased?‖51 They find that Muslims were overrepresented as plaintiffs against 
                                                 
50 See, for example, Ekrem Buğra Ekinci, Ateş İstidâsi: İslam-Osmanli Hukukunda Mahkeme Kararlarinin 
Kontrolü (Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 2001); Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in 
Comparative Perspective, 56-57; Abraham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in 
the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 112. 
51 Kuran and Lustig, "Judicial Biases in Ottoman Istanbul: Islamic Justice and Its Compatibility with 
Modern Economic Life," 633. 
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non-Muslims, a fact that suggests non-Muslims did not sue their Muslim counterparts as 
long as they did not have a strong case with a high chance of victory. 
Kuran and Lustig‘s question about the court‘s bias against non-Muslims is also 
valid for women, whose testimony did not count for as much as that of men. Does a 
higher rate of women‘s victory against men actually indicate the existence of certain 
judicial biases against women? While certain cases of judicial manipulations against 
women and non-Muslims, but also against Muslim men, have been observed by some 
Ottomanists, was it indeed a wider phenomenon that systematically favored Muslim men 
against parties of different confessions and genders? My findings about Muslim women‘s 
litigations in the period under study do not provide a conclusive answer in light of Kuran 
and Lustig‘s methodology. Muslim women did have a higher victory rate when compared 
to Muslim men; they were also underrepresented as plaintiffs. This explanation, however, 
might not be the whole picture. Women had fewer economic transactions when compared 
to men, which was a partial explanation for their underrepresentation as litigants. For 
smaller amounts of transactions, in which one might expect that many women were 
involved, litigants used other methods of conflict resolution such as amicable settlements, 
not all of which were recorded in the sharia courts. As we will see below, women did not 
frequently sue their close family members, with whom they might have made the 
majority of their economic transactions. My data, therefore, does not corroborate the 
existence of a systematic judicial bias against Muslim women in the period under study.  
What was the impact of the gendered value of testimony on women‘s litigations? 
The answer to this question can be provided through a closer examination of the judicial 
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procedure in the sharia courts. In order to prove a case, except for the cases that required 
the expertise of women, at least two males or a combination of one male and two female 
witnesses were required. While the weight of testimony was explicitly gendered, it is 
important to remember that providing testimony was not necessary for winning a case. 
Procedurally, after hearing a plaintiff‘s claim, the kadı asked the defendant if he or she 
would comply. If the defendant did, the case would be decided in the plaintiff‘s favor. If 
the defendant did not, then the kadı would ask the plaintiff to provide evidence for his/her 
claim to win the case. In case the plaintiff failed to substantiate their claim, they would 
have the right to ask the defendant to take an oath denying the plaintiff‘s claim.  
One intriguing fact about the function of the sharia court was the frequency of the 
cases in which neither side provided any form of evidence. After excluding the cases 
which were not finalized or those that contained a combination of male and female 
defendants, we have 342 cases in which the parties were either men or women and the 
court made a decision in favor of a party. From among these cases, 145 cases required 
proof, predominantly in the form of oral testimony (42.4 percent), while no proof was 
presented in the remaining 197 cases (57.6 percent). The fact that the majority of 
litigations were finalized without any evidence should qualify our understanding about 
the significance of ―evidence generating procedures,‖ which were discriminatory against 
non-Muslims and women. 
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Table 1.4: Evidence in the Istanbul sharia court, 1659-1661 
 Male plaintiffs v. 
Male defendants 
Male plaintiffs v. 
Female Defendants 
Female plaintiffs v. 
Male defendants 
Female plaintiffs v. 
Female defendants 
Total 




128 20 38 11 197 
Total 206 41 72 23 342 
 
One explanation, particularly for cases in which defendants simply accepted 
plaintiffs‘ claims, is the fact that parties may have already agreed on the terms of a 
settlement before they even arrived in the court. This possibility, however, does not 
explain the formulation of their settlements in terms of a lawsuit, particularly because 
parties had the right to simply register their amicable settlements (sulh) in the sharia 
court, and indeed many did so. In addition, some of the cases that were finalized with no 
proof were based on procedural laws, particularly the lapse of time. In the Ottoman legal 
system, if a litigant claims the ownership or possession of a property based on what 
happened more than 15 years before the lawsuit, the kadı would not require either party 
to provide any evidence and would declare the defendant as the winner. That was exactly 
what happened in the case of the man Süleyman bin Dede who sued the woman Dilaver 
bint Abdullah in October 1661 over an inherited house. Süleyman argued that his father 
had sold his share in the house to Dilaver‘s husband at a lower price than normal. She did 
not deny his claim; rather, she argued that the house had been in her husband‘s 
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possession for the last 35 years. The court ruled in her favor without asking any party to 
provide evidence.52  
Furthermore, lack of evidence on the plaintiff‘s side usually required taking oath 
by the defendant. Taking an oath of denial had a significant moral weight on the litigants. 
In July 1661, for example, a female resident of Istanbul named Müslime bint Osman sued 
her husband Abdulkerim bin Ali over the possession of some real properties she had 
earlier bought from him. Abdulkerim denied the sale. Instead of soliciting evidence to 
prove her claim, Müslime asked her husband to swear to God that he did not sell her the 
disputed properties. Abdulkerim chose not to take the oath and lost the case.53 In yet 
another case that came to the attention of the court some three months later, a female 
plaintiff named Ayşe bint Abdullah sued three men for having sold her a ―deficient‖ 
female slave. While the defendants had the right to deny the accusation and ask her to 
prove her claim, they simply asked her to take an oath in the court that she was right, 
which she did and subsequently won the case.54 Many litigants who came to the court 
without any form of evidence, therefore, were aware that a lawsuit was a particular legal 
action that initiated a set of procedural laws (including oath), which were absent in cases 
of simple registration of their settlements.55 
                                                 
52 İŞS9: 169b, 28 S 1072.  
53İŞS9: 2b, 25 Za 1071.  
54 İŞS9: 174b, 7 Ra 1072.  
55 The reputation of litigants had a significant impact on the legal procedure. Sometimes, a claim could be 
proved by taking an oath if he/she was ―trusted‖ (emin) person. Thus, two defendants in two separate cases 
of debts came with the counterargument that they had already paid the amounts due to them. Under normal 
circumstances, these defendants would be asked to prove their counterclaims. Yet, the court offered them to 
take an oath because they were ―trusted‖ people and their oath would suffice to prove their claims (yemin 
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The gendered value of oral testimony had a complicated impact on Istanbulite 
Muslim women‘s litigations. While one expects that requiring male witnesses might have 
a detrimental impact on the outcome of women‘s litigations, this was certainly not the 
case for Istanbul in 1659-1661. When compared to their male counterparts, Istanbulite 
Muslim women did not have any particular difficulties in providing non-relative male 
witnesses in order to win a case. This discriminatory aspect of the procedural laws 
ironically encouraged women to become further integrated within the larger society in 
order to seek the support of the respected men of their communities and protect their 
property rights. 
 When Muslim women were involved in litigations, there was a higher possibility 
of providing evidence in the form of oral testimony than when only men were involved. 
Muslim women appeared in 23 cases against other women, from which they provided 
evidence in 12 cases (52.2 percent). Muslim men, on the other hand, appeared in 205 
cases against other men, from which they provided evidence in 78 cases (38 percent). In 
general, when Muslim women were involved in any case of litigation, there was a much 
higher proportion of providing evidence. From among the 113 cases in which Muslim 
women were litigants against their male counterparts, in 55 cases (48.7 percent), one 
party had to provide evidence against the litigant of the opposite sex (compare to 42.2 
percent for the entire cases of litigations).  
                                                                                                                                                 
ile musaddak olmağın). In one case, the defendant took the oath and won (İŞS8: 46a, 24 R 1071) while in 
the other case the defendant did not take the oath and lost (İŞS9: 89a, 6 Z 1071).   
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Was the higher rate of providing proof in cases where Muslim women were 
involved as litigants a cause for their higher rate of winning cases in the sharia court? The 
question can be answered by looking at the rate of proof in cases in which male and 
female litigants appeared against each other. Out of the 69 cases in which female litigants 
won against their male counterparts, they provided proof in 32 cases (46.4 percent). From 
the 44 cases that Muslim men won against their female counterparts, the former provided 
evidence in 21 cases (47.7 percent). These findings demonstrate that evidence (or lack 
thereof) in any litigation did not significantly impact the outcome of women‘s litigations. 
A higher rate of providing evidence in cases where Muslim women were involved might 
be a result of the fact that women used other methods of conflict resolution at a higher 
rate than their male counterparts when they did not have evidence. This is evident in the 
cases of amicable settlements (sulh) brought to the Istanbul sharia court in the period 
under study. Muslim men and women appeared in 149 cases of sulh, from which Muslim 
women appeared in 69 cases (46.3 percent), which was more twice the rate of their 
litigations (see above). 
Muslim women were aware of the significance of oral testimony. That explains 
why many of their economic transactions, even with close family members, took place in 
front of a group of primarily male witnesses. One example is the case of a Palace woman 
(saraylı) named Hadice bint Abdullah whose deceased husband Ali Çelebi owed her 
some 150 piasters.56 Instead of paying her the amount, Ali Çelebi transferred the money 
                                                 
56 Sayaylı referred to women who had lived in the Ottoman palace for a while as female slaves and 
servants. Many of them were married off to Ottoman officials and started to reside in different 
neighborhoods of the capital.  
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from his business partnership with a third person. Accordingly, the person who owed 
him, named Mehmed Beşe, was to directly pay her the amount. After the death of Ali 
Çelebi in November 1659, Hadice sued Mehmed Beşe in order to make the transfer take 
place. Mehmed Beşe admitted that he owed Ali Çelebi the amount, but he denied the 
transfer arrangement. Fortunately for Hadice, she had made sure that the arrangement 
took place in front of at least two male witnesses named Halil Çelebi and Süleyman 
Çelebi. They came to court and testified for the authenticity of the transfer agreement, 
after which she won the case.57 For Hadice, as a childless woman, the presence of 
witnesses at the time of the agreement proved extremely significant. The absence of 
witnesses would have entitled her to only a quarter of the 150 piasters she had claimed, 
the rest of which would go either to her husband‘s other relatives or in their absence to 
the state (see chapter three).  
Women‘s awareness about the significance of oral testimony encouraged them to 
go beyond the segregations that some moralists and legal scholars advocated for.58 It 
seems that oral testimony formed a culture of frequent conversation about existing 
contracts. It is evident in a peculiar form of oral testimony, in which witnesses did not 
necessarily observe the disputed contract but rather witnessed a party‘s admission to 
                                                 
57 İŞS7: 34a, 9 Ra 1070.  
58 The jurist and moralist of the sixteenth century, Birgili Mehmed, whose writings inspired the influential 
conservative movement of the Kadızadelis in the late seventeenth century, elaborated on women‘s divinely 
sanctioned obligations. They consisted primarily of domestic functions including baking, cleaning, and 
cooking. See Birgivi, Tarikat-i Muhammediyye Tercümesi, 478. For the rise of the Kadızadelis in the 
seventeenth century, see Zilfi, The Politics of Piety : The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-
1800), chapter four.  
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his/her liability in the time period between the original transaction and the current 
lawsuit.    
How does one explain this aspect of oral testimony in which witnesses observed 
the confession of liability rather than the original transaction? Boğaç Ergene, in his study 
of eighteenth-century Çankırı and Kastamonu, suggests that testimony to such 
confessions of liability might have been a case of court manipulation, particularly in the 
lawsuits in which community members testified against an unwanted member of the 
community such as the kızılbaş or a slave accused of sexually harassing a Muslim 
woman.59 For Istanbul in the period under study (at least for the cases of property-related 
disputes studied here) manipulation seems unlikely for testimonies to confessions. After 
all, if the plaintiffs wanted to bring fake witnesses, they could do so by asking them to 
simply claim they were present at the time of the transaction. Yet, in the majority of the 
cases that were finalized by witnesses, the testimony was about the defendants‘ 
confession after the transaction and before the court.  
An alternative explanation could be the legal culture that valued oral testimony as 
the primary form of evidence in seventeenth-century Istanbul. Men and women of the 
capital regularly had their transactions observed and verified by their community 
members, particularly those Muslim men who qualified as ‘udul (fair witnesses). After 
all, original witnesses to any contract could not be solicited for several reasons, including 
their absence due to traveling or death. Even the validity of a written court document 
                                                 
59 Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society, and Justice in the Ottoman Empire : Legal Practice and 
Dispute Resolution in Çankiri and Kastamonu (1652-1744), 162-64. 
 48 
could be contested. In such cases, proof of the document‘s authenticity required the 
testimony of the exact court witnesses (şuhud el-hal) who had testified to and signed 
under the document. Within this context of Islamic legal procedure, it seemed necessary 
to have contracts repeatedly verified in front of other witnesses who could later testify in 
court in case a party initiated a lawsuit. For women, this gendered value of women‘s 
testimony encouraged them to be actively involved in constant contact and conversation 
with non-relative male members of their communities. 
This aspect of legal culture also helps answer the question of the extent of 
women‘s knowledge about legal niceties. Irisi Agmon, in her study on the women of late 
Ottoman Jaffa and Haifa, maintains that court records cannot be used to answer this 
question. After all, court records were summaries, not verbatim accounts of the events 
that happened and statements that were made in the sharia court.60 While I agree with 
Agmon about the methodological problems that scholars of court records face, this 
particular question could be answered through the prevalence of oral culture, at least in 
Istanbul in the period under study. Many women, similar to men, made sure their 
transactions with relatives and outsiders were publicly observed. Not many women had 
expertise in the details of legal norms and procedures, but many men did not either. 
Muslim men and women of the capital in this period interacted with one another under a 
larger cultural umbrella that crossed gender lines. Men‘s oral testimony proved critical to 
                                                 
60 Iris Agmon, "Muslim Women in Court According to the Sijill of Late Ottoman Jaffa and Haifa," in 
Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, ed. Amira al-Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1996), 132.  
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winning a case, and women secured evidence through publicizing their transactions in 
front of men‘s eyes.  
Litigation for Property  
The sharia court was, first and foremost, a place where economic transactions 
were registered, disputed, and settled. The majority of litigation cases brought by men 
and women of the capital to the sharia court in this period were related to property 
disputes on debts, inheritance, and ownership of real estate and movable property.  
Yet, the cases of litigation demonstrate that men and women had different 
concerns when it came to the protection of their property rights. Similar to the women of 
many other Ottoman cities, Istanbulite women were barred from participating in most of 
the city‘s economic activities which were regulated by organized guilds.61 The putting-
out system, particularly in textile production, which allowed women to work from their 
homes in cities such as seventeenth-century Bursa, did not play a predominant role in the 
economy of Istanbul in the seventeenth eighteenth century.62 Customary limitations on 
women‘s participation in the market economy, however, did not mean they were barred 
from owning, possessing, and managing their properties. The data on women‘s litigations 
demonstrate that women acquired a higher proportion of their properties through their 
natal and conjugal families when compared to men. 
                                                 
61 Evliya Çelebi, whose accounts should be taken with grain of salt, mentions the existence of a women‘s 
guild specializing in slave dealership in Istanbul in 1640. Evliya Çelebi, Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi, 
trans. Zuhuri Danışman, vol. 2 (Istanbul, : Zuhuri Danışman Yayınevi, 1971), 188-89.  
62 Zarinebaf-Shar‘s study about the existence of putting out system and women‘s ―informal‖ economic 
activities in the textile sector provides some useful though scanty evidence for eighteenth-century Istanbul. 
Evidence for the seventeenth century, however, has not been located yet. See Zarinebaf-Shahr, "The Role 
of Women in the Urban Economy of Istanbul, 1700-1850," 141-52. 
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Table 1.5: Themes of Muslim women‘s litigation in Istanbul, 1659-166163 
 Plaintiff Defendant 
Debt  26 (26.5%) 15 (24.6%) 
Movable Property 5 (5.1%) 7 (11.5%) 
Real Estate  14 (14.3%) 11 (18%) 
Inheritance  8 (8.1%) 4 (6.6%) 
Marital  14 (14.3%) 4 (6.6%) 
Slavery 19 (19.4%) 14 (22.9%) 
Theft/Usurpation 8 (8.2%) 6 (9.8%) 
Criminal64 4 (4.1%) 0 (0%) 
Total 98 61 
Table 1.6: Themes of Muslim men‘s litigation in Istanbul, 1659-1661 
 Plaintiff Defendant 
Debt  156 (59.6%) 124 (48.6%) 
Movable Property 20 (7.6%) 20 (7.8%) 
Real Estate  16 (6.1%) 21 (8.2%) 
Inheritance  17 (6.5%) 20 (7.8%) 
Marital  4 (1.5%) 12 (4.7%) 
Slavery 15 (5.7%) 18 (7.1%) 
Theft/Usurpation 17 (6.5%) 16 (6.3%) 
Criminal 8 (3.1%) 12 (4.7%) 
Guild 4 (1.5%) 5 (2%) 
Zulüm65 4 (1.5%) 6 (2.4%) 
Vakıf 1 (.4%) 1 (.4%) 
Total 262 255 
 
 
                                                 
63 I categorized litigations based on the primary theme of disputes. I located, for example, the disputes 
related to an inherited house or debt under the categories of real estate or debt, respectively, rather than 
inheritance. When a dispute was about the ownership of a slave, similarly, I located it under the category of 
movable property rather than slavery.  
64 Criminal cases were those about verbal or physical assaults. I placed crimes against one‘s ownership of 
property under the category of theft/usurpation.  
65 Zulüm (suppression) here means the suppression of high officials against tax paying subjects, which 
were later brought to the Istanbul sharia court.  
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A survey of women‘s debt-related litigations, for example, demonstrates that 
while they were independently involved in borrowing and market transactions, a 
relatively high number of their cases pertained to debt claims inherited from their 
relatives. Muslim women sued for debt in 26 cases, from which 13 cases were related to 
inherited assets from a relative. In contrast, Muslim male plaintiffs sued for inherited 
debts at a much lower rate (26 cases which consisted 16.7 percent of their entire debt 
cases).  
In addition to inheritance laws, Muslim family law entitled women to certain 
property rights in the form of dower (mihir), maintenance (nafaka), and child support. 
Women‘s relatively high number of litigations on the basis of their marital rights 
demonstrates the significance of marital ties in their acquisition of property. From the 14 
cases in which Muslim women sued for marital disputes, 11 cases were related to their 
dower, maintenance, or child support. In contrast, men brought only 4 cases related to 
marital rights. Men‘s marital disputes, different from those of women, were related to 
their non-pecuniary rights such as demanding a wife to move with her husband to a new 
neighborhood. Based on the analyses of litigations in the sharia court of Istanbul in this 
period, it seems that women‘s marital ties provided a significant portion of their financial 
well-being.66 
What did different forms of property mean for Istanbulite women in the period 
under study? What kinds of properties were disputed between women and their family 
members on the one hand and outsiders on the other? Did men and women have different 
                                                 
66 For an analysis of women‘s financial rights within their marriage, see chapter two.  
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priorities in owning and managing their properties? In the following three subsections, I 
will examine the Istanbul court records (1659-1661) in order to provide some partial 
answers to these questions by focusing on three forms of properties which were disputed 
in the sharia court: movable property, cash, and real estate. While the categorization is 
somehow arbitrary since any type of property could be readily transformed into another 
form, I find the categorization useful since each type of property represented different 
meanings for men and women.67   
Movable property 
If there was one form of property that women had the least problems in managing 
and controlling, it was movable properties such as furniture and other household and 
personal items. While almost every woman had ownership of certain personal and 
household items, many of which they received as trousseaus from their natal family at the 
time of their marriage, their actual control over such items were not frequently disputed. 
In the period under study, Istanbulite Muslim women brought only five cases involving 
movable properties, three of which were against their ex-husbands.  
Personal properties such as jewelry and household items could easily be 
converted into cash and therefore circulate in the economy. Women sometimes used their 
movable properties to help their husbands in dire financial situations, although they 
primarily left them as surety to secure a loan for their husbands. Women did not, 
                                                 
67 I excluded cases on inheritance and matrimony from the following analysis since they are analyzed in 
details in the following chapters. Furthermore, I excluded the category of slavery since they were primarily 
lawsuits for emancipation and had little to do with women‘s property rights. Criminal cases were also 
excluded for the same reasons.   
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however, transfer the ownership of their personal items to their husbands. The ownership 
of such properties, similar to that of cash (see below), was not frequently disputed among 
couples during their married life. It was the deterioration of marital relations that initiated 
women‘s litigation against their husbands. These cases, furthermore, demonstrate that 
women could and did use sharia courts to secure the ownership of what legally and 
culturally belonged to them.  
While trousseau was not a part of the marriage contract as sanctioned by Islamic 
law, it has been widely practiced in the Islamic world since at least the medieval period 
and continues up to this day.68 Trousseau was a form of pre-mortem inheritance 
arrangement, according to which daughters received some properties and took them to 
their marital households. In one case of calculating the assets and liabilities in the estate 
of the deceased Ahmed Ağa that came to the attention of the sharia court in June 1660, it 
became clear that he had given some land to his son as a gift and some movable materials 
to his daughter as a dowry. The value of the dowry items amounted to as much as 55,000 
aspers, i.e. the price of a relatively large house in the capital.69 
The cultural norm of women‘s ownership of such movable properties was also 
reflected in the opinions of contemporary jurists. The question of the ownership of 
domestic materials after the death of a spouse was asked of the seventeenth-century chief 
jurist Çatalcalı Ali Efendi. His response was that the materials that suit women belonged 
to the wife and the materials that suit men belonged to the husband unless this could be 
                                                 
68 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 14-18; Tucker, In the House of the 
Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 55-57.  
69 İŞS9: 25b, 22 L 1071.  
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proven otherwise.70 In other words, women were the natural owners of ―feminine‖ 
materials. The jurist did not specify what materials belonged to either men or women. 
The court records, on the other hand, provide some insights into which properties were 
viewed primarily as feminine.  
The woman Rabia, for example, came to the court on August 7, 1661 to sue her 
husband Mehmed Ağa for having sold her belongings without her permission. The 
properties she claimed consisted of a set of silver washbowl ewer and a silver 
candlestick.71 Eleven days later, a divorced couple came to the sharia court where the 
woman Havva sued her ex-husband for having appropriated her movable properties after 
having divorced her a day earlier. The materials she claimed consisted of a ruby ring, a 
pearl mirror, a cap (‘arakiyye), a red scarf, a flask for holding rosewater (gülâbdân), a 
green velvet headcover (serpûş), and a pair of shoes.72 In both cases, the male defendants 
admitted their liability and the court asked them to return the appropriated materials to 
their (ex-)wives. It seems that movable materials such as jewelry, ornamental clothes, and 
household items were assumed to belong naturally to women. 
An interesting area of contention between spouses was the ownership of domestic 
female slaves. How were such slaves viewed within the gendered division of domestic 
properties? Did they naturally belong to the master or mistress of the house? The chief 
jurist Çatalcalı Ali Efendi did not specify what constituted masculine or feminine 
properties, but a legal justification for his response quoted a medieval Indian legal text, 
                                                 
70 Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, Fetâvâ-yı Ali Efendi ma‘an-Nukûl (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı el-Hac Muharrem Efendi el-
Bosnevi, 1887), 76-77.  
71 İŞS9: 38a, 11 Za 1071.  
72 İŞS9: 93b, 22 Z 1071.  
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which included male slaves among the properties that belonged to husbands.73 The quote, 
however, does not specify to whom female slaves belonged.  
Again, the sharia court records provide some additional information about the 
ownership of male and female slaves. While, on a legal level, free men and women could 
own both male and female slaves, ownership of slaves was also a gendered phenomenon 
in Istanbul. The manumission deeds of slaves recorded in 1659-1661 demonstrate that 
women almost exclusively owned female slaves and men owned primarily male slaves.74 
In the period under study, 52 women came to the court to manumit 51 female slaves and 
only one male slave; while 122 men came to manumit 73 male slaves and 51 female 
slaves. The data, of course, challenges the Orientalist harem notion of Muslim men 
surrounded by concubines.   
What was the impact of the gendered ownership of slavery on married couples‘ 
relationships? Deeds and disputes on inheritance recorded in the Istanbul sharia court 
suggest that Istanbulites, similar to the residents of many other cities of the empire, were 
primarily monogamous. Wives, therefore, could have resisted the ownership of female 
slaves by their husbands. After all, sexual union between a man and his female slave was 
legal and the ensuing children were regarded as legitimate heirs of the man. One method 
                                                 
73 The text Fetava Tatarhaniyye was authored by a legal scholar in the late fourteenth-century Turco-
Persian Sultatane of Delhi. The genre of Nukûl (quotes) was a form of Ottoman legal scholarship which 
justified the short responses of grand jurists by anchoring them in previous juristic opinions. For Fetava 
Tatarhaniyye see Ferhat Koca, "El-Fetâvat't-Tatarhâniyye," in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, 
12: 446-47.   
74 Seng did not observe female owners of male slaves in early sixteenth century Üsküdar, while female 
slaves were owned both men and women. Yvonne Seng, "Fugitives and Factotums: Slaves in Early 
Sixteenth-Century Istanbul," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 39, no. 2 (1996): 
145. 
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wives applied to prevent such undesirable outcomes was acquiring the ownership of their 
husbands‘ female slaves. One divorced couple pursued such a case in court on October 3, 
1661. Hasan Ağa sued his divorced wife Hadice for not returning his female slave after 
the divorce. Hadice responded that he had granted the female slave as gift to her while 
they were married. After Hasan Ağa‘s denial of Hadice‘s claim, the court asked her to 
provide proof. Hadice procured two witnesses who testified in her favor. They 
maintained that Hasan Ağa had admitted in front of them some five months before the 
divorce that he had already granted the slave as a gift to Hadice. The court ruled in 
Hadice‘s favor and asked Hasan Ağa to drop his claim for the female slave.75   
Cash 
Litigation on debts formed the largest category of women‘s disputes in the period 
under study. Out of 41 cases of women‘s debt-related litigations, 17 were related to 
inherited debts involving non-relative debtors to a deceased family member of the female 
litigants. The remaining 24 cases of debt-related litigations indicate that women were 
involved in a wide variety of economic activities with both their relatives as well as 
outsiders. Women were litigants against their relatives in five cases and the rest were 
against outsiders, a point that I will examine in more detail below. Before that, an 
analysis of women‘s financial activities in the capital would be in order. 
A survey of women‘s deeds pertaining to debts shows that Istanbulite women 
were involved in financial transactions as borrowers and lenders with other individuals as 
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well as financial institutions (Table 1.7). The average number of loans involving women 
was higher than 55,000 aspers, a handsome amount of money sufficient to purchase a 
relatively large house in the capital. There were no loan deeds below 1,000 aspers and 
only seven cases of loans between 1,000 and 5,000 aspers. 
Table 1.7: Istanbulite women as borrowers and lenders, 1659-1661 
 Female Borrower Male Borrower  
Male Lender 10 0 10 
Female Lender 6 12 18 
Vakf Lender 17 0 17 
Total 33 12 45 
 
It is notable that the data from court records does not include the entirety of loan 
transactions in the capital. Loans for small amounts were negotiated in more informal 
settings, perhaps due to the fees associated with court proceedings. We typically learn 
about the existence of relatively smaller amounts of loans and those between family 
members usually when the borrowers failed to repay their debts. Most of the loans below 
5,000 aspers were recorded in the court usually after some difficulties the lenders had in 
redeeming their debts. These deeds were either about the appointment of a proxy to 
collect the debts or about a settlement (sulh) of disputes between the involved parties. It 
seems fair to argue that many cases of small loans were not brought to the attention of the 
sharia court unless there was a dispute. This finding is corroborated with the data from 
women‘s debt-related litigations. The average amount of disputed debts between men and 
women in this period was more than 19,000 aspers, when women were plaintiffs, and 
8,000 aspers, when they were defendants (compare to more than 55,000 in loan deeds). 
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From among 24 debt-related litigations of Istanbulite women, 10 cases involved a value 
between 1,000 and 5,000 aspers (compare to five cases of loan deeds in this range). 
Another category of women‘s loans which were underrepresented in the court 
records were those involving their relatives. Only two out of 43 cases of women‘s loan 
deeds involved their relatives. Similarly, women did not frequently use the sharia court to 
settle their disputes over loans with relatives. Women‘s financial disputes with family 
members, particularly with their husbands, were usually a sign, and perhaps a 
consequence, of the strained familial relationship.  
The woman Ayşe bint Şaban, for example, came to court on November 5, 1661 to 
sue her husband Ebubekir. She maintained that her husband had taken some of her 
personal belongings and sold them on the market for 17 piasters, which he now owed her. 
The husband responded that Ayşe had actually owed her the money and after she failed to 
pay her debt, he sold the items to redeem the debt. When Ayşe denied her debt, he 
provided two witnesses who testified that Ayşe had taken the loan from her husband in 
their presence. Ayşe, subsequently, lost the case.76 The couple, though still married, had 
gone through a series of financial disputes which were not resolved within intra-familial 
or communal settings. In other litigations involving intra-familial loans, women did not 
sue their husbands during the lifetime of their marriage. They rather litigated as either 
divorcees or widows for the money they had lent their husbands during the time they 
were married.  
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The few cases of women‘s debt-related deeds and litigations provide, however, a 
colorful picture of women‘s contribution to the economy of their households. Islamic law 
did not view family as a financial union: husbands and wives, as well as parents and adult 
children, had the right to acquire and manage their properties independently, which many 
residents of Istanbul did. Yet, wives took an active role in contributing to the economy of 
their families through lending money, permitting their properties to be used as surety for 
family members‘ loans, and forming business partnerships.  
While the finance market in the capital was a vital economic sector with an 
interest rate that could fluctuate between 12 to 22 percent in the years 1659-1661, intra-
familial debts seemed to be without any interest. The woman Hadice bint Mehmed, for 
example, had lent some 700 piasters to her husband, which became the matter of lawsuit 
on October 25, 1661 between her and the public treasurer who had appropriated her late 
husband‘s estate.77 More than three months earlier, another woman named Fatma sued a 
male relative of her late husband for 40,000 aspers, which she had lent her husband.78 
While many cases of debts from the third parties were recorded with the exact amount of 
their interest rate, the cases of intra-familial debts did not mention the existence of 
interest.     
In addition to providing direct loans to their husbands, women contributed to the 
economy of their matrimonial household through leaving their personal items as surety 
for their husbands‘ debts to third parties. Similar to the times when women lent money to 
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their husbands without charging any interest, putting their household items and jewelry as 
surety for their husbands‘ debt meant that they shared some of their husbands‘ financial 
responsibilities in managing the household economy. If their husbands failed to pay the 
debt, the lender could appropriate the items in surety and sell them on the market to 
redeem their debt. The woman Tevekkül, for example, came to the court on October 29, 
1660 to appoint her current husband as her proxy to deal with her properties that she had 
given as surety for the debt of her previous and deceased husband Mustafa Beg. The 
latter had borrowed 150 piasters from a cash endowment (vakıf) with 15 percent of 
annual interest. Tevekkül had given the administrator of the vakıf some of her properties 
as surety, which included an emerald ring, two ruby rings, a couple of gold bracelets, a 
damaskeened girdle, and some other ornamented clothes. Mustafa Beg had passed away 
before paying his debt, the payment of which was now the responsibility of Tevekkül. 
She appointed her current husband to sell the properties, redeem the debt, and pay her 
any extra money that remained afterwards.79 
Some other women played an even more active role to financially help their 
husbands and other male family members. When a certain Mehmed Çelebi was indebted 
to another person, for example, his wife Emine stepped in to take over the debt. Emine 
and the creditor appeared in court on September 2, 1661 to record the transfer of the debt. 
They maintained that at a previous meeting where the three parties were present, Emine‘s 
husband ―transferred‖ (havâle) the debt to her. At the court meeting, the husband was not 
present since he was not a party to the financial transaction between the creditor and 
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Emine.80 About two months later, Emine and the creditor appeared again in the court to 
register a settlement (sulh) over the debt issue and her subsequent payment of the 
money.81   
A survey of widows‘ legal actions immediately after the deaths of their husbands 
suggests that wives were not oblivious to their husbands‘ economic activities, which had 
a direct impact on the wellbeing of their nuclear families. After the death of el-Hac 
Ahmed, for example, his widow Fatma sent a proxy to the court to sue Mayil, a Jewish 
businessman for some 20.5 piasters he owed to her deceased husband. Fatma‘s proxy 
mentioned that the money was owed for some silk the late el-Hac Ahmed had sold to 
Mayil. After Mayil‘s denial of his indebtedness, the proxy procured two witnesses to 
prove Fatma‘s claim. The court subsequently ordered Mayil to pay her the claimed 
amount.82 In the period under study, many women came to the sharia court with a 
detailed knowledge of their husbands‘ economic activities, enumerating the lists of their 
assets and liabilities to third parties. While husbands were responsible for providing for 
matrimonial family members, some women were actively involved in their husbands‘ 
business activities.   
In addition to their immediate family members, Muslim women of the capital in 
the period under study entered into financial transactions, both as borrowers and lenders, 
with a wide variety of individuals and institutions (Table 1.7). In this period, Muslim 
women borrowed from Muslim women in six cases, from men in 10 cases and they lent 
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money to men in 12 cases. The case of the woman Safiye, for example, illustrates 
women‘s wide network of financial transactions. On November 12, 1659, Safiye and her 
four male creditors came to the sharia court to register her loans. Accordingly, she had 
borrowed a total amount of 442.5 piasters from two men with the military title of beg, 
one man with the ilmiye title of efendi, and a Christian man.83 
A more important source of loans, at least for Istanbulite women, was cash 
endowments which functioned as public financial institutions. From among the 33 cases 
in which women borrowed money, in 19 cases the lenders were endowments. The 
average sum of women‘s debts to endowments was more than 90,000 aspers, much 
higher than the total average (above 50,000 aspers). The lowest sum a woman borrowed 
from an endowment was 6,000 aspers, followed by another woman with a loan of 12,000 
aspers. It seems that endowments in the second half of the seventeenth century dominated 
the finance market of the capital. 
One significant aspect of Istanbulite women‘s economic life was their 
transformation of other forms of wealth into cash. Istanbulite women, similar to their 
sisters in other urban centers of the empire, were active borrowers and lenders. Yet, they 
borrowed more than they lent, which was similar to the situation of the seventeenth-
century women in Kayseri and unlike those in seventeenth-century Bursa.84 In Istanbul, 
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not only were female lenders fewer than female borrowers, there was also a significant 
difference between the average sums they lent and borrowed. Women were lenders in 18 
cases, and borrowers in 33 cases. The average amount Muslim women lent money was 
below 30,000 aspers, while the average amount they borrowed was above 65,000 aspers.    
A direct method of acquiring cash for women was selling their real estate or 
movable properties. As we will see below, women were net sellers of real estate for cash. 
Another method was getting loans after having left their real estate or movable properties 
as surety. One woman, Ayni, for example, came to the court on October 3, 1661 to sue a 
certain Veli Beşe for items that she had left as surety for a loan. She had borrowed 1,400 
aspers some two years ago and in return she had left a silver sword and a large double-
edged silver scimitar (gaddâre).85 Similarly, another woman named Rabia had borrowed 
some 80 piasters from a certain Mustafa Beşe, for which she had left some of her jewelry 
and household items as surety. Rabia‘s representative, who was another woman named 
Ayşe, sued Mustafa Beşe on October 11, 1660 for not returning Rabia‘s properties 
despite the fact she had redeemed her debt. Among the materials Rabia had left as surety 
in Mustafa Beşe‘s hands were a ruby ring, two pearl buttons, and nine other pearl buttons 
ornamented with pieces of ruby.86 
They were not only the women of middle social strata who left personal items as 
surety to secure a debt. Court records contain many examples of the women of the 
highest echelons of society who had to leave their personal items in temporary possession 
                                                 
85 İŞS9: 148a, 8 S 1072. 
86 İŞS8: 18a, 7 Ra 1071.  
 64 
of lenders. One such example was the woman Şehr Hatun, who was of slave origin but 
had achieved her manumission and integration within the household of her master. 
Manumitted female slaves did not necessarily belong to the lower social strata of the city. 
Many acquired the social status of their masters. In addition to highly valued personalized 
items that Şehr Hatun owned, another signifier of her social status was the fact that she 
did not come to the sharia court. Nor did she send a proxy. Instead, the sharia court sent a 
deputy judge to the house of a member of the learned hierarchy, who resided in Şehr 
Hatun‘s neighborhood.  
In the ―court‖ meeting (meclis-i şer’), in front of the deputy judge, Şehr Hatun 
admitted that she had borrowed some 500 piasters (approximately 60,000 aspers) from 
Şeyh Sadık Efendi, who was also present in the meeting. As surety, she had left a house 
as well as her personal items which included two pairs of bracelets weighed at 67 
miskals,87 two garments ornamented with silver, five daggers, a silver knife, a scabbard 
ornamented with a silver chain, a number of silver bandeaus with rubies and pearls on 
them, a number of caftans made of satin with gold buttons, a girdle ornamented with 
silver, pillows made of fur and satin, an earring with ruby and pearl, and seats (mak’ad) 
made of satin. She declared that in case she failed to pay her debt at the end of six 
months, the lender could sell the items in surety to redeem his loan.88 It seems that 
Istanbulite women in the seventeenth century did not necessarily attribute any significant 
emotional meanings to their belongings no matter how ―personal‖ they were. The most 
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personal items such as bandeaus, earrings, cushions, and pillows could be easily turned 
into cash whenever needed.   
Women who owned houses usually used istiğlal as a common method of 
borrowing higher amounts of money. İstiğlal was a form of conditional sale, according to 
which the owner of a house would sell it for a certain period, usually one year, and then 
immediately rent it for the period. At the end of the contract, the buyer would sell it back 
to the original owner. In this transaction, the ―price‖ of the house was the amount of debt 
while the annual rent was actually the interest for the loan. Throughout this method, the 
lender eventually had the right to sell the house to third parties if the borrower failed to 
repay his or her debt. In other words, the istiğlal contact was effectively a contract of loan 
with interest while leaving the ―sold‖ real estate as surety for the loan. In the period under 
study, Istanbulite Muslim women came to the court to record the use of their real estate 
as surety for loans in 23 cases, 19 of which were through the istiğlal contract.  
What was the reason for Istanbulite Muslim women‘s indebtedness? The debt-
related litigations demonstrate that women‘s socio-economic background as well as their 
marital status determined their different needs. Married women were mostly provided 
with accommodation, food, and clothing by their husbands, and unmarried young women 
usually benefitted from the support of their natal families. The dissolution of a marriage, 
due to either divorce or the death of a husband, could cause serious economic hardship 
for some women. Although Islamic law on marriage and inheritance entitled women to 
certain financial rights (see chapters two and three), it appears that some Istanbulite 
women were pushed to the margins of society, often in need of charitable support. 
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Among the beneficiaries of a charitable endowment were ―women without husbands‖ 
including divorced and widowed women. The founder el-Hac Mehmed Efendi‘s proxy 
came to the sharia court on September 11, 1660, to endow a large residential house 
initially for his descendants. After the extinction of their line, the founder stipulated that 
the house should be rented out. The income, the stipulations continued, should provide 
100 aspers a year for each woman in the neighborhood who did not have a husband.89 
The founder‘s care for the divorced and widowed women of his neighborhood indicates 
that the impoverishment of women after the dissolution of marriage indeed created a 
social problem.   
Some other women with no familial support had to borrow from the market in 
order to meet their immediate needs for food and clothing. The woman Rabia bint 
Mehmed, for example, owed a grocer (bakkâl) a considerable amount of 6,902 aspers for 
her purchase of grocery items on credit. The case came to the attention of the sharia court 
after Rabia‘s death. Rabia was either a widow or divorced. Her only heir was her 
daughter, who had inherited this relatively large amount of debt from her mother. The 
case was settled amicably (sulh) between the grocer and the daughter, possibly because 
the latter did not have the financial power to pay her mother‘s debt either.90  
Many widows of a better economic situation also appeared in the sharia court as 
borrowers in order to maintain themselves and particularly their orphans. The widow 
Badreftar bint Abdullah, for example, came to the sharia court on October 31, 1661, in 
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order to record a debt from a certain Halil Efendi. As the guardian of her minor son, she 
borrowed around 40,000 aspers with an interest rate of 12.5 percent; in return, she left as 
surety a house inherited from her late husband.91  
It was not only widows or impoverished women who were indebted for their daily 
and immediate material needs. Some women borrowed in order to acquire materials that 
would match their social status. The woman Safiye, for example, acquired a female slave 
for 150 piasters on credit. She had paid only 13 piasters, the rest of which became a 
matter of litigation between her and the seller on November 11, 1660.92 Some six months 
later, the woman Rabia bint Hasan purchased on credit a highly valued piece of Persian 
muslin (‘acem metâ’ı dülbend) from an Armenian merchant.93 Ten days after Rabia‘s 
case, another woman named Fatma bint Abdullah was sued for her debt related to the 
purchase of a couple of gold earrings. She admitted to her debt and promised to pay it in 
45 weekly installments.94 
One, perhaps unexpected, group of women who appeared as borrowers of large 
amounts of money consisted of married women of high social and economic status. The 
woman Afife bint el-Hac Ahmed, for example borrowed from a cash endowment on two 
occasions. On December 9, 1660, her husband and legal representative Mahmud Ağa 
came to the sharia court to record her debt from a cash endowment at the amount of 200 
piasters. The day after, Mahmud Ağa appeared again in the court to record another one of 
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his wife‘s debts from the same endowment, this time at the amount of 215 piasters. She 
left two of her houses as surety for her debts, for which she was responsible to pay an 
annual interest of 15 percent. Afife was by no means an impoverished woman. She had at 
least two houses; her father had the honorary title of el-hac while her husband had the 
military title of ağa. It is difficult to explain the reasons for the indebtedness of this 
category of women. It is probable that they needed the cash in order to invest in their 
husbands‘ economic endeavors or purchase dowries for their children. 
Real Estate 
Unlike women who owned household items, jewelry, female slaves, and cash, 
men were the primary owners of agricultural, horticultural, and residential property. True, 
women acquired real estate through inheritance as well as purchase, yet they sold their 
real property much more often than their male counterparts (Table 1.8). Muslim women 
of the capital in this period bought real estate on 17 occasions and sold it in 75 cases. 
Istanbul, in that sense, was similar to many other Ottoman cities where there was a net 






Table 1.8: Istanbulite Muslim women‘s sale deeds, 1659-1661 
                  Sellers          
Buyers 
Men Women Men and 
Women 
Total 
Men 0 68 7 75 
Women 6 6 5 17 
Men and Women 2 1 0 3 
Total 8 75 12 95 
 
Why did women sell their real estate? Faroqhi attributes the high rate of women‘s 
sales of real estate to the possibility that female heirs did not hold on to their inherited 
estates. A sale, however, did not mean giving up inheritance rights. The examination of 
other forms of properties demonstrate (see above) that women actually turned their real 
estate into currency, either in the form of cash or movable properties that could easily be 
converted into cash. If the sale of property for women was related to an inheritance 
practice that kept real property intact at the cost of women‘s disinheritance, then the 
majority of their buyers should have been their male relatives. From among the numerous 
inherited real estate properties that Istanbulite Muslim women sold in this period, only 
four were sold to close relatives, two of whom were women. Other women sold either 
entire houses or their inherited shares to non-relatives. Women, therefore, were not 
disinherited. They rather transformed one form of property to another.   
In addition to the gendered nature of properties, the practical difficulties women 
faced in the management and maintenance of their real estate could provide a better 
explanation for sale of their real estate. Cases of litigation of real estate demonstrate that 
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women had more difficulty controlling real estate (Tables 1.5 and 1.6). Despite the large 
difference between the number of lawsuits between men and women, the number of 
lawsuits initiated by men and women for real estate were almost equal (16 and 14, 
respectively). Litigations regarding real estate formed a considerable portion of female 
plaintiffs‘ cases in the sharia court (14.3 percent) when compared to that of men (6.1 
percent). Similarly, Muslim female defendants had a higher proportion of real estate-
related disputes when compared to that of their male counterparts (18 percent compared 
to 8.2 percent, respectively). It seems that women had a much more difficult time in 
acquiring their properties when they were in the form of real estate.  
Unlike women‘s litigations for other forms of property, which we saw above, 
their litigations for real estate were primarily against relatives, particularly male members 
of their extended families. From the 25 cases in which women were litigants for disputes 
pertaining to real estate, in 19 cases the other parties were family members, 17 of which 
were related to disputes about inherited real estate. The court cases demonstrate that 
while Muslim women‘s ownership of real estate was constantly challenged by their 
family members, they benefitted from the application of Islamic law in the sharia court in 
order to secure their property rights.  
From the 19 (out of a total of 25) cases in which women were litigants against 
their family members, in seven cases they litigated against female relatives. A survey of 
the relationship of these relatives against whom women litigated demonstrates members 
of small nuclear families rarely sued each other while disputes over inherited real estate 
could be a common source of contention between members of the extended family. The 
 71 
feraid rules, that prescribed the division of estate among multiple heirs of close and 
distant relation to a deceased person, were not necessarily conducive to the needs of 
nuclear families as it divided inherited properties into arbitrary shares among descendants 
and other relatives. Accordingly, time and again the material interests of nuclear family 
members were in conflict with that of members of the extended family. According to the 
feraid rules, for example, a deceased man‘s wife was entitled to only one-eighth of the 
entire estate, and in case he did not have any children, the rest of the estate would pass to 
his agnatic family members such as siblings, cousins, and nephews. Daughters, similarly, 
did not exhaust the entire estate; members of the deceased father‘s extended family were 
entitled to a significant portion of the estate (see chapter three). Many men and women 
bypassed the feraid rules through making gifts and alienating properties in the form of 
family trusts in order to keep the inherited properties in the possession of nuclear family 
members (see chapter four). The legality and legitimacy of such mechanisms were 
contended by members of the extended family who were excluded as legal heirs.  
After the death of a certain Ahmed in October 1661, for example, his legal heirs 
came to the sharia court to settle a dispute over real estate. According to the feraid rules, 
Ahmed‘s heirs were his widow, daughter, and nephew (brother‘s son), who were legally 
entitled to one-eighth, four-eighths, and three-eighths of the estate, respectively. The 
most significant part of Ahmed‘s estate was a house in the Karabaş neighborhood of 
Istanbul, where his widow and daughter continued to live after his death. Ahmed‘s 
nephew Süleyman sued the widow Dilaver and the daughter Fatma for having 
appropriated the entire inherited house and refused to give him his share in the estate. 
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Dilaver and Fatma responded that the late Ahmed had given the house as ―gift‖ to them 
some three years ago. The two women procured four male witnesses to prove their claim 
and the court subsequently decided in their favor.95   
The rarity of suing close family members for property-related disputes, however, 
does not mean that there were no conflicts among them. Rather, they might have used 
other methods such as intra-familial or communal negotiations and mediations to settle 
their disputes. Women, after all, needed the support of their close male family members 
for a number of purposes, including legal representation in their economic endeavors as 
well as the protection of their property against non-relatives. Using the court of law in 
order to sue a close male family member may have strained familial relations and 
therefore cost women their ―social capital,‖ i.e. the protection of their male relatives.96  
For Istanbulite women, social capital was closely and directly related to their real 
capital. Women‘s investment in real estate usually took place through their male family 
members. Husbands particularly proved to be ideal candidates as business partners since 
they could act as the representative of their wives not only in the sharia court for legal 
issues, but also to take care of the maintenance and day-to-day administration of their 
businesses.97 The couple Muharrem Beg and Rahime, for example, had a large 
investment in an endowed property, which was burned to ashes in the Great Fire that 
started on July 24, 1660. The couple asked the permission of the endowment‘s 
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administrator (mütevelli) to build a large estate at the place of the burned properties. 
About a year after the fire, the couple finished the construction of a large complex, which 
included some 47 one-room apartments. After that, Muharrem Beg came to court both as 
a legal agent as well as his wife‘s representative, to ask the court to ascertain the value of 
their investments, which was subsequently evaluated to be a considerable amount of 
more than 350,000 aspers.98 In another similar case of common investment in an 
endowed property, a married couple came to the court in mid-November 1661 to record 
the details of their investments.99 The husband was not her legal proxy in the court and 
yet it could be assumed that he represented her when they decided to repair the endowed 
property which had been devoured by the Great Fire of 1660.  
Not all women, however, benefitted from the support of their male relatives in 
acquiring and managing their real estate. Women, as mentioned above, were more 
frequent sellers than buyers of real estate. The fact that the practical hardships of 
managing and maintaining properties was a reason for women to sell their real estate 
became even more evident after the Great Fire of 1660.   
Abundant numbers of the court records that registered transactions about burned 
and destroyed properties after the fire show the terrifying impact of the incident on the 
lives and the properties of the Istanbulite. While fires were not unknown to the residents 
of Istanbul, the contemporary chronicles and court records immediately named it as the 
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―Great Fire‖ (Harîk-i ‘Azîm), indicating the fire‘s size and destructive power.100 From the 
court records registered after the fire, one can imagine a great dislocation of people and 
destruction of their properties during the fire. In addition to saving their lives, many 
Istanbulites were also concerned with saving at least some of their valuables, observable 
in cases where people gave their properties to others for safekeeping (emâneten). It is 
also easy to picture some opportunists stealing and looting the properties whose owners 
had fled, a few cases of which were reflected later in the court records as well. 
For Muslim men, the short- and middle-term impacts of the fire were more 
complicated. While many men, like women, lost all their properties in the fire, a group of 
moneyed elites of the capital lost no time in turning the disaster into an opportunity. The 
destruction caused by the fire brought many damaged properties onto the market. In 
addition, the Jewish residents of the capital were expelled from many areas particularly 
those around Tahtakale, after which their properties were auctioned for sale. Many 
damaged churches and synagogues were also confiscated by the state and sold on the 
market.101 The huge number of new properties on the market should have decreased the 
value of real estate for Muslim men, who were the primary buyers of the burned houses, 
                                                 
100 It started in the Odunkapısı area of the city on the Golden Horne‘s shore and then quickly spread to the 
central areas including the districts of Süleymaniye, Fatih, the Janissary Barracks, Bayezid, and the Old 
Palace. It destroyed a great portion of the Eminönü area where primarily Jewish residents lived. 
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churches, and synagogues. The fire, therefore, provided a unique opportunity for 
moneyed Muslim men to acquire real estate.  
Istanbulite Muslim women were more frequently sellers than buyers both before 
and after the Great Fire. The fire, however, started a new era in which women‘s sale of 
property accelerated. In the post-fire period, many women came to the sharia court in 
order to transfer ownership of the debris (enkâz) and land of their burned houses both to 
relatives and outsiders. Out of the 25 sale deeds of burned houses that involved women, 
in 24 cases women sold property and only in a single case did a wife purchase her 
husband‘s burned house. The Great Fire, therefore, had accelerated an already existing 
trend of women parting with their real estate for cash.  
There were, therefore, two reasons for women to sell their real estate. One was the 
practical difficulties associated with women‘s management and maintenance of their 
properties. The other one was the fact that women‘s possession of property was 
frequently challenged by outsiders, and more particularly by their extended male family 
members. It seems that for many women, their independent ownership of real estate was 
a temporary situation.    
Yet women, particularly those without male family support, needed to purchase 
and maintain their houses. One common method Muslim women used in the second half 
of the seventeenth century in order to secure their control over their privately owned real 
estate was turning them into family trusts (see chapter four). Using this method, women 
benefitted from legal and moral principles regarding the impunity of endowments and 
therefore could safely pass them on to the next generation. The woman Fatma bint 
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Kasım, for example, came to the sharia court on July 24, 1661, to register the purchase of 
a middle-size house for 20,000 aspers. The house had two upper rooms, a porch, a 
workshop, and a backyard with trees. The next day, she came to the court to announce 
that she had turned the house into a family trust, the primary beneficiary of which was 
herself. After her death, a woman named Ayşe bint Abdülcelil would be the resident of 
the endowed house, and then Ayşe‘s descendants.102 The relationship between Fatma and 
Ayşe remains unclear. Fatma was living alone, and had neither close male family 
members nor children who could serve as the beneficiaries of her family trust. Likewise, 
Ayşe‘s marital situation is ambiguous. Her patronymic name implies that she might have 
been a freedwoman.103 In any case, the fact that Fatma had turned her privately owned 
real estate into a family trust would help the two women to claim a relatively secure 
ownership over the house.  
CONCLUSION 
By the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a series of 
social, economic, and political transformation which had a direct impact on the property 
ownership of men and women in the capital. The classical feudal system of land tenure 
(the tımar system) was increasingly replaced by tax-farming (iltizâm). Tax farmers, 
unlike the feudal warlords of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, did not have to reside 
in the places of their appointments. Many of them lived in large cities, particularly 
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Istanbul, where they had easier access to the power networks necessary for securing 
additional investments. The Istanbul court records show that many tax-farmers whose 
appointments were in several corners of the empire were indeed residents of Istanbul. 
These tax-farmers subcontracted (der-uhde) these appointments—which were located in 
nearby regions like Eyüb, or as far away as Erzurum in eastern Anatolia and villages in 
western Rumelia—and pocketed the difference between the amounts they originally paid 
to secure the appointments and what subcontractors paid them. The income of tax-famers 
was re-invested in commerce, financial market, and particularly the real estate. 
Another aspect of the post-classical transformation was temlik, which was an 
imperial grant of previously feudal lands as private property to state officials. Koçi Bey, 
the seventeenth-century Ottoman scholar who was critical of the ongoing 
transformations, viewed temlik and the subsequent transformation of such privatized 
lands into non-taxable alienated endowments as signs of the corruption of the classical 
system and hence the ―decline‖ of the empire.104 It was not only a case of the large-scale 
landholding distributed as hâs, dirlik, and private property to the grandees and the male 
and female members of the Palace. Many small-scale agricultural lands were also 
privatized in the seventeenth century. Faroqhi documents this transformation in 
seventeenth-century Kayseri. Agricultural fields, which theoretically belonged to the 
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state, began to circulate on the market in the form of private property over the course of 
the seventeenth century.105    
Corrupt or not, Ottoman urban women benefitted greatly from these ongoing 
transformations. The reinvestment of tax-farm income in different varieties of private 
property, the privatization of lands which were previously under the imperial ownership, 
and the proliferation of the endowment system all meant that a greater proportion of the 
property within the empire now came under the regulation of Islamic law as practiced by 
sharia courts. Unlike the feudal land system from which female heirs were almost 
categorically excluded, the new sources of private property meant that women started to 
enjoy a certain share of accumulated wealth through the application of the Islamic 
inheritance system. In addition, the rise of the vakıf system in seventeenth-century 
Istanbul led to a more egalitarian division of inherited properties (see chapter four).   
In this chapter, I examined Muslim women‘s use of the sharia court in order to 
secure their property rights within this era of transformation. Istanbulite Muslim women 
were active litigants. Many were also knowledgeable about legal norms and practices. 
Most of the cases that women brought to the court in 1659-1661, similar to their male 
counterparts, pertained to the protection of property rights. Unlike men, however, women 
acquired economic resources primarily through inheritance and marriage.  
The fact that the majority of Muslim women‘s wealth came through their familial 
ties did not mean that women did not have access to the world beyond their domicile. 
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Indeed, women procured the testimony of impartial observers in order to prove their 
claims against both their family members and outsiders. True, customary laws that 
regulated most of Istanbul‘s economy through organized guilds prohibited women‘s 
access to a significant portion of the city‘s economic resources. And true, customs 
excluded them from a new group of moneyed people, the tax-farmers who controlled a 
significant portion of the city‘s commerce. Yet, Islamic legal culture provided women 
with easy access to the sharia court to protect the wealth they acquired through the 
application of Islamic law, despite the challenges caused by their relatives.  
The gender-egalitarian approach of Islamic law pertaining to men and women‘s 
ownership and management of property, however, did not necessarily lead to a regime of 
property in which gender did not matter. Muslim jurists and judges were sensitive to the 
social practices of their times and therefore certain properties such as women‘s household 
and personal items were indeed viewed as ―feminine.‖ Perhaps more importantly, the 
ownership of slaves was a gendered phenomenon as well: women almost exclusively 
owned female slaves while men owned primarily male slaves. The ownership and 
management of real estate, on the other hand, was primarily the prerogative of men.    
The gendered division of different types of properties was in line with the 
disparate functions that men and women were expected to perform in society. Legally 
and culturally, men were expected to provide their families with accommodation and 
other immediate needs such as clothing and food. Their monopoly, therefore, over many 
sources of economic activities was viewed as the norm. The domain of women, on the 
other hand, was primarily their domicile. Women were expected to reside within the 
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houses of their natal or marital family members, and therefore they did not need to own 
houses. The gendered division of public and private spaces between men and women also 
prevented women from active management of their real estate. Women, however, did 
own considerable amounts of cash and movable properties. Such properties were not only 
the signifier of women‘s social status; they also provided a certain level of security in 
case they lost their familial support for reasons such as a husband‘s death or divorce.  
This gendered division of property ownership, however, seems to have been an 
idealized reflection of the expected gender norms in society. First, women of lower socio-
economic status were underrepresented in the sharia court and therefore this chapter does 
not represent their relationship with different forms of property. Second, some propertied 
married women were actively involved in the economic world of their male relatives and 
husbands. While some women built business partnerships with their male relatives, others 
contributed by providing cash or surety for loans.  
What were the incentives for women to contribute to the economic activities of 
their husbands? Despite the fact that ownership of property was not legally shared 
between male and female family members, the economic activities of husbands 
determined the financial well-being of their families. Muslim women of the capital in this 
period viewed their nuclear families not only as a social but also, at least, partially as an 
economic unit. 
Another explanation, as suggested by Leslie Peirce in her study of the sixteenth-
century Anatolian town of Aintab, is that women relinquished some of their properties to 
male relatives in order or secure ―social capital.‖ Aintaban women frequently gave their 
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real estate as ―gifts‖ to their male relatives and in return they benefitted from their 
support and protection. My examination of the Istanbul court records corroborates her 
suggestion, as women frequently used their male relatives (and particularly their 
husbands) as legal representatives in order to protect their property rights. 
Unlike the women of the sixteenth century Anatolian town of Aintab, however, 
Istanbulite Muslim women in the period under study did not relinquish their property 
rights in order to achieve social capital. While cases of ―gifts‖ of real estate to relatives 
were not uncommon in Istanbul, it was not necessarily a gendered phenomenon. It was 
rather a method to bypass some of the inconveniences of the feraid rules that divided the 
estate randomly among many close and far relatives (see chapter three). While Istanbulite 
women shared some of the financial responsibilities of their male relatives, they made 
sure that their contributions were observed by the community members, and sometimes 
even recorded in the sharia court. Such measures would provide some insurance for 
women whose marital and financial status was far beyond stable. There were many social 
and legal reminders of the fact that women‘s share in their husbands‘ wealth was 
minimal. Husbands could unilaterally divorce their wives, after which they were 
responsible for their maintenance for only a few months. A married woman‘s share in her 
husband‘s estate was only one-fourth if she had not borne him children, and one-eighth if 
she had. Muslim Istanbulite women, therefore, formed a balance between their need to 
establish amiable relationships with their male relatives, on the one hand, and their 
financial security, on the other. An important area in which women sought such a balance 
 82 
was in the area of their financial rights, which they acquired through marriage, the topic 







Chapter 2: Money and Matrimony 
On July 21, 1661, a case of marital infidelity appeared in the sharia court of 
Istanbul. A woman named Ayşe stayed overnight at the house of a couple some ten days 
before the court hearing. When they all woke up in the morning, the hostess Rabia saw 
some hickies (emik) on the guest‘s neck. Rabia accused her husband Himmet Beşe of 
having caused the hickies, which he denied. Under Rabia‘s accusations, and desperate to 
emphasize his innocence, Himmet Beşe responded, ―If I did it, you would have been 
irrefutably divorced (talâk-ı selâse) from me.‖106 In the days after the incident, Himmet 
Beşe was likely subject to his wife‘s uneasy questioning, and he eventually admitted his 
infidelity. Now in court, Rabia had a strong argument against her husband. She argued 
she was already divorced from him based on his statement on the day of the incident and 
his subsequent confession of infidelity. She asked the court to register her divorce as well 
her financial demands from her husband that included her dower, her maintenance, as 
well as child support for their minor daughter. The court ruled in her favor, granting 
Rabia all of her requests.107 
Although the court scribe presented the lawsuit in the typical rigid language of the 
court record, the existing details still help to reconstruct the realities of the married lives 
of Istanbulites in the period under study. Rabia and Himmet Beşe had a minor daughter 
and Rabia was again pregnant at the time of the divorce. Besides a story of infidelity at 
the center of Rabia‘s claim, the court record does not reveal much about the domestic 
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issues that escalated to a divorce, which would separate a minor daughter and an unborn 
child from their father. Although the record is kept in the form of a lawsuit, it seems that 
the couple had mutually decided that the marriage bond was not sustainable. When the 
husband was asked about Rabia‘s claim, he corroborated her story although he had the 
legal right to deny it, which would have put the difficult burden of proof on Rabia. It 
seems that divorce was unavoidable between the couple and the real reason they were in 
court was Rabia‘s financial claims after the divorce.  
Rabia benefitted from the sharia court in order to obtain a divorce and secure her 
financial interests. Her legal rights to child custody, child support, and her maintenance 
were not even disputed. They were all well-known legal doctrines in practice in the 
Islamic world for centuries.108 After the approval of the divorce, she asked the court to 
determine the amount of child support for the minor daughter as well as her alimony. As 
a pregnant woman, she was entitled to receive alimony until the child was born. She 
would remain the custodian of the minor daughter until the age of nine, during which 
Himmet was responsible for providing child support. The court determined that he had to 
pay eight aspers a day for her alimony and four aspers a day for the child support. In 
addition, she also demanded her delayed dower of 1,100 aspers.  
Rabia‘s story sheds some lights not only on Istanbulite women‘s matrimonial 
rights but also on the negotiation of power relationships between men and women in the 
period under study. It demonstrates several aspects of patriarchy, including men‘s 
                                                 
108 For a discussion of medieval and early modern legal and social practices about women‘s marital rights 
see Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society; Tucker, In the House of the Law: 
Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine.  
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unilateral right to divorce. Husbands‘ responsibilities were also the sign of their power to 
provide nafaka, i.e. to spend their money on the needy. The word nafaka had a wide 
definition in the Islamic tradition. It referred to the costs necessary to maintain a wife and 
children, as well as needy relatives. It was by no means a voluntary charity by a 
benefactor. Nafaka was a legal obligation, whose details and methods were clearly 
elaborated by Muslim jurists over the centuries.  
As a form of compulsory charity, the word nafaka suggested a hierarchy of power 
between the rich and the poor, a hierarchy well documented in the form of the prophetic 
tradition: ―the upper hand (that gives) is much better than the lower hand that 
receives.‖109 Men‘s responsibility to provide nafaka for their wives, children, and slaves 
should be viewed within this gendered cultural and religious setting, in which it was 
assumed that men with the ―upper hand‖ supported those under their protection. Yet, 
concerns about social and familial harmony could render gender norms negotiable. The 
seventeenth-century chief jurist Çatalcalı Ali, for example, permitted a poor father to use 
the money of his rich minor daughter for his own nafaka.110 The emphasis, though, was 
on the father‘s being ―poor and needy‖ (fakîr ve muhtâc) and his minor daughter‘s being 
―rich‖ (mûsire), most likely through inheritance or gifts, and the fact that he did not have 
anyone else but his daughter to support him. A father‘s patriarchal responsibility to 
maintain his minor daughter could be challenged by his poverty, leading to the reversion 
                                                 
109 Abdullah Allheedan, "Poverty and Wealth in Islam's Sacred Texts," in Poverty and Wealth in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, ed. Nathan R. Kollar and Muhammad Shafiq (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2016), 
272.  
110 Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, Fetâvâ-yı Ali Efendi ma‘an-Nukûl, 145.  
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of the power relationship in order to preserve familial unity and keep the poor protected 
from absolute destitution.   
In this chapter, I examine Muslim women‘s recourse to the Istanbul sharia court 
in the period 1659-1661 in order to analyze their methods of protecting and managing 
their marital property rights. In an attempt to contribute to the existing body of literature 
on women‘s matrimonial rights—which have already challenged the stereotypical 
depiction of passive Muslim/Middle Eastern women111—I try to answer the following 
questions: What methods did Istanbulite Muslim women use in order to secure their 
marital rights? Did women of all socio-economic backgrounds use similar legal methods? 
Did all married women—whose husbands were absent, dead, or divorced—benefit from 
the Islamic family laws in the same manner?  
Marriage and divorce have formed one of the central themes of scholarship 
regarding women in the Middle East. By now, it is a known fact that pre-modern Middle 
Eastern/Muslim enjoyed certain rights in marriage such as the property rights they 
acquired in the form of dower and maintenance, as well as the right to initiate divorce. 
Istanbulite Muslim women of 1659-1661 benefitted from the same rights that their sisters 
enjoyed in other Ottoman cities and times. Yet, a case-by-case analysis of the sharia court 
records depicts another aspect of this general picture. True, women‘s choice of strategies 
depended mostly on the available legal norms as practiced in the sharia court. Yet, the 
                                                 
111 See for example three contributions by Abdal-Rehim, Ivanova, and Agmon in Sonbol, Women, the 
Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History. 
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social and capital resources required for taking particular legal measures also had a 
significant impact on women‘s legal strategies. 
Matrimonial rights and responsibilities proved too important to be regulated 
privately within the confines of households. As the most significant ―social building 
block‖ and a ―bulwark against social discord and disorganization,‖112 the institution of 
marriage needed to be regulated by jurists and supervised by relatives, neighbors, and 
other community members. The legal significance of marriage is visible even in the 
organization of fetva compilations. Laws related to marriage, divorce, maintenance, 
alimony, and child support usually formed the first chapters of fetva compilations 
immediately after the chapters on the five pillars of faith in Islam. The state, as the 
executor of judicial decisions, could theoretically sentence a husband incapable of 
performing his financial responsibilities to his wife.113 While I have not observed cases of 
prison sentences for such husbands, there is ample evidence demonstrating that sharia 
courts actively regulated marital rights and responsibilities, and that Istanbulites took 
these judicial decisions seriously.  
Yakub, the father of two minor children, for example, came to the court on 
November 11, 1660, to ask the court to reduce his mandated child support. A previous 
judicial decision had determined six aspers a day, which he had to pay to the maternal 
grandmother and custodian of his children.114 Yakub declared that he could not pay it (ol 
mikdâr nafakayı edâya iktidârım olmamağla) and requested to pay five aspers a day 
                                                 
112 Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 40. 
113 Ibid., 42.  
114 The children‘s mother had either died or married a non-relative and was therefore incapable of acting as 
children‘s custodian.  
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instead. The judge, before changing the previous judicial decision, asked the ―impartial‖ 
(bî-garez) members of the community about his financial situation. They testified that 
Yakub was indeed capable of only making five aspers of payment for either child. The 
judge adjusted his child support accordingly.115 Both the sharia court as well as 
community members were deeply involved in regulating domestic issues.  
How did the expansion of the Ottoman administrative and judicial bureaucracy 
affect women‘s marital property rights? Istanbulite Muslim women of 1659-1661 
witnessed the expansion of the sharia courts through the addition of two other sharia 
courts within the walled city a few years before and after this period.116 The proximity of 
Istanbulite women to the imperial divan gave them easier access to the highest executive 
council of the empire in order to complain about unfair and illegal treatments. In the mid-
seventeenth century, as part of the larger process of imperial bureaucratization, the 
―complaint registers‖ (şikayet defterleri) became an independent category within the 
large body of imperial administrative records. Although women rarely applied to the 
imperial divan to settle their marital disputes, the majority of the women who did apply 
came from Istanbul.117 Some relevant questions that require further research are: Did the 
proliferation of the sharia courts in this period decrease court fees due to the competition 
between several courts in the capital? Did poor women, therefore, have better access to 
                                                 
115 İŞS8: 16a, 8 Ra 1071.  
116 Although the exact date of the Bab and Ahi Çelebi courts are not known, the first available records from 
these courts are from the mid-century (see Introduction).   
117 Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Women, Law, and Imperial Justice in Ottoman Istanbul in the Late Seventeenth 
Century," 81-96. 
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the sharia court in ameliorating some of the injustices they faced by virtue of their gender 
and class?   
The marriage contract, on the one hand, was sexual. A marriage could not be 
initiated before the married couple had intimate intercourse. Availability for sexual union 
was a wife‘s primary responsibility. Leaving home, except for a few occasions such as 
going on pilgrimage to Mecca, visiting parents, going to public bath, and attending the 
sharia court, could limit a husband‘s access to copulation. A disobedient wife (nâşize), 
therefore, could lose her marital rights because she had violated the sexual aspect of the 
marriage contract.  
On the other hand, marriage was a financial contract. Husbands were responsible 
for providing their wives and children with shelter, clothing, and food. In addition, the 
husband was supposed to pay the wife the dower, specified at the beginning of their 
marriage. The dissolution of a marriage contract through divorce did not end the financial 
responsibility of the husband; he had yet to provide for his divorced wife for a certain 
period until she was allowed to marry another person and for his children until they 
reached a certain age. While it can be assumed that many men did provide maintenance 
for their families with the necessary items in kind, the court records of 1659-1661 
demonstrate that (at least when disputed) women asked their husbands to meet their 
marital responsibilities in cash. Furthermore, all of married women‘s dowers recorded in 
the court records were in the form of cash. It seems that the monetization of matrimony 
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that started in the late medieval period in the Middle East had been completed by the 
mid-seventeenth century, at least for Istanbulites.118 
A common methodological problem for students of Ottoman records is that the 
records are short summaries rather than detailed minutes of court proceedings. In the 
process of summarizing, many legally irrelevant details were purged. A consequence of 
reading the sharia court records, for the purpose of this chapter, can be an 
overrepresentation of women‘s marital property rights. In rare cases, like that of Rabia‘s 
story mentioned above, we learn about some other aspects of marital life, such as a 
woman‘s discontent about her husband‘s disloyalty. Yet, such cases should not be 
reduced to mere issues of jealousy. Rabia‘s reaction was not merely an emotional 
reaction to her husband‘s impertinent action. For Rabia, marriage also meant financial 
security. Her husband was responsible for providing for her and her children. The 
security Rabia sought in marriage, however, was threatened by a possible competitor. 
According to Islamic law, Himmet Beşe could easily and unilaterally divorce her. He 
could also marry a second wife while still married to Rabia, which was not common but a 
real possibility in seventeenth-century Istanbul. In that case, Rabia had to share her 
breadwinner‘s earnings with another woman and her prospective children. Rabia and her 
children‘s share in Himmet Beşe‘s inheritance would be also reduced substantially if he 
married a second wife. Rabia, therefore, secured a divorce as a preemptive measure to 
retain her financial rights while still young and eligible for another marriage.  
                                                 
118 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 51-68. 
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Himmet Beşe‘s use of conditional divorce, which formed Rabia‘s primary legal 
argument in her lawsuit, requires some additional attention in order to examine the power 
relationship between Istanbulite men and women. Conditional divorces, formulated in the 
form of ―if x happens or happened, my wife will be divorced,‖ were unequivocal signs of 
patriarchy. Men liberally used the formula to prove that they were honorable men of their 
words. While not many women had financial incentive to sue for divorce, the 
examination of the fetvas of the contemporary chief jurist Çatalcalı Ali Efendi 
demonstrates that seventeenth-century men used the formula in almost every aspect of 
their manly world, publicly promising to do something or suffer the consequences of 
divorce.  
The jurist‘s fetva compilation even has an entire chapter and four subsections 
dedicated to such conditional divorces, called ta’lîk, or suspension.119 Wives‘ marital 
status thus depended upon their husbands‘ display of their masculinity. For example, men 
promised to pay their debts on the condition that if they failed to do so, their marriage 
would be terminated. On one occasion, the mourning and angry father of a murdered son 
promised to kill the murderer, otherwise his wife would be divorced. Later on, he settled 
the murder dispute amicably (sulh), which led to the divorce of his wife, at least 
according to the jurist. Another man, possibly accused of theft, maintained that if any 
stolen item was in his house, his wife would be divorced. Later on, it was found out that 
he actually had some of those items in his house, which resulted in the divorce of his 
wife, again at least according to the jurist. In some other cases, men used this formula as 
                                                 
119 Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, Fetâvâ-yı Ali Efendi ma‘an-Nukûl, 97-111. 
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a threat against their wives who would frequently leave house to visit other people, 
including their parents.  
The conditional divorce, however, was a double-edged sword. From the questions 
posed to the jurist, we realize that many men actually resented uttering the stipulation and 
were desperately in need of legal advice to overcome their situation. One solicitor to the 
jurist had stipulated previously that his wife would be irrevocably divorced from him if 
he performed a certain action left unspecified in the documents. In the end, the action in 
question proved too difficult for him to avoid.120 As a legal solution, he chose first to 
divorce his wife (not irrevocably), execute the action, and then remarry his wife. In this 
scenario, the divorce did not preclude his right to remarry her after the act in question.  
Sometimes even single men made stipulations about the divorce of their 
prospective wives. There are many such cases in the fetva compilation in which the 
solicitor asks the jurist‘s opinion about a ―legal leeway‖ (mahlas-ı şer’î). In one such a 
case, a single man had stated, ―If I do this act, all the wives I will take will be divorced 
(alıb alacağım boş olsun).‖ He subsequently performed the act and asked the jurist for a 
solution. The answer was that he could marry through a third party (fuzûlen), who would 
first marry him off to his future wife and then ask him to validate the marriage.121 This 
way, he did not technically ―take‖ the wife; she was rather given to him.     
                                                 
120 Islamic law limited men‘s divorce of their wives to three times. After the third divorce, the divorced 
wife had to marry another and experience intimacy (halvet) with him, before she could get married to the 
previous husband. According to the Hanafi law, a man had the right to divorce his wife thrice simply by 
uttering in a single statement. It was practically an irrevocable divorce due to the practical and emotional 
burdens associated with the conditions the couple had to meet before they could get remarried.  
121 Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, Fetâvâ-yı Ali Efendi ma‘an-Nukûl, 110.  
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What were the implications of such conditional divorces for the wives? While 
many wives were harmed by the suspension of their marital status, it would appear that 
other women in the capital, like the above mentioned Rabia, employed the same formula 
to their benefit. Unlike the Maliki, Hanbali, and Shia schools of Islamic law that 
permitted stipulated marriages so that wives could secure particular rights at the time of 
marriage, the Hanafi school which was the official legal school in Istanbul, did not allow 
such stipulations in marriage contracts.122 The seventeenth-century Cairene women added 
certain clauses in their marriage contracts in order to prevent their husbands from 
marrying other women or leaving them behind unsupported while traveling. Marriage 
contracts in Istanbul, in contrast, were particularly short. They entailed only the consent 
of both parties and the amount of dower that the husband had to pay his wife.  
It was within this legal context that many women of the capital used conditional 
divorce to mitigate some of their insecurities. Men took the oath that if they married other 
women while married to their current wives, the subsequent wives would be divorced. 
This statement might have been a gesture of the husband‘s affection toward his wife 
and/or a result of his wife‘s insistence that he promise not to take a second wife. In one of 
the questions posed to the jurist, it is clear that the wife initiated a dialogue in which she 
expressed her dissatisfaction with her husband‘s prospective second marriage. The 
woman Hind told her husband Zeyd that she worried her husband would take a second 
                                                 
122 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco (London: I.B. Tauris, 
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wife.123 Zeyd responded that if he married another woman while still married to Hind, the 
other woman would be divorced. Now, if Zeyd marries Zeyneb, while still married to 
Hind, would Zeyd and Zeyneb be considered divorced? The answer was yes.124 In this 
way, the first wife had secured the monogamy of her husband, at least as long as they 
were married. Other women, like Rabia, used conditional divorce in order to secure 
divorce from an unwanted marriage, without sacrificing their financial rights. Using this 
formula, Rabia did not have to initiate a hul’ divorce, according to which she would be 
obliged to waive her rights to dower, maintenance during her pregnancy, and even child 
support.  
As shown in the previous chapter, Istanbulite women did not frequently sue their 
husbands for their financial rights as long as their marital bond was not strained. This was 
particularly the case in regards to women‘s financial rights gained through matrimony. 
After all, many marital disputes were a result of a husband‘s failure to perform his marital 
responsibilities. Therefore, the remaining part of this chapter examines three categories of 
women who struggled to acquire their marital property rights: wives of absent husbands, 
divorced women, and widows.   
WIVES OF ABSENT HUSBANDS 
Maintenance was not usually a problem, at least as reflected in the sharia courts, 
as long as spouses and their children lived under the same roof. It was the dissolution of 
                                                 
123 The fetvas did not include the real names of the solicitors. They were rather given the hypothetical 
names Zeyd and Amr for men and Hind and Zeyneb for women, analogous to the English John and Jane 
Doe.  
124 Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, Fetâvâ-yı Ali Efendi ma‘an-Nukûl, 109.  
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this common domicile that triggered women to apply to the sharia court to protect their 
rights including maintenance for themselves and their children. The men of the capital 
traveled to other areas of the vast empire for business, pilgrimage, or war. It can be 
assumed that many traveling men left sufficient funds at home in Istanbul to provide for 
their families. When they failed to do so, their wives did not shy away from taking their 
cases to court, asking the judge to determine the amount of maintenance and also issue 
permission to borrow on their absentee husbands‘ behalf. Women‘s access to different 
legal measures, however, depended on the availability of financial resources and familial 
support.  
Women were encouraged to seek judicial support in securing their matrimonial 
rights. The seventeenth-century jurist Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, for example, stated that absent 
husbands were accountable to pay for the maintenance of their wives only if the latter had 
secured a judicial decision. If the wives of absent husbands spent from their savings or 
borrowed from a third party without obtaining a judicial decision about their daily 
maintenance amount, the husbands were not responsible for paying the maintenance 
amounts spent in their absence.125 While the history of this particular legal opinion 
requires further research,126 it seems that Ali Efendi assumed that the sharia court was 
                                                 
125 Ibid., 147.  
126 The two quotes that follow the chief jurist‘s opinion belong to a late medieval Indian fetva compilation 
and a legal commentary by a sixteenth century Egyptian jurist, Ibn Nujaym. The quote by the latter 
maintains that ―in our opinion‖ a judicial decision was necessary in similar cases. Ibn Nujaym‘s quote 
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which was the necessity of a judicial decision. Further research will hopefully shed light on the evolution of 
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accessible for all women, which was more the case for the Istanbulite Muslim women in 
the period under study than women of previous generations.  
Legal ―encouragement‖ of women to use the sharia court proved very effective. 
The cases of wives of absent husbands demonstrate that they did frequent the sharia court 
in order to secure a judicial decision for their marital rights. Thus, when the husband of a 
childless woman named Emine bint Ramazan Efendi had gone to another place without 
leaving any funds behind or sending any money from wherever he was, she came to the 
court on July 5, 1661, to secure a judicial decision for her maintenance. The court ruled 
she receive 12 aspers a day and permitted her to borrow on her husband‘s behalf.127 In 
another case, Ümmühani, the mother of a minor daughter, came to the court on 
November 30, 1660, to complain against her husband who had left her and the minor 
daughter without providing any funding. Ümmühani also added that her husband never 
showed up and was in a state of constant flight (dâimâ gıybet ve firâr). He had even, she 
added, married another woman. The court, after hearing Ümmühani, decided that she was 
entitled to 5 aspers a day to maintain her daughter and that she could borrow this amount 
from third parties on behalf of her deserted husband.128 
Some four months earlier, another case of maintenance of an absent husband 
came to the attention of the court. A certain Kenan bin Abdullah had been captive in the 
island of Malta, leaving behind a childless wife Saliha, a female slave Belkıs, and two 
minor children from his union with the slave. As a rare example of polygamy, Kenan‘s 
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decision to have another conjugal partner was probably due to the fact that he had not had 
any children from his marriage.129 Belkıs was not his legal wife but had the status of 
―mother of child,‖ (ümm-i veled). Regardless, both Saliha and Belkıs came to the court to 
ask the kadı to determine the amount of maintenance for them and for the minor children. 
They also asked the judge to let them borrow from Yahya Çelebi, who was indebted to 
the captive husband. The court determined two aspers a day for the four members of the 
captive‘s family and permitted them to borrow from Yahya Çelebi. On the same day, 
Yahya Çelebi argued that he had already paid some 6,270 aspers for their maintenance.130 
While we cannot be sure if all the wives of absentee husband could actually take money 
from third parties on behalf of their husbands, the case of Saliha and Belkıs demonstrates 
that wives and even female slaves had access to the funds of their missing husbands and 
masters.    
In cases when the funds of absent husbands were not accessible, Istanbulite 
women did not passively wait for their husbands to appear so that they could sue them. 
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Kerime bint el-Hac Ahmed, for example, first applied to the court to ascertain the amount 
of her maintenance due to her absent husband, a man named Abdünnebi bin el-Hac 
Ahmed. The court assigned 12 aspers a day. Later, she came to the court on July 29, 
1661, to appoint a proxy to go after her husband and collect the maintenance money he 
had to pay. The court record does not show if the proxy actually found Abdünnebi and 
sued him in the court. It does, however, show that Kerime took legal measures in her 
capacity to secure the payment of the money she believed belonged to her.131    
Kerime‘s story demonstrates the significance of men‘s support due to the 
technical and cultural limits on women‘s movements. It was particularly the case if their 
husbands were not in Istanbul anymore. Kerime, now a resident of Istanbul, was 
originally from Ankara, by then a mid-size Anatolian town. By the time she resorted to 
the sharia court, Kerime did not know the whereabouts of her husband, or at least she did 
not mention it in court. Her husband was probably also from Ankara and might have 
returned there some time ago. In any case, Kerime needed to secure her property rights 
from her husband, for which the support of a man looked necessary. The proxy was a 
certain Esad Efendi, a member of the judicial hierarchy and most probably not a kin 
member of Kerime. After all, Kerime should have left most of her kin in Ankara, where 
she was originally from. Yet, she employed a powerful proxy, someone that matched or 
even surpassed her social status. From Kerime‘s maintenance amount (12 aspers a day) 
and the fact that her father had the title of el-hac, we know that Kerime enjoyed a high 
social and economic status in the capital. When male kin were absent, employing a 
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member of the elite and learned hierarchy would prove significant in order to achieve her 
goal of protecting her marital rights against a husband who did not perform his 
responsibilities.  
While the court records of Istanbul do not provide much information on the legal 
actions of Istanbulite women against their husbands who lived in other cities, the cases 
that were initiated by the female residents of other cities and towns whose husbands lived 
in Istanbul provide some insights into contemporary legal practices. The case of Ayşe, 
who was originally from Trabzon, and whose husband lived in Istanbul, sheds some light 
on such legal measures. She travelled together with her father all the way from Trabzon 
(located on the southwestern shores of the Black Sea) to Istanbul. With the help of her 
father, she found and sued her husband, named Ali, in court on July 17, 1661, for failing 
to provide her with support for the preceding seven months. Her proxy and father claimed 
a total amount of 2,100 aspers that her husbands had to pay her. They finally arrived at 
the terms of an amicable settlement (sulh), according to which the husband agreed to pay 
her some 800 aspers. By the time they arrived in the court, Ayşe and Ali were already 
divorced, possibly due to the latter‘s absence and failure to maintain his wife.132 
The court record does not provide much information on how Ayşe and her 
husband got divorced. The negotiation over Ayşe‘s financial rights might have been also 
a part of their divorce negotiations. Negotiation for divorce took several forms, one being 
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the use of conditional divorce as we saw in the case of Rabia at the beginning of this 
chapter. A provincial woman from Rumelia, for example, sent a proxy to Istanbul, where 
her absent husband Mehmed Beşe had been living for an extended period. The proxy 
Mehmed Ağa found her husband, brought him to the court on December 20, 1659, and 
made him promise to go back to his wife. Mehmed Beşe, who had not visited his wife for 
the past six years, maintained that ―if I do not go to her in 90 days, she would be divorced 
from me.‖133 In this case, the wife probably did not prefer divorce, but she was fed up 
with her husband‘s constant absence as well as his failure to provide for her. She wanted 
him back but she also wanted to reserve her legal right to marry another person if her 
husband continued to live apart from her. One can assume that many contemporary 
women of the capital took similar measures against their husbands living in other cities. 
The most common method women used for divorce was hul’, according to which 
women had to waive some of their financial rights in order to persuade their husbands to 
agree to a divorce. The Istanbul sharia court in the period under study is full of hul’ cases, 
in which women waived their rights to dower and post-divorce maintenance. In most of 
these cases, we are not informed about the reasons for women‘s decision to terminate 
their marriage. That was not the case, however, for a hul’ case initiated by a woman 
named Mümine bint Hüseyin on October 12, 1661. She maintained that her husband, 
Seyid İbrahim Efendi, did not provide for her in the past three years. She argued he owed 
her some 10,800 aspers in recompense. She continued that she waived her right to the 
accumulated maintenance, her dower which was 4,000 aspers, and her post-divorce 
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maintenance in order to get divorced from Seyid İbrahim Efendi.134 It shows that his 
failure to provide for her was, at least partially, a reason for Mümine‘s initiation of a 
divorce case.135  
Some other wives of absent husbands decided to take a more radical measure, 
perhaps because they did not have sufficient social and financial capital to initiate such 
legal measures, which usually required the employment of a male proxy that had to travel 
to another city. Absence of husbands, even if they did not provide for their wives, did not 
lead to a judicial separation (tefrîk) in the Hanafi school. The marriage contract was 
terminated only if there was a good reason to believe the husband was dead. Either 
reliable evidence of a husband‘s death had to be produced, or the wife had to wait as long 
as 90 years to be considered legally eligible to marry another man. True, the door of the 
sharia court was wide open for the wives of absent husbands to claim their marital rights. 
For women of lower socio-economic status, however, securing loans without trustworthy 
guarantors or valuable properties such as jewels and houses proved difficult.   
That is probably why a woman named Fatma bint Abdullah, possibly from a slave 
background and therefore with no male kin members in Istanbul, decided to marry 
another person after her first husband had left her without divorcing her. In the court 
session held on July 28, 1661, Fatma was present together with her first and second 
husbands. The first husband maintained that he had married her some 10 months ago, 
after which he had gone to another place (âher diyâr). In the meantime, he added, Fatma 
                                                 
134 İŞS9: 156b, 17 S 1072.  
135 For a similar case, see İŞS9: 104b, 2 M 1072.  
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married the second husband, which should be null and void. The second husband replied 
that he had married Fatma without knowing she was already married. The first husband 
procured two male witnesses to prove the authenticity of the first marriage, which was 
subsequently endorsed by the court.136 The record does not recount Fatma‘s side of the 
story, but it seems plausible that her decision to remarry was related to her husband‘s 
absence and failure to provide for her, on the one hand, and her lack of resources to 
initiate legal measures against her husband, on the other. Unfortunately, as a typical case 
of the sharia court record, this entry does not inform us about whether or not Fatma faced 
any repercussion for her illegal act.137 
DIVORCED WOMEN 
According to Islamic family law, the dissolution of marriage, similar to its 
initiation, brought about significant financial responsibilities for husbands. Upon divorce, 
a husband had to pay the remainder of his wife‘s dower (mihir), provide her with 
maintenance for a few months before she could marry another person (the ‘idde period), 
and also provide for the minor children who were usually in the custody of their divorced 
wives. Istanbulite Muslim divorcees, at least those whose ex-husbands resided within the 
capital, had fewer problems when compared to the wives of absent husbands in bringing 
their husbands to court. Yet, women‘s socio-economic status, as well as whether or not 
they enjoyed kin support against their ex-husbands, had an impact on the legal measures 
                                                 
136 İŞS9: 70b, 1 Z 1071.  
137 For another case of a woman who married another man while being legally married to an absentee 
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they took in the sharia court in ways that were completely different from those of the 
wives of absent husbands.  
One common area of contention between divorced spouses was the woman‘s right 
to a dower. A husband usually paid his wife the dower in two installments. One was 
usually paid in advance (mu‘accel) upon the initiation of the marriage contract and the 
other was delayed (mü’eccel) until the dissolution of marriage, as a result of either 
divorce or the spouse‘s death.138 The court documents studied here do not provide much 
information about the ratio of the advance and delayed portions of the dower. In the few 
cases of marriage in which the amounts of both advance and delayed dowers were 
mentioned, it seems that there were no set ratio for the installments.139  
Regardless of its proportion in the entire dower, the delayed dower (as clearly 
mentioned in cases of divorce) constituted a significant amount of money that could be 
used as a bargaining chip against their husbands‘ unilateral right to divorce. The many 
cases of hul’ registered in the Istanbul sharia court in the period under study demonstrate 
that delayed dower constituted the most significant part of their financial rights, which 
they often waived to secure a divorce. Furthermore, dower formed a deterrence against 
husbands who could easily divorce their wives by simply uttering ―you are divorced.‖ 
When Murad bin Süleyman, for example, regretted divorcing his wife Ayni bint Hasan, 
the two came to the court on June 6, 1661, to get married once again. This divorce and 
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remarriage cost Murad at least 4,000 aspers in the form of Ayni‘s dower for this second 
marriage.140    
For divorced women, the payment of their delayed dower meant that they could 
independently maintain themselves for a considerable period after their divorce. The 
dower could provide funds for a few months to a few years depending on the social status 
of the divorced women. Women of higher status had higher costs of living, which can be 
observed in the amount of maintenance mentioned in their divorce cases. Yet, the ratio of 
dower to maintenance was higher for women of higher social status when compared to 
those of relatively humble background.  
The woman Meryem was an example of the women of higher social status. She 
had been married to a high military officer with the title of beg. The couple‘s social status 
is also evident in the fact that they did not come to the court; rather the court personnel 
went to the residence of Meryem in order to record their divorce on October 12, 1659. 
Meryem maintained that the beg paid her the delayed dower of 12,000 aspers and the 
post-divorce maintenance for about three months of 500 aspers.141 Accordingly, 
Meryem‘s dower provided her with sufficient funds for six years. About a month earlier, 
another woman named Rabia came to the court to register her divorce. She maintained 
that her husband Mustafa Beşe had paid her the delayed dower of 6,000 aspers and her 
post-divorce maintenance of 900 aspers.142 The facts that she was married to a Janissary 
with the title beşe and that she was paid 10 aspers a day for her maintenance clearly 
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demonstrate that she enjoyed a high socio-economic status. The amount of her delayed 
dower was enough to provide for her living costs for 20 months, despite the fact that her 
cost of living was much higher than the average woman.143  
Divorced women of relatively humble social backgrounds came more frequently 
to the court to either register or demand their dower and ‘idde maintenance, despite the 
fact that their dower could provide for them for a much shorter period when compared to 
women of higher social status. While the average rate of women‘s dower, as observed in 
the cases of hul’ divorce and marriage deeds, was slightly above 2,000 aspers, the 
majority of divorcees who used the sharia court to register their marital financial rights 
had a dower below 2,000, the average being slightly above 900 aspers. The woman 
Saraylı bint Mehmed,144 for example, came to the court on September 10, 1659 in order 
to register her divorce from her husband Mustafa bin Hüseyin. Neither she nor her 
husband had any titles to their names or their patronymics, which indicate their non-elite 
status. Furthermore, her post-divorce maintenance consisted of only 350 aspers, which 
was equal to less than 4 aspers a day and much lower than that of the divorced woman 
Meryem, mentioned above. Her delayed dower, in line with her humble social status, was 
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1,000 aspers. Regardless of her low living costs compared to that of the two women 
mentioned above, her dower would be enough only for more than eight months.145    
The financial responsibilities of husbands at the time of divorce were not limited 
to the dower and ‘idde maintenance of their wives, they also included the child support of 
minors in the custody of divorced wives. Women of the capital could and did benefit 
from the application of Islamic law in the sharia court to make their husbands perform 
their financial responsibilities towards minor children. The woman Havva came together 
with her husband to the court on August 25, 1661 for a divorce, immediately after which 
the wife asked for the maintenance of her two children. The court assigned four aspers a 
day for each child to be paid by the divorced husband.146 A week earlier, another woman 
asked her husband in the court to provide for her children immediately after they were 
divorced. The court, subsequently, assigned six aspers a day for each child.147   
While it is unclear if all ex-husbands actually paid the amount the kadı 
determined for child support, the sharia court provided the divorced women with an 
opportunity to follow up and render their husbands accountable for their financial 
responsibilities. The case of a convert couple who came to the sharia court on November 
5, 1660, sheds some light on this process. Ümmü Gülsüm and Ahmed—their names after 
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their conversion to Islam—had been divorced for some 15 months. The ex-wife Ümmü 
Gülsüm had gone to court immediately after the divorce to assign child support for her 
son born into her marriage with Ahmed. The court had decided on five aspers a day. 
After 15 months, Ahmed had not paid the child support. Ümmü Gülsüm, therefore, 
decided to come to the court to document her husband‘s failure to make the payment. She 
maintained that the accumulated sum of the child support in the past 15 months was 
2,250 aspers. Ahmed corroborated his ex-wife‘s account, after which the court ordered 
him to pay her the amount.148 In about a year after the convert couple‘s case, another 
couple came to the court to declare that the ex-husband paid the ex-wife the remainder of 
the child support, constituting 1,000 aspers.149 The two cases demonstrate that despite 
some difficulties Muslim women had in securing child support from their divorced 
husbands, the sharia court provided a venue for them to seek justice.  
Not all ex-wives were as patient as Ümmü Gülsüm; nor were all husbands as 
cooperative as Ahmed. In such cases of non-cooperation, ex-wives had the right to 
initiate a lawsuit against their husbands. After the janissary Mahmud Beşe divorced his 
wife Fatma bint Abdullah in April 1661, he refused to pay not only the child support for 
his minor daughter who was in Fatma‘s custody, he also did not pay Fatma her dower and 
her ’idde maintenance. After the divorce, similar to Ümmü Gülsüm, Fatma had made sure 
to go to the court to ascertain the amount of her child support; the court assigned 10 
aspers a day. It took her less than three months after the divorce to come again to the 
                                                 
148 İŞS8: 8a, 2 Ra 1071.  
149 İŞS9: 88b, 17 Z 1071.  
 108 
court, this time as a plaintiff against her husband. She claimed that Mahmud Beşe did not 
pay her the dower, ‘idde maintenance, and child support, which amounted to a sum of 
2,270 aspers. Mahmud Beşe responded that he had paid her the sum but could not 
substantiate his claim. Fatma took an oath that she did not receive the money from him, 
after which the court ordered Mahmud Beşe to make the payment.150 
A commonality between Fatma and Ümmü Gülsüm was their patronymic, bint 
Abdullah, common for female ex-slaves but also used for freeborn convert women. From 
the seven cases of litigations for marital rights such as dower, ‘idde maintenance, and 
child support that divorced women brought against their husbands, five had the same 
patronymic of bint Abdullah.151 In two of them, the plaintiffs‘ names were Cinan and 
Fağfur, common names for female slaves. While coming from slave background did not 
necessarily mean impoverishment since slaves were usually integrated into the 
households of their masters and adopted their social status, the court records demonstrate 
that some female ex-slaves, who probably could not secure the favor of their masters, fell 
into the lower social strata of society. Unlike their freeborn counterparts, female ex-
slaves could not count on the support of their kin, absent from the capital. Whether 
female ex-slaves or converts to Islam, these five women (whose low-value dowers imply 
a lower socio-economic background) did not enjoy kin support. Ex-slaves did not literally 
have any kin in Istanbul and freeborn converts did not have a high chance of counting on 
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their non-Muslim kin. Their low socio-economic status, combined with a lack of kin 
support, explain why these women were more active litigants when compared to others.  
WIDOWS 
Another group of women who applied to the court for their delayed dower as well 
as child support were widows. According to the feraid rules, a wife could inherit one-
fourth of her husband‘s estate if he did not have any children and one-eighth if he did. If 
the widow was the mother of her deceased husband‘s children, the estate would usually 
remain intact and under the supervision of the widow, especially if the children were 
minors. The widow would act as both custodian and legal guardian of her minor children, 
and therefore would effectively be in control of her husband‘s estate (a process that is 
analyzed in chapter three). Istanbulite widows who were the guardians and custodians of 
their children refrained from applying to the sharia court for their marital rights including 
alimony and child support. After all, particularly if they were the guardians of their minor 
male children, widows were in charge of the entire inherited property of their 
husbands.152 For widows, therefore, recourse to sharia court for marital rights depended 
more on whether or not they had borne children and particularly sons to their late 
husbands, and on whether or not they secured the guardianship of their children.  
Legal guardianship was not the right of widows by default. According to Islamic 
law, fathers were the natural guardians of their children, which could be transferred to the 
relatives of fathers after the latter‘s death. A kadı, however, could use his discretion to 
                                                 
152 Only in one case, a widow came to the court first to be appointed as the guardian of her two minor 
children, then to ascertain the amount of the children‘s maintenance, and finally to sell an inherited 
property on behalf of the children (İŞS9: 72a, 3 Z 1071; İŞS9: 72b, 5 Z 1071).  
 110 
appoint widows as the guardians of their children. In Istanbul in the period under study, 
Muslim widows applied frequently to the sharia court in order to be appointed as the 
guardian of their minor children, which was usually granted. In the rare cases in which 
widows were not appointed as the guardian of their minor children, they acted as their 
custodians. It was in their capacity as custodians, similar to the divorced women with 
minor children, that Istanbulite Muslim widows applied to the sharia court in order to 
ascertain the amount of their child support.153  
Similar to child support, non-guardian widows could also apply to the court to 
demand their delayed dower to be paid from the deceased husband‘s estate. It was not 
only some few widows with minor children who were deprived of the privilege of a 
guardian, other widows who either did not have minor children or had adult children 
were not eligible to be guardians. Non-guardian widows had limited control over the 
inherited estate of their deceased husbands and, therefore, used the sharia court for their 
marital property rights to supplement their limited share in inheritance. After the death of 
Süleyman in November 1660, for example, his heirs consisted of his widow and son. His 
wife, Kerime, could not act as the legal guardian for the son Halil as he was already an 
adult. Her legal share in Süleyman‘s estate was one-eighth, which amounted to only 
3,000 aspers. It was her dower of 9,000 aspers that enabled her to share the ownership of 
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an inherited humble house with his son. Thus, the two heirs came to the court and 
recorded the transfer of the ownership of half of the house to Kerime.154  
Fatma bint Abdullah and Safiye bint Abdullah, the two wives of the late Ömer 
Ağa, fell into the category of non-guardian widows. Ömer Ağa had a minor son among 
his heirs, who was most probably born to either of his two wives. Yet, Hüseyin Ağa had 
decided to appoint another man, probably his brother (both shared the same patronymic 
bin Hüseyin), as his ―chosen guardian‖ (vasi-yi muhtâr). The guardian Yunus Ağa had 
appropriated the entire estate. Despite the fact that either wife was entitled to only one-
sixteenth of her late husband‘ estate, Ömer Ağa‘s huge amount of wealth meant that 
either wife was entitled to more than 66,000 aspers. Yet, the wives came separately to the 
sharia court to claim their delayed dowers from the guardian. In both cases, the guardian 
claimed, but failed to prove, that he had already paid their shares in the inheritance as 
well as their delayed dowers. After the wives swore to God that they did not receive any 
money from Yunus Ağa (the guardian), the court ordered him to pay them their delayed 
dowers in addition to their shares in the inheritance.155  
NEGOTIATING MATRIMONY 
The fact that women used their property rights to negotiate a hul’ divorce is 
commonly known. Istanbulite Muslim women in the period under study negotiated the 
matrimonial regime at several levels, from before the marriage contract until its 
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dissolution. Terms of negotiation were determined by what wives wanted and what they 
could offer in order to acquire their desired outcome. Legal norms and practice, which 
formulated men‘s and women‘s matrimonial rights and responsibilities, crosscut other 
factors such as socio-economic status and social support from one‘s natal family. For 
women at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, the financial security of their marital 
relationship proved vital. Being married for them was not only an escape from the social 
stigma against adult unmarried women; it also provided them with an escape from 
absolute poverty. That is why they frequented the sharia court to secure their financial 
rights whenever they could and resorted to other means when they could not.  
The financial security of marriage was under constant threat by a number of 
factors, including the premature death or desertion of a husband. The fact that Islamic law 
granted husbands the unilateral right to divorce was an additional factor. Istanbulite 
women took several steps to avoid the hardships that lingered as a result of their 
precarious marital status. A female ex-slave, for example, ―bribed‖ her husband in order 
to remain married. Gülistan bint Abudullah came to the sharia court on August 28, 1661, 
to sue her ex-husband Kenan for a bribe (rüşvet) of 16 piasters. She explicitly mentioned 
that she had paid Kenan 16 piasters so that he would not divorce her. Kenan had divorced 
her anyway and now she demanded her money back. After Kenan corroborated her claim, 
the court ordered him to pay her back.156  
The insecurity of unmarried women who did not live with kin can also be 
observed in the questions posed to the contemporary jurist Çatalcalı Ali. The case of a 
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poor widow who rushed to remarry after the death of her husband is illustrative. The 
anonymous protagonist was a woman who arranged for her next marriage while she was 
still in the four-month waiting period after her husband‘s death. She had asked the 
prospective husband to provide for her while she was still in that waiting period, which 
he did. In case she married him, she would not be responsible to pay back the amount she 
received in the waiting period, but she did not keep her promise, possibly because she 
had a better suitor. In that case, according to the jurist, she was responsible to pay back 
the money she had received.157   
Women of higher social status, who were freed from immediate subsistence needs 
of shelter, food, and clothing, had other concerns when it came to their marital 
relationships. This category of Istanbulite Muslim women used their financial power to 
negotiate different gendered aspects of marriage prescribed by Islamic law. While Islamic 
law had imposed some limitations on their rights to move, initiate a divorce, and 
guardianship of children after the divorce or death of a husband, married women were 
able to use their wealth to negotiate some of these limitations. The flexibility of Islamic 
law, which could sanction several solutions to the same legal problem, provided wives 
with the opportunity to be actively involved in negotiating their social and legal status 
within their conjugal family.  
A case of such negotiations came to the attention of the sharia court when a 
couple, Emine and Receb Ağa, asked the sharia court to send a deputy judge to their 
house in order to settle their financial disputes. The wife Emine claimed that she had 
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given her husband a female slave as well as some pieces of her jewelry to sell, which he 
did for a total sum of 300 piasters (approximately 36,000 aspers). When she asked her 
husband for money from her husband, he said he had spent the money on her 
expenditures. The husband Receb Ağa‘s claim, however, was legally invalid since he was 
already responsible for providing for her. The couple, then, agreed on terms of an 
amicable settlement, according to which the husband agreed to pay her 5,000 aspers. At 
the meeting in front of the deputy judge, the husband paid her 500 aspers and promised to 
pay the rest in 360 days in four installments. Her generous offers to her husband were not 
limited to the terms of the amicable settlement, but also included waiving a significant 
portion of her delayed dower. She agreed to waive 7,000 aspers of her dower, which was 
10,000 aspers. Emine‘s generosity, however, seems to be part of the negotiation process 
with her husband about securing permission for her to travel outside the capital. She 
wanted to go to Edirne together with her minor son. She also offered to cover the travel 
costs for her and the child. Her travel, which legally required the permission of her 
husband, had been secured at the same court session in which she had given up on a 
significant portion of her properties. Emine seems to have successfully secured her 
freedom of movement together with the minor child, who was legally under the 
guardianship of Receb Ağa, in return for waiving some of her material belongings.158 
Women did not only use the indebtedness of their husbands to secure some 
freedoms within the marriage; they also used that as leverage to leave unhappy marriages. 
The woman Ayşe, for example, initiated a case of hul’ divorce on July 30, 1661, 
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immediately after which she raised the case of her husband‘s debt of some 3,000 piasters 
(approximately 360,000 aspers). The husband‘s hesitance to repay his debt had caused 
some tension in their relationship before their divorce. She had asked him to redeem his 
debt, but he had denied that he owed her anything in the first place. On the day they 
divorced, Ayşe maintained that some mediators (muslihûn) intervened to settle the debt 
dispute amicably. Accordingly, the husband agreed to pay half of what she had 
claimed.159 The hul’ divorce had proved to be very expensive for Ayşe. She had given up 
not only her marital financial rights, but also a considerable amount of the personal 
wealth she had acquired through other means, most likely as inheritance from her natal 
family. As a result she negotiated her freedom from an unhappy marriage.160   
CONCLUSION  
 
Universal marriage was the case in Istanbul in the period under study, as it was in 
other cities and times of the empire. Parents married off their daughters at an early age, 
sometimes even as young as four or six (though the initiation of marriage had to wait 
until they reached a certain age deemed as sexually active). Marriage, however, did not 
always last forever. High mortality rates meant that many young couples suffered the loss 
of marital partners. Cultural and legal norms, also, facilitated the dissolution of marriage 
contracts if the spouses wished it to be so. The universality of marriage, therefore, meant 
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than men and women were ideally married at any given time of their life but did not 
necessarily remain married to the same person until their death.  
There were many reasons for women to cherish the institution of marriage. 
Forming one‘s own family, raising children, and enjoying the emotional support of a 
companion were, perhaps, universal values associated with marriage, though 
unquantifiable in the available sources for seventeenth-century Istanbul. The available 
data, however, provide ample evidence about the material aspects of women‘s marital 
life. In this chapter, I examined the different legal strategies that Istanbulite women 
employed to protect their property rights.    
A case-by-case examination of the matrimonial regime demonstrates that 
marriage had different meanings and consequences for women of different social and 
economic backgrounds. For women of lower status, particularly those without much 
support from natal families, marriage offered certain material rights. Women of higher 
social status also valued the material benefits of a married life, but to a lesser extent 
compared to less fortunate women, such as impoverished ex-slaves, converts, and 
migrants. Ordinary women of different socio-economic backgrounds, however, came to 
the sharia court for different reasons and utilizing different methods. Resourceful women 
mobilized their financial and social powers either to bring absent husbands home, 
demand they meet their financial responsibilities, or secure a divorce. Women used the 
sharia court in order to initiate a set of legal measures against absent husbands, but not as 
much against their divorced husbands who were already in Istanbul. In the latter case, 
divorced women of high socio-economic status used the sharia court only to register the 
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out-of-court settlement and registration of their marital rights. Divorced spouses of higher 
socio-economic status are less present in records of litigations, indicating that these 
women might have used other sources such as their kin support in order to secure their 
rights.  
Poor wives of absent husbands had to face a harsher reality. In cases when their 
husbands did not have sufficient funds for them during their absence, these women found 
little success in sharia court. The registration of their daily maintenance amount in the 
court and the permission to borrow from third parties, in reality, could not have a 
significant impact on their well-being, particularly when the chances of borrowing, for 
this category of women, was not high. This group had limited resources to employ 
proxies, who could travel to other cities and initiate lawsuits against their absent 
husbands in the cities of their residence. This dire state of affairs left many poor wives of 
absent husbands in a precarious situation. Many were pushed further to the margins of 
society, seeking charitable support or work, neither of which existed in abundance. Other 
poor women who did not have the means to bring their absent husbands home resorted to 
a second marriage while still married to their first husbands. The harsh choice was 
between the illegal and immoral action of adultery and absolute destitution.  
One category of women, the widows, used the sharia court under different 
circumstances when compared to married or divorced women. While widows‘ marital 
rights did not end due to the death of their husbands, the way this group of women used 
the sharia court depended largely on another factor: their status as guardians. Widows 
were heirs to a fraction of their late husbands‘ estate, the exact proportion of which 
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depended on whether or not the late husbands had surviving children and the number of 
wives he had at the time of death. For widows, guardianship over minor children granted 
a more secure control over the properties inherited from their late husbands. Widows, 
therefore, typically used the sharia court to secure legal guardianship of their children 
rather than dispute the marital rights of delayed dower or child support. Lack of relevant 
deeds and lawsuits for widow-guardians, however, does not necessarily mean they gave 
up on their marital rights. Their effective control of their husbands‘ estate rendered it 
unnecessary to use the sharia court for such financial rights. In cases in which widows did 
not enjoy the status of guardians, they frequented the sharia court not only to ask for their 
marital financial rights or delayed dower, but also their share in the inheritance. In the 
two chapters, I will examine women‘s different strategies to secure their inherited 
properties and the mechanisms they used to transfer their properties to the generations to 











Chapter 3: Inheritance 
A complicated case of inheritance came to the attention of the Istanbul sharia 
court on September 20, 1661. A certain Hüseyin Çavuş had passed away years before, 
leaving behind a considerable number of properties to be divided among his three 
daughters and wife. His estate had remained undivided while his three daughters were 
alive. In the meantime, the daughters formed their own conjugal families. One of them, 
Saliha, married twice, and had a child from her first marriage. When Saliha passed away, 
her legal heirs consisted of her second husband, her child, her two sisters, and her mother. 
When the child died soon after Saliha, her first husband became an heir to the deceased 
child, and therefore an indirect heir to Hüseyin Çavuş‘s undivided estate. To further 
complicate the matter, one after another, Hüseyin‘s other two daughters passed away as 
well, leaving their husbands and mother as their heirs. With so many indirect heirs, the 
division of Hüseyin Çavuş‘s estate would require judicial attention. The kadı employed 
the algebra of the feraid rules, distributing Hüseyin Çavuş‘s estate into 9,216 shares, of 
which 4,449 shares would go to his widow; 672 to Saliha‘s second husband and 1,120 to 
her first husband; 1,050 to the husband of Hüseyin Çavuş‘s second daughter; and 1,925 to 
the husband of the third daughter.161 
 Women‘s right to inheritance was a central theme of the feraid rules and one of 
the revolutionary aspects of Islam. The feraid rules complimented the existing pre-
                                                 
161 İŞS 9: 154b, 25 M 1072. 
 120 
Islamic inheritance traditions with a list of female heirs through Quranic verses.162 The 
message of women‘s inheritance rights permeated time and space to challenge patrilineal 
and patrilocal traditions in which women were systematically disinherited. The late 
medieval Maghrebi jurists, for example, viewed systematic exclusion of women from 
their legally inherited properties as a sign of apostasy, which would require the Muslim 
state to wage a holy war against fellow Muslims who ignored the Quranic verses. The 
Cairene Maliki jurist of the fourteenth century, Sidi Khalil, for example, protested the 
exclusion of female heirs from inheritance through family endowments. The Hanbali 
school held that the exclusion of any heir was illegal.163 Regardless of the sensitivities of 
Muslim jurists about women‘s entitlement to their Quranic shares, the incompatibility of 
legal norms and social practices with these dictates, time and again, led certain societies 
to bypass Islamic laws of inheritance and occasionally resulted in the disinheritance of 
women.164  
In this chapter, I analyze the intersection of inheritance laws with social practice 
in order to examine women‘s right to inheritance in Istanbul in 1659-1661. I argue that 
Istanbulites used a wide variety of legal mechanisms in order to arrange for the 
devolution of their estate. Istanbulite women in this period inherited, but not always 
exactly according to the feraid rules. The application of the feraid rules for women 
depended on many factors such as the amount of one‘s estate that was actually divisible 
                                                 
162 Noel J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 29-
30. 
163 Layish, "The Mālikī Family Waqf According to Wills and Waqfiyyāt," 8-9; J. N. D. Anderson, "The 
Religious Element in Waqf Endowments," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 38 (1951): 298. 
164 One example is the Malikis of Algeria, whose family endowments disinherited female heirs until the 
colonial period. Layish, "The Mālikī Family Waqf According to Wills and Waqfiyyāt," 1-32. 
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by the feraid rules; whether or not a widow had borne children to her late husband; the 
age and sex of her children; and her decision to remarry. It was the intersection of these 
factors with the prescriptions of the feraid rules that determined when, how, and to what 
extent women were entitled to their inheritance rights. 
The observance of Islamic inheritance laws depended not only on the 
compatibility of legal norms with dominant social practices, but also on the power of 
state to enforce the laws. Pastoral and tribal societies in which the power of the state was 
limited could therefore easily maintain their inheritance systems. In urban societies, 
however, particularly those under the jurisdiction of a powerful state, individuals sought 
alternative legal mechanisms if the feraid rules proved too rigid to support their 
traditional inheritance practices. Ottoman cities of the seventeenth century such as Bursa 
and Kayseri were examples of cities in which ignoring Islamic inheritance laws was not 
an option. The residents of the capital in 1659-1661 were under even stricter legal 
surveillance than the Anatolian cities. After all, the capital was the seat of the empire‘s 
highest echelons of the judicial and legal hierarchy. So was the seat of the empire‘s most 
important legal and executive council, the imperial divan (divan-ı hümâyun), to which 
Istanbulite men and women had easier access than did residents of other parts of the vast 
empire. A systematic breach of inheritance laws for the urban population of the empire, 
and particularly for Istanbulites, did not seem to be an option.   
Hanafi law, as the only school of Islamic law applicable in many parts of the 
empire including Istanbul, recognized more flexibility in inheritance arrangements when 
compared to other schools of law. Accordingly, the use of non-feraid mechanisms of 
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inheritance in order to exclude legal heirs, including women, was regarded as equally 
legitimate as the application of the feraid rules. Residents of Istanbul in 1659-1661, 
therefore, felt legally and morally free to arrange for the devolution of their properties to 
future generations as they wished. Theoretically speaking, Hanafi law permitted 
mechanisms that could disinherit women or give them shares equal to those of men, both 
of which were perfectly legal. Within this legal context, answering the questions of 
whether or not and to what extent women inherited can shed more light on Istanbulites‘ 
social practice than can an analysis solely of the relevant legal prescriptions.  
Despite the sophisticated knowledge of legal scholars and practitioners regarding 
the division of estates based on the feraid rules, and despite the financial incentives to 
abide by these regulations, seventeenth-century Istanbulites did not leave their 
inheritance to be regulated by these predetermined rules. Instead, they effectively used 
other inheritance mechanisms to determine who would benefit from the estate and to 
what extent. While they were still alive, many individuals would arrange preemptively 
for the inheritance of their estates through other mechanisms already recognized and 
permitted by Islamic law. (For my examination of family trusts, see chapters 4.)  
Even when such arrangements did not take place, the heirs were not passive 
subjects of the feraid rules. They frequently retained their inherited estate undivided for 
generations, as long as the family continued as a social unit. Even when disruptions 
within a family took place, members used negotiations and mediations to arrange for the 
division of the inherited properties. The feraid rules were applied in the absence of the 
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social ties between legal heirs, particularly when it consisted of distant relatives or when 
it included the state among the legal heirs. 
FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 
One area of contention in the field of Muslim women‘s inheritance rights is the 
question of whether or not women actually acquired the inherited properties to which 
they were legally entitled. While studies on sicils usually suggest that Muslim urban 
women acquired their inherited properties,165 anthropologists have found many cases in 
which women were disinherited, particularly of agricultural lands.166 Moors questions the 
urban-rural dichotomy among historians and anthropologists and observes that 
Palestinian women in both urban and rural areas were excluded from their inheritance 
rights. She argues, however, that women‘s disinheritance did not necessarily lead to their 
disempowerment; many times a woman‘s actual acquisition of her inheritance might 
                                                 
165 For relevant sicil studies, for example, see Haim Gerber, "Sharia, Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman 
Law: The Court Records of 17th-Century Bursa," International Journal of Turkish Studies 2, no. 1 (1981): 
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166 For a sample of such anthropological studies see Deniz Kandiyoti, "Social Change and Family Structure 
in a Turkish Village," in Kinship and Modernization in Mediterrannean Society, ed. P. G.  Peristiani 
(Rome: The Center for Mediterrannean Studies, 1976), 61-71; Peters, "The Status of Women in Four 
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example, John R. Bowen, "Equality, Difference, and Law in Indonesian Inheritance Practices: A Sumatran 
Case Study," Political and Legal Anthropology Review 19, no. 1 (1996): 83-90; C. W. Watson, "Islamic 
Family Law and the Minangkabau of West Sumatra," Cambridge Anthropology 16, no. 2 (1992): 69-84. 
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cause alienation from her kin, who provided the main source of emotional and material 
support.167  
The sicil studies, however, are not uniform in their answers to the question of 
women‘s disinheritance. Gerber and Meriwether argue for the exact application of feraid 
rules in seventeenth-century Bursa and eighteenth-century Aleppo, respectively. Others 
maintain that women had difficulty in acquiring their inherited properties due to either 
being pressured to sell out their shares168 or by the application of other mechanisms of 
inheritance such as endowments and bequests.169 Similar to Moors‘ findings, Leslie 
Peirce observes that the sixteenth-century women of Aintab gave away their properties in 
order to gain ―social capital,‖ i.e. acquire support from their male family members.170 
While my findings for Istanbul in 1659-1661 corroborate the argument that 
familial ties played a role in women‘s negotiation over their inherited properties, it seems 
that Istanbulite women in this period were generally more protective of their inheritance 
when compared to their modern Palestinian counterparts. Estates, such as that of Hüseyin 
Çavuş, often remained undivided for a considerable period of time. Despite this, 
women‘s right to inheritance was not usually forsaken. Istanbulite Muslim women in the 
period under study benefitted from male support in managing their properties; yet, the 
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fact that the legal ownership of their properties remained in their hands can be observed 
from the inheritance cases that appeared generations after the death of a certain person. If 
the pendulum for other Muslim women of other times and places was between receiving 
their feraid shares on the one hand and total disinheritance on the other, Istanbulite 
women of this period had a particular status. In a city which had a considerable amount 
of its properties alienated in the form of endowments, women of this period inherited the 
right to their usufruct on equal footing with their male counterparts. The actual division 
of inheritance based on the feraid rules, as this chapter demonstrates, happened rarely and 
only in the absence of the nuclear family members of a deceased person. When the feraid 
rules failed to be applied, however, it was not because judges were ignoring the Islamic 
laws of inheritance, and it did not lead to the disinheritance of women. The appointment 
of a widow as the guardian of her orphaned children, for example, was a judicial 
discretion used by the judges of Istanbul. In practice, it left estates undivided and the 
widow in control of almost all of the properties inherited from her late husband. 
Similarly, the egalitarian division of the right to usufruct of endowed properties between 
male and female descendants, for example, was sanctioned by the judges of Istanbul 
because Islamic law prescribed it to be so.   
    The details of Hüseyin Çavuş‘s inheritance case demonstrate that the 
meticulous calculus used by the kadı did little more than pay lip service to the feraid 
rules. Among the most valuable properties Hüseyin Çavuş left was a house worth 
100,000 aspers as well the domestic material within the house. It is unlikely that a man 
such as Hüseyin Çavuş, the owner of an expensive house, did not have any other assets. 
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He might have been a creditor or borrower of money and the owner of other commercial 
and residential properties. Yet, the record does not provide a comprehensive list of the 
inherited items, and includes only the estimated value of an inherited house. Furthermore, 
it does not record the exact monetary value of the exchanged items at the time of the 
―division‖ of Hüseyin Çavuş‘s estate. Rather, it simply records the final outcome of a 
possible intra-familial negotiation.   
The parties involved in Hüseyin Çavuş‘s inheritance case can also illuminate 
more details about contemporary inheritance practices and family relationships. This 
particular court case was initiated by İbrahim, the second husband of Hüseyin Çavuş‘s 
daughter Saliha. On the other side of the case stood not only Hüseyin Çavuş‘s widow 
Kelale, but also Şahin, the husband of the daughter who was the last to pass away among 
the sisters. The two parties—Kelale and Şahin on the one hand, and İbrahim on the 
other—maintained that they had settled the inheritance issues among themselves. The 
fact that Kelale and Şahin stood together as a united party indicates that the two lived 
together in the inherited house and had been viewed as the possessors of the entire estate 
until İbrahim launched his case to take his share. Keeping the estate intact served a 
significant function for Hüseyin‘s widow Kelale. Not having any sons, Kelale sought the 
support of her son-in-law. In return, she provided him with a large house to reside in. It is 
likely that Kelale‘s daughters did not ask for their shares of the estate immediately after 
their father‘s death so that their mother could continue to reside on the property. By the 
time Hüseyin Çavuş‘s estate finally did come to be divided among legal heirs, none of his 
descendants were still alive. Hüseyin Çavuş‘s inheritance case demonstrates that the non-
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application of the feraid rules did not necessarily mean the exclusion of female heirs. 
Rather, the sharia court maintained a low profile, permitting family members to arrange 
for optimal solutions. The judges of Istanbul provided the legal framework by 
ascertaining each heir‘s legal shares according to the feraid rules and permitted the 
family members to negotiate their property rights.    
ISLAMIC INHERITANCE SYSTEM 
The ―Islamic law of inheritance‖ is usually used to refer to the feraid rules, which 
prescribed who legal heirs were and what share each heir was entitled to. The entitlement 
of any heir depended on their membership in the categories of ―agnatic‖ and ―Quranic‖ 
heirs. Agnatic heirs were all male relatives connected through men to the praepositus (the 
deceased person who owned intestate properties at the time of death). Therefore, one‘s 
son, brother, and father were agnatic heirs. The male ascendants and descendants of these 
relatives were also considered as agnatic heirs. In the presence of multiple agnatic heirs, 
those who were closer to the praepositus would exclude those who were farther. 
Accordingly, an uncle would exclude all paternal nephews from inheritance. According 
to Coulson, the rules pertaining to agnatic heirs‘ inheritance are reminiscent of the pre-
Islamic tribal traditions of Arabia.171 
The Quran assigned some portions of the estate to certain relatives, including 
some female and non-agnatic relatives such as daughters, sisters, and uterine brothers. 
The agnatic relatives become entitled to inheritance only when the assigned shares to the 
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Quranic heirs (zev’il-feraid) do not exhaust the entire estate. There are twelve Quranic 
heirs: daughter, agnatic granddaughter, husband, wife, father, mother, agnatic 
grandfather, grandmother, uterine brother, uterine sister, consanguine sister, and germane 
sister.172 Being a Quranic heir, however, does not automatically render one an heir. While 
spouses, parents, and daughters cannot be excluded from the estate under any 
circumstances, the entitlement of other Quranic heirs was conditional. Siblings of a 
deceased person can inherit only if the latter had no surviving children. A granddaughter 
and a grandparent can inherit only in the absence of son and parent, respectively. A 
father, or, in his absence, an agnatic grandfather, are entitled to inheritance both as a 
Quranic heir and agnatic heir. Sons and non-uterine brothers are merely agnatic heirs. 
Because of the general rule that males get twice the share as females of the same status, 
daughters don‘t receive their Quranic share in the presence of surviving sons. Rather, the 
daughters receive half of what the sons receive.    
The application of the feraid rules sometimes had consequences that were not 
necessarily compatible with the prevalent definitions of kin and family in a given time. 
The notion of an agnatic heir (‘asaba) excluded all non-Quranic female relatives as well 
as male relatives connected through female relatives from inheritance. Accordingly, 
aunts, nieces, children of a daughter or sister and paternal aunts were categorically 
excluded from the estate, while male ancestors through the paternal line, male children of 
male siblings, and male children of paternal uncles were potential heirs. Even when they 
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did provide for female kin, these rules gave larger portions of an estate to men in the 
paternal family line. Furthermore, the Hanafi feraid rules did not recognize the doctrine 
of representation, which would entitle the surviving grandchildren to the shares of their 
deceased parents. In the presence of agnatic nephews (brother‘s sons), therefore, a 
daughter‘s daughter would be excluded from the entire estate.  
The feraid rules were particularly complicated in the determination of ―outer‖ 
family members, who were neither Quranic heirs nor agnatic family members. Outer 
family members could have a close relationship to the praepositus and yet be disinherited 
in favor of Quranic and/or agnatic family members. The agnatic grandson of a paternal 
uncle, for example, would trump a daughter‘s daughter as heir, the former being an 
agnatic heir and the latter an outer family member.173 
An additional, and perhaps more significant, problem with the feraid rules is that 
they are context-blind. Muslim families functioned within specific contexts, assigning 
varying financial responsibilities to male and female members of the family. An adult 
married son, according to the feraid rules, was entitled to the same share as his infant 
brother. A widow‘s decision to remarry was irrelevant to her entitlement in the estate. A 
young widow with several minor children was entitled to the same share as if she was a 
senior widow with adult and married children. In practice, however, as this chapter 
demonstrates, seniority and marriage transformed the lives of Istanbulite men and women 
and their membership within the family. Therefore, their entitlement to the same 
inheritance shares regardless of their status and ties within the family led Istanbulites to 
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arrange for more socially acceptable solutions within the broad framework of the Islamic 
inheritance system.  
The centrality of the feraid rules, as extensively elaborated by jurists, combined 
with the existence of other multiple mechanisms of inheritance, might lead to some 
confusion in terminology. In this chapter, I use Powers‘ term ―Islamic inheritance 
system‖ to refer to the comprehensive set of rules that regulated inheritance and ―feraid 
rules‖ to refer to the particular set of prescribed rules that divided estates among heirs.174 
In this way, I hope to avoid the ambiguities about the term Islamic law (in the singular) of 
inheritance. After all, other inheritance mechanisms, such as inter vivos gifts, bequests, 
and endowments, were all regulated by Islamic law. The transfer of one‘s right to 
usufruct of either agricultural land or endowment was regulated by imperial orders and 
not the feraid rules. Yet, such practices were well integrated within the broader Islamic 
inheritance system as the early modern jurists recognized and legitimized Ottoman 
sultans‘ decrees on inheriting the right to usufruct.175 
FERAID RULES IN THE ISTANBUL SHARIA COURT (1659-1661) 
The financial concerns of the state agents involved in regulating inheritance 
played a significant role in the actual application of relevant laws. The fee associated 
with the registration of estates whetted the appetite of the court personnel to act 
rigorously in dividing inheritance among heirs based on the feraid rules.176 Nevertheless, 
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the kadıs were frequently reminded by the central authority not to intervene if there were 
no legal reason to record estates.  Estates needed only to be recorded with the court when 
there were concerns about the rights of those who did not have the legal capacity to act 
on their own behalf: minors, the mentally disabled, and those who were not physically 
present in the location where the estate was divided. Otherwise, the parties involved 
would have to request the court‘s involvement.177 As we will see below, officials‘ 
financial incentive to register inherited estates, and individuals‘ lack of incentive to do so, 
left a significant portion of estates beyond the scope of the court‘s jurisdiction.  
INTESTATE INHERITANCE: İCARETEYN AND MUKTATA‘A 
Many people did or could arrange for the posthumous distribution of their 
property during their lifetimes. However, many of the estates brought before the court  
involved only a fraction of the entire property of the deceased—a sign that many estates 
to which the feraid rules were applied had in fact been largely divided up by other means 
on a previous occasion. Individuals could arrange for several forms of pre-mortem 
provisions, such as founding a family trust, giving away gifts, or bequeathing. While 
gifted properties had to be handed over to the beneficiary immediately, bequeathed and 
endowed properties usually remained in the control of the original owner until his death. 
Regardless, since gifted, endowed, or bequeathed properties were no longer considered 
―owned‖ by the deceased, they were not subject to division by the feraid rules.  
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There was yet another area of properties which stood beyond the jurisdiction of 
the feraid rules, which resulted in a significant impact on women‘s inheritance rights. 
The intestate properties (the estates which remained undivided upon the owner‘s death) 
formed two primary categories based on the extent to which the praepositus had 
controlled the property. Ownership, in legal terms, meant enjoying the right to the 
―rakaba‖ of property, indicating an unlimited right to possess, rent, sell, modify, or give 
away as gift.178 Legal possession and use of a property, however, did not necessitate its 
ownership. A right to usufruct (menfaat), for example of a rented house, gave the 
possessor some limited right to benefit from a property according to the conditions of the 
lease.  
The Ottomans inherited the Mamluk tradition of regarding agricultural lands as 
the state‘s property. By the sixteenth century, the theory that the state had the right to the 
rakaba of the land and the peasants‘ tax was a form of rent became the dominant legal 
theory among the Hanafi jurists, and was particularly promoted by Ebu‘s-su‗ud, the chief 
jurist of Süleyman the Magnificent. Such lands were called miri (imperial) lands to 
distinguish them from privately owned or endowed lands. The miri land, according to the 
new legal regime, theoretically belonged to God and the state acted as its administrator. 
The Ottoman jurists further elaborated on another legal problem, the inheritance of miri 
land. While in practice, pre-Ottoman Muslim states maintained the practice of leaving 
agricultural lands only in the hands of men, Ottoman jurists of the sixteenth century 
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legalized and legitimized the practice by granting the ruler the right to determine 
pertaining inheritance rules. Women, nonetheless, were almost categorically excluded 
from inheritance, though now in no particular contradiction with the Islamic laws of 
inheritance. A new terminology was coined in order to refer to this particular method of 
inheritance. İntikal-i âddi (literally ordinary transfer), as opposed to the feraid rules, 
prescribed that miri lands were automatically transferred from fathers to sons. In the 
absence of any surviving sons, daughters had the right to step in, but on the condition of 
proving that they could cultivate them and only after paying an initial fee.179 Some 
agrarian properties in the larger Istanbul area in the seventeenth century were transferred 
according to ―ordinary transfer.‖180 
Another category of real estate whose inheritance rules were not determined by 
feraid rules were endowments. Setting aside lands and urban residential properties for 
either public philanthropic purposes or for supporting one‘s family excluded them from 
the category of private property and therefore rendered the feraid rules inapplicable. 
According to the Hanafis, the founder had the right to stipulate who the beneficiaries 
were without any limitations, which also had a significant impact on women‘s inheritance 
rights for Istanbulites in the second half of the seventeenth century (see chapter 4).  
An important legal innovation in the Ottoman Empire that considerably changed 
women‘s right to inheritance was the introduction of icareteyn (literally double rent) for 
endowed properties. Accordingly, a tenant would give a huge amount of money, close to 
                                                 
179 Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukı  Tahlilleri, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 
1990), 97-98.  
180 İŞS9: 152b, 5 S 1072.  
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the real value of the property, in the form of ―advance rent‖ (mu‘accele) at the beginning 
of the lease period and then make nominal and periodical payments in the form of 
―delayed rent‖ (mü’eccele). The most important aspect of the icareteyn contracts was 
their perpetuity. Unlike other forms of rent, tenants with icareteyn contract had the right 
to either benefit from the rented property as long as they lived, or transfer their right to 
others (ferağ). More importantly for this chapter, tenants had the right to inherit these 
rented properties. The pertaining inheritance law, however, was very different both from 
the feraid rules as well as the rules regulating the inheritance of miri lands. After the 
death of an icareteyn tenant, only his sons and daughters could inherit the rented 
property. A significant difference of this new regulation was that sons and daughters had 
equal shares.181  
The introduction of icareteyn brought about another long-lease form of endowed 
properties. The periodic fires and earthquakes in Istanbul destroyed large portions of the 
capital‘s residential and commercial properties. If the administrator of a destroyed 
endowment did not have enough funds to repair the buildings, he/she could lease the land 
and permit the tenant to build private buildings on top of the endowed land. Mukata‘a 
leases, therefore, introduced new forms of property which were partially endowed and 
partially private properties. The muktata‘a lease resembled icareteyn in that the tenant 
had to pay a substantial sum at the beginning and periodical rents afterwards for the 
rented land. The mukta‘a land, however, was inseparable from the private buildings 
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constructed above it and the sale of such private buildings also required the transfer 
(ferağ) of the land to the buyer.  
The perpetual lease in the form of icareteyn and mukata‘a, however, was a 
controversial issue among Muslim jurists. The Hanafi jurists permitted it only in 
exceptional cases. If the endowed properties were in ruins and the administration did not 
have enough funds to repair them, the prospective tenant and the administrator of 
endowment had to acquire an imperial permission for either icareteyn or mukata‘a. Only 
after securing such permission could the endowed properties be rented out in perpetuity. 
The permissibility of these practices was debated among the sixteenth-century Ottoman 
jurists and was finally legalized in the seventeenth century.182 In seventeenth-century 
Ankara and Kayseri, endowed properties were rented out for short terms, usually for one 
year.183 A study of leases of endowed properties in Aleppo demonstrates that tenants and 
administrators used non-Hanafi judges to validate their long-leases; the practice of 
icareteyn was uncommon between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries despite the 
juristic elaborations in Istanbul.184 Aleppans had decided to use other schools of law 
instead of leasing on new but controversial legal norms. It seems that for provincial areas 
                                                 
182 Bülent Köprülü, "Evvelki Hukukumuzda Vakıf Nev'iyetleri ve İcareteynli Vakıflar," Ankara 
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184 Rafeq, "The Application of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Courts in Damascus: The Case of the Rental of 
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of the empire, perpetual lease had to wait the nineteenth century to become a prevalent 
method of possessing endowed properties.185  
Istanbul in the seventeenth century was very different from the provincial areas as 
far as icareteyn and mukata‘a leases were concerned. First, the proximity to the sultan 
rendered acquiring permissions for double-rent leases much easier than in any other areas 
of the empire. Second, Istanbulites did not have the luxury of using other schools of law; 
the Hanafi school had monopolistic jurisdiction over the Muslim residents of the capital. 
Istanbulites, therefore, took full advantage of the introduction of icareteyn and mukata‘a.    
By 1659-1661, the dense population of the city already had limited access to new 
residential properties in the form of private property. A considerable number of urban 
properties had been set up as endowments to support public buildings such as 
monumental mosques, fountains, and colleges (medreses). An increasing number of 
existing private real properties were also set up as family endowments. The fact that 
endowments were founded in perpetuity meant that the Istanbulites turned to endowed 
properties for residential or investment purposes. While short-term leases did exist, many 
Istanbulites sought a more reliable form of housing, one that would be safe against 
fluctuations in prices and the whims of a landlord.186 A study of the estate inventories of 
                                                 
185 Baer, "The Dismemberment of Awqâf in Early 19th-Century Jerusalem," 220-41; Hoexter, "Adaptation 
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186 As an example of the insecurity of short-term leases in Istanbul, a tenant came to the court in June 1661 
and maintain that he had rented a house from an endowment, but the administrator wanted to evict him 
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Istanbulites in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries demonstrates that such investments 
comprised a significant portion of Istanbulites‘ wealth.187 
Court documents that recorded lease contracts and transactions persistently 
demonstrate the prevalence of icareteyn and mutaka’a leases for both small and large 
properties in Istanbul in the period under study. Many plots of lands, houses, and 
particularly apartment complexes belonged to large endowments, and were rented out to 
individuals.188 Although the nominal rate would stay stable during the term of a lease, the 
appreciation in the rented property would be reflected in an advance payment. At the time 
of the sale of the usufruct right to a property, the amount of the advance payment was 
close to the current price of the property, which could change over time. 
The difference in the inheritance of miri lands and endowed properties reflected 
the disparate social assumptions and customary practices in rural and urban centers. The 
legislature, who came exclusively from an urban elite background, prescribed that the 
usufruct right to agricultural land had to pass to male children who were assumed to be 
capable of managing the land and maintaining its taxable productivity over generations. 
The management of urban properties, on the other hand, did not require masculine and 
muscular power. While many women got rid of their real estate to acquire cash and 
movable properties, many others decided to manage their real properties. After a period 
following the death of a certain İlyas, for example, his son and daughter appeared in the 
court in October 1661 to settle a dispute over the inheritance of a rented endowed 
                                                 
187 Bozkurt, "Tereke Defterleri ve Osmanlı Maddî Kültüründe Değişim (1785-1875 İstanbul  rneği)," 90-
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property. Their father, who was a peştemalcı (a dealer in or keeper of towels used in 
public baths), had invested in a one-room apartment, which was part of a large endowed 
complex. After his death, the investment was transferred equally to his son and daughter. 
The daughter was the sole manager of the property, probably due to the younger age of 
the son. The sale of their possession rights over the property to another person became 
the subject of a lawsuit with a third person, which was settled in the daughter‘s favor. The 
case explicitly mentioned the equal shares of the two siblings and the central role played 
by the daughter in the management and then sale of the property.189 İlyas‘s daughter did 
not disappoint the legislature‘s assumption about women‘s capability in managing their 
urban properties, and, when necessary, litigating to protect their rights.  
For the nuclear families of the Istanbulites in the period under study, icareteyn 
and mutaka’a had the obvious advantage of excluding non-nuclear and agnatic family 
members from estates. When, for example, a certain Mahmud passed away in August 
1661, his widow and two minor daughters were among his heirs. According to the feraid 
rules, the daughters would receive two-thirds of the estate, and the wife one-eighth. The 
remaining portion would belong to the agnatic heirs, such as a paternal uncle, or a male 
cousin. Mahmud and his wife had equally invested in the property that belonged to an 
endowment. The property was not private; rather, it was a mukata’a from the endowment 
and, therefore, the feraid rules were not applicable. In this case, half the property that 
belonged to the deceased Mahmud would pass exclusively to his two minor daughters. In 
order to solidify her management right over the property, Mahmud‘s wife purchased her 
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daughters‘ shares and became the sole possessor of the entire property.190 After her death, 
the entire property would pass again to the daughters. Investment in the increasing 
number of endowed properties, therefore, demonstrated a particular trend in the 
devolution of estates, one that included sons and daughters on an equal basis while 
excluding the agnatic heirs.   
INTESTATE INHERITANCE: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
The portion of the estate that was subject to division by feraid rules, then, was 
limited to that ―owned‖ by the praepositus at the time of his/her death. The Istanbulites in 
the period under study opted to limit the feraid rules to determine the heirs and their 
shares in the estate. The high number of court records involving estates theoretically 
divisible according to the feraid rules does not contradict the observation that Istanbulites 
managed inheritance through a wide range of mechanisms and rarely through the feraid 
rules. There are two primary reasons for the existence of such inheritable estates, both of 
which indicate the exceptionality of such cases: first, the praepositus died unexpectedly 
and therefore left his/her estate without any arrangements; second, the praepositus 
actually preferred the feraid rules to arrange for the transfer of his/her estate in cases in 
which his/her nuclear family members did not have to compete with the extended family 
members over the estate.  
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Unexpected Death 
The high mortality rate of the capital caught many residents of Istanbul by 
surprise, as was the case in many other parts of the world. The Great Fire of 1660 
devoured a good portion of the wooden houses in the walled city, causing the death of 
thousands of people.191 Both external wars and internal turmoil had significant impact on 
the life expectancy of the Istanbulites. Tens of thousands of members of the imperial 
army, frequently mobilized for campaigns on different borders of the empire, lived in or 
around the walled city. The uprisings in the capital between different political and 
military factions frequently became violent, causing the death of many officials including 
the şeyhülislams and grand viziers.192 Even travelling for pilgrimage and business out of 
the city was not a safe endeavor. Many travelers succumbed to the ―highway robbers‖ 
(kuttâ’-i tarîk)193 and to the hardships and diseases of the long journeys. The sudden and 
unexpected death of many Istanbulites left a considerable amount of inheritable estates to 
be divided among heirs according to the feraid rules.     
While court records did not always register the reason for a person‘s death, 
several examples show that the deceased‘s failure to arrange for the division of his or her 
estate was due to an expected death. When a certain Mustafa Çavuş died on a military 
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campaign to re-conquer Transylvania in November 1659,194 for example, his inheritance 
became the subject of a series of disputes (nizâ-i kesîr) between his heirs: his two wives, 
his adult daughter, and his agnatic nephew Ahmed Beg. The latter, according to the 
feraid rules, was entitled to three-eighths of the entire estate. Mustafa Çavuş‘s wives and 
daughter, however, wanted the entire estate to remain within the conjugal family. The 
ensuing disputes were eventually resolved after some ―mediators‖ (muslihun) 
intervened.195 Similarly, when a high-ranking officer of the Imperial Navy passed away 
on the island of Midilli (Lesbos) in October 1661, his inherited property in Istanbul was 
to be divided among his heirs, which included his widow, his minor daughter, and his two 
paternal uncles. He had not arranged for the devolution of his estate, and therefore, the 
uncles appeared in court as the shareholders of a significant portion of his estate.196   
State as the Shareholder 
In certain situations, the state could become an heir to the entirety or a portion of 
one‘s estate. The feraid rules recognized the state as an heir in cases when the estate was 
not exhausted by legal heirs. The introduction of the red principle by Hanafi jurists, 
however, rendered state‘s right in inheritance extremely limited. According to the red 
principle, the residue of an estate which was not exhausted by the feraid heirs would be 
redistributed among the existing heirs. Widows and widowers, however, were excluded 
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from receiving any shares in the redistributed residue. In practice, it meant that the state 
became a shareholder when a deceased person either did not have any heirs or had only a 
spouse as heir. The exclusion of spouses from the benefits of the red principle, however, 
had an uneven impact on widows and widowers. A childless widower was entitled to half 
of his late wife‘s estate while a childless widow‘s share was only one-fourth. 
Public treasurers (beytülmal emini), as the state‘s agents in receiving its shares 
from unexhausted estates, had become highly institutionalized by the seventeenth 
century. The office, by the seventeenth century, was farmed out to investors, whose 
collection of the state‘s inheritance shares provided a substantial amount of their income 
and profit.197 Public treasurers, therefore, acted quickly in appropriating any estate in 
which they had any possible share. The tax policies related to the collection of the estate 
of heirless deceased people further encouraged the officials to act vigilantly. In case the 
treasurers were wrong in appropriating the estate of a person who had surviving heirs, the 
latter not only had to prove that they were legal heirs; they also had to pay the officials 
for retrieving the misappropriated estate.198 Treasurers also brought numerous lawsuits 
against those who had allegedly violated the state‘s rights in unexhausted estates.199    
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Yet, a closer look at cases in which public treasurers were involved demonstrate 
that childless widows, who could inherit only one-fourth of their husbands‘ estate, used 
certain strategies to limit and challenge the state‘s rights to the estate. Such a case came 
to the attention of the court after the death of a certain İbrahim Çelebi on his pilgrimage 
to Mecca in September 1661. The treasurer did not lose any time bringing a lawsuit 
against İbrahim Çelebi‘s widow, named Fatma Hatun. Instead of simply acquiescing to 
the sound legal argument of the treasurer, Fatma Hatun was involved in a sophisticated 
web of connections involving notables of the neighborhood community in order to 
prevent the treasurer from acquiring her husband‘s estate. She argued that her husband 
arranged for a bequest before he went on his trip to Mecca. Accordingly, if he died on his 
pilgrimage, a considerable amount of his estate should go to his wife. The legal problem 
for such an arrangement was the one-third clause in Islamic law. One could not bequeath 
more than one-third of one‘s estate, and, more importantly, no legal heir could benefit 
from a bequest. Fatma Hatun bypassed that conundrum by claiming that her husband‘s 
will was, in fact, for the redemption of the money he had owed her (a considerable 
amount of 360 piasters in debt and a higher-than-average amount of 60 piasters in the 
form of a delayed bridal gift). This amount of cash would of course be on top of her legal 
right to one-fourth of the estate.  
For Fatma Hatun, the cooperation of the neighborhood community was essential 
in order to substantiate her claims. She took several steps to secure their involvement in 
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her favor. The first step was the appointment of a respected member of the community as 
the executor (vasi) of the bequest. This guardian was a certain Mehmed Çelebi, who held 
the same religious title as the deceased. The defendant argued that the executor had been 
appointed by the deceased İbrahim Çelebi before his death. The authenticity of this claim, 
as well as the terms of the bequest required the collaboration of other respectable 
members of the community. Three people gave such testimony, two of whom were 
members of the sâdât (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), and all of whom held the 
same title as the deceased İbrahim Çelebi. This communal support, however, came at a 
certain cost. The three çelebis testified that in addition to the amount of cash that was due 
to Fatma Hatun, the deceased İbrahim Çelebi had bequeathed some of his estate as an 
endowment to support the local mosque. The endowment would hire five people to recite 
the Quran within the mosque with a daily stipend, a stipulation that would generate 
additional income to the learned members of the community. The end result was the 
division of İbrahim Çelebi‘s estate between his widow and the fellow members of the 
community. The executor provided a detailed calculation of the assets and liabilities 
according to the alleged bequest. In the end, no money remained in İbrahim Çelebi‘s 
estate for the public treasurer to claim.200 
Patrimonial State        
In its patrimonial role, the state acted as the protector of orphans‘ financial 
interests through a careful supervision of the devolution of the estate, based on the feraid 
                                                 
200 İŞS9: 169a-b, 20 M 1072. 
 145 
rules in the absence of other alternative mechanisms. The state‘s patrimonial role was 
manifested after the murder of a grand vizier after an uprising in the capital. Tarhuncu 
Ahmed Paşa was executed in 1653 by the chief black eunuch, an act that was possibly 
ordered by the regent queen mother. Ahmed Paşa‘s execution, like the execution of many 
other grand viziers of the seventeenth century, was immediate, without either previous 
notice or a trial. As the grand vizier of the empire, he left a considerable estate. The only 
surviving heir was his minor daughter, Fatma. The sharia court, as one of the instruments 
of the patrimonial state, appointed İsmail Ağa, a member of the grandees (titled as 
fahr’ül-akran) as her guardian. The guardian, who was responsible for managing the 
property of the minor in her best interest, came to the court to register the sale of some of 
the inherited property, which was needed for the maintenance of the minor girl. The court 
record, in its formulaic nature, maintains that the sold property was auctioned and was 
purchased by the highest bidder, who happened to be two non-Muslim residents of 
Istanbul. Although we cannot be sure about how fair the process and price of the sale 
was,201 the state demonstrated its patrimonial role by recording minor children‘s 
properties; appointing guardians for them; requiring auctions for the sale of minor 
children‘s properties; and registering the transactions in the sharia court. The state might 
execute Fatma‘s father with no trial, but it was concerned with the wellbeing of his minor 
daughter. It provided a set of political and financial institutions that would implement the 
sharia rules pertaining to the protection of minor children‘s rights. On the state‘s part, it 
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was an ostentatious show of interest in safekeeping the interests of its powerless 
subjects.202    
This patrimonial role, however, was subject to negotiation and modification by 
interested parties, and not to a rigid set of pre-determined rules as prescribed by sharia 
and applied by state institutions. The state‘s patrimonial care for minor children could, at 
times, contradict the interests of widows who had limited inheritance rights (one-eighth 
in the presence of children) in their husbands‘ estate. If a late husband‘s heirs consisted of 
only his widow and minor children, then his widow‘s control of the entire or the majority 
of his estate was the norm (see below). Occasionally, however, widows with minor 
children legally lost control of their husbands‘ estates. In what follows, I will examine the 
strategies used by a widow with a minor son who had to share the inherited estate with 
her husband‘s children from another marriage. The state agents were involved in 
regulating the inheritance because minor children were among the heirs. The widow, 
however, negotiated with state officials and other involved parties in order to ameliorate 
her legally disadvantaged position.   
A certain Mahmud Ağa, a çavuşbaşı (high court official), was murdered in 
1656.203 His heirs were his wife Hemrah Hatun and his five minor children. The state 
played a patrimonial role in the following ways. First, the kassam-ı askeri registered 
Mahmud Ağa‘s inherited items and his heirs. Second, the court appointed Hemrah Hatun 
as the guardian of the minor children. She was the mother of one of Mahmud Ağa‘s sons, 
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and the rest were from a different mother or mothers. The mother(s) of the other children 
were either divorced or passed away before Mahmud Ağa‘s murder. Third, the court 
appointed a supervisor (nazır) to oversee the management of the inherited property by 
Hemrah Hatun. Although the wives of the deceased were generally appointed as the 
guardian of minor children without any extra supervision during this period, concern 
about Hemrah Hatun‘s capacity to manage such a large inheritance, or about her fairness 
in administering the property of her stepchildren, most likely drove the court to the 
appointment of a supervisor.204  
The items in Mahmud Ağa‘s estate suggest that there was yet another reason for 
the court‘s concerns about the management of the inherited properties. It included 
privately owned real estate and cash, as well as investments in perpetually leased 
properties that included two fruit and vegetable gardens, five shops in different parts of 
the city, a house, and an apartment complex (all located in Istanbul), as well as two mills 
in Rusçuk. The right to use these properties could be inherited by Mahmud Ağa‘s sons 
and daughters equally, but not by Hemrah Hatun. The court, therefore, might have been 
concerned about such a large portion of Mustafa Ağa‘s estate being managed by a woman 
who was not even legally entitled to it. The supervision of the nazır was subject, likewise, 
to a final level of supervision. He was supposed to provide a detailed report about the 
management of the estate to the court, in which court personnel including the court 
witnesses (şuhud el-hal) supervised the registration of Hemrah Hatun‘s financial 
transactions on behalf of the minor children. 
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Despite these careful patrimonial protections, Hemrah Hatun was able to become 
the manager of the entire inherited properties in the years after the death of her husband. 
A year before the supervisor‘s report, the Great Fire had devoured a huge number of 
properties in the capital.205 Among them were many items in Mahmud Ağa‘s estate. In 
addition to the costs of maintenance and a marriage trousseau for one minor daughter, 
Hemrah Hatun used a significant portion of her late husband‘s estate to repair the 
damaged properties. The report does not show any distinction between owned and leased 
properties in calculating the income and costs of the estate. A strict application of legal 
norms, however, should have clearly distinguished between such properties because 
leased properties would exclude Hemrah Hatun and include male and female children as 
equal inheritors, while the owned properties would be divided according to the feraid 
rules. Having proved her accountability through her cooperation with the supervisor, 
Hemrah Hatun was able to combine her late husband‘s owned and leased properties 
under her control. 
Considering the age of her only son, Hemrah Hatun was probably young, and 
could have remarried in the years after her husband‘s death. That would have led to the 
appointment of another person as the guardian of the minor children and the exclusion of 
Hemrah Hatun from her late husband‘s estate. Instead, she decided to maintain the 
integrity of her husband‘s family and property and remain as the manager of the 
undivided inheritable property. The court showed more interest in the wellbeing of the 
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minor children than in the observance of strict categorizations and divisions based on 
legal doctrine. It seems that Hemrah Hatun made calculated decisions to cooperate with 
the supervisor and the sharia court in order to maintain the integrity of the inherited 
estates and, through it, of her family.  
The Preferred Feraid Rules 
Not all the outcomes of the feraid rules were undesirable to the residents of 
Istanbul, which could be the reason that some Istanbulites did not make any particular 
arrangements for the transfer of their estates. Any son would exclude all agnatic relatives 
from inheriting. Therefore, unless the praepositus intended to provide for those who were 
non-feraid heirs, he or she did not have the incentive to circumvent the feraid rules. One 
such case came to the attention of the court on August 28, 1661. A certain Veli bin 
İbrahim, aware of his imminent death, perhaps due to illness, left his minor son and 
daughter as his only heirs. Veli‘s wife was not listed among the heirs, which means she 
most probably predeceased him.206 Therefore, Veli had to arrange for a smooth transition 
of his estate to the minor children in order to safeguard their financial wellbeing. In the 
presence of his son and daughter, the feraid rules would assign his entire estate to them to 
the exclusion of other relatives. Therefore, Veli did not have any incentive to circumvent 
the feraid rules as they already guaranteed a favorable outcome. Three days before his 
death, Veli held a meeting in the presence of some of the local elite—including a member 
of the Janissaries and the müezzin of a mosque—in which he officially appointed a 
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disqualify her as the guardian and custodian of Veli‘s children.   
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certain Ahmed Beşe as the guardian of the children.207 The guardian, then, would manage 
the estate, which according to the feraid rules, belonged to the children.208    
Unlike sons, daughters did not exhaust the entire estate. A daughter‘s feraid share, 
in the absence of a surviving son, was half of the estate. Two or more daughters were 
entitled to a total of two-thirds of the estate. In a scenario in which a man passed away 
leaving his widow and one daughter as heirs, the widow was entitled to one-eighth and 
the daughter to one half. The remaining three-eighth would belong to agnatic family 
members. In the absence of agnatic family members, the principle of red would divide 
the residue among the legal heirs with the exception of spouses. In this case, the residue 
would be returned to the daughter and the final division of the estate would be as follows: 
The widow would receive one-eighth of the estate, and the rest would belong to the 
daughter. This outcome could also be a favorable division of estate based on the feraid 
rules as long as the maintenance of the estate within the small nuclear family was the 
concern.209  
In certain cases, an undivided estate would remain within the same nuclear family 
even after the death of some heirs, which would legally redistribute their shares in 
inheritance. A certain İbrahim Beşe had passed away long before his inheritance case was 
                                                 
207 The court case does not elaborate on the relationship between Veli and Ahmed Beşe. Yet, the fact that 
Ahmed Beşe was a member of the Janissaries, with sufficient resources for executing the transfer of the 
estate and protecting the minors‘ rights, might have played a significant role in Veli‘s appointment of him 
as a guardian. 
208 İŞS9: 117b-118a, 2 M 1072.  
209 For cases in which daughters exhausted the entire estate due to the red principle which rendered their 
parents‘ pre-mortem inheritance arrangements unnecessary, see İŞS9: 161a, A S 1072; İŞS9: 161b-162a, 24 
S 1072; İŞS9: 134b, 28 M 1072; İŞS9: 138b, 28 M 1072; İŞS9: 161a, 21 S 1072; İŞS9: 161, 22 S 1072; 
İŞS9: 162b, 22 S 1072.  
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recorded in the sharia court in July 1661. His legal heirs consisted of his widow, his 
minor son, and his adult daughter. İbrahim Beşe was not worried about the division of his 
estate according to the feraid rules because members of his immediate nuclear family 
were entitled to the entire estate. That is probably why he left the estate without any 
particular arrangements. His nuclear family, consisting of his wife and children, did not 
divide the estate for many years. In this period, the daughter passed away and the minor 
son reached adulthood. The estate of the daughter, according to the feraid rules, would be 
divided between her mother and brother, which meant that the estate would remain within 
the small nuclear family. The mother and son appeared in the court in July 1661 to sell a 
house belonging to their joint inherited property, perhaps to meet their financial needs. 
Regardless of whether or not the estate was divided between the mother and son, it is 
significant to note that the feraid rules kept the property within the nuclear family after 
the death of not only the family‘s patriarch, but also of his daughter.210 
Accordingly, under certain circumstances, the feraid rules could actually help 
small nuclear families retain inherited properties. In such cases, the feraid rules provided 
legal protection against the claims of extended family members. After the death of a 
woman named Ayşe, for example, her daughter Fatma and nephew Mehmed initiated a 
legal dispute over her estate in July 1661. According to the feraid rules, Fatma, the 
daughter, was entitled to half the estate. The remaining part would belong to agnatic 
family members. In their absence, the entire estate, based on the principle of red, would 
belong to the daughter. Mehmed, however, was not an agnatic nephew. Had he been the 
                                                 
210 İŞS 9:34b, 6 Za 1071.  
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deceased Ayşe‘s brother‘s son, he would have a sound legal claim. Unfortunately for 
him, he was Ayşe‘s sister‘s son. Once the merits of the legal arguments of both parties 
were set, the judge decided that Fatma was entitled to the entire estate, excluding 
Mehmed altogether.211 
DIVISION OF THE ESTATE 
While the inter vivos arrangements for the division of an estate provide 
information on who belonged to the deceased‘s household, the post-mortem divisions 
demonstrate the fragility of such family structures. Regardless of how long the inheritable 
estate remained in joint possession of family members,212 there were certain moments 
that signified the end of the family as a social unit, resulting in the division of the 
communally-held property among the individuals who had been members of the same 
family.  
Matrimony created a fragile link between an individual and his or her spouse‘s 
extended family. A married couple usually separated from their paternal households in 
order to form their own small conjugal family. The death of a husband, however, created 
                                                 
211 İŞS9: 170a, 1 Ra 1072. For a similar case in which a widow, who was also the guardian of her minor 
children, won against her late husband‘s extended family members, see İŞS8: 26b, 15 Ra 1071. 
212 The cases involving undivided estates usually do not mention exactly when the principal praepositus 
died. Some circumstantial evidence, however, shows that such estates were undivided for a long period of 
time. In one such example, the estate belonged to the wife and son of a deceased person. At the time of the 
praepositus‘s death, the son was legally a minor (sağîr). This small family, consisting of a mother and a 
son, did not divide the estate for a considerably long time. By July 1661, when the two came to sell an 
inherited property, the son had become mature (İŞS9: 34b, 6 Za 1071). The non-division of inherited 
residential properties was also detected in the documents about the transaction of real estate. In the absence 
of street names, the court records showed the address of any real property by the name of the neighborhood 
and/or district in which they were located, as well as the properties on the four sides of the property in 
question. Some of these properties were inherited but not divided amongst the heirs; these were recorded as 
the ―inherited property‖ of the original owner (İŞS9: 21, 29 L 1071).    
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a complicated relationship between the widow and her late husband‘s paternal family, 
which was manifested in the court cases pertaining to the division of the late husband‘s 
estate. A widow would usually strive to maintain the integrity of her small conjugal 
family after her husband‘s death, which was typically in contradiction with her late 
husband‘s family‘s financial interests. The end result of the bargaining between the late 
husband‘s paternal family and the widow‘s small conjugal family depended on a number 
of factors, including the widow‘s maternity, the age and sex of her children, and her 
decision to remarry.  
The continuation of a widow‘s control over the property of the conjugal family 
depended largely on whether or not she had children. After her husband‘s death, a widow 
had to compete with her husband‘s paternal family members over the material resources 
accumulated within her conjugal family, including any property her husband had 
inherited from his paternal family. If the widow had no surviving children from her 
husband, the latter‘s paternal family members acted quickly to appropriate the inherited 
estate from the widow. In such cases, widows usually demanded the one-fourth of their 
husband‘s estate in addition to their delayed dower.213  
If the deceased patriarch had minor children, it was usually the mother of the 
children who retained the integrity of the family and their financial assets (see below). 
The mother was usually appointed as the guardian (vasi) of the children, after which she 
                                                 
213 İŞS 9:49b-50a, 17 Za 1071. For a similar case, in which the widow was compensated before being 
excluded from the estate by her deceased husband‘s siblings, see İŞS9: 154b, 14 S 1072. In yet another 
case, the heirs of a deceased man were his widow and his brother. The widow sued a person who owed her 
deceased husband, after which they agreed to an amicable settlement. It is interesting that she claimed only 
her one-fourth share in the owed money, a clear indication that the she and her brother-in-law had already 
divided the estate (İŞS9: 162b, 23 S 1072). For a similar case see İŞS8: 39b, 14 Ra 1071.  
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would control the entire estate in their names. Being the custodians (hâdine) of their 
minor children by default, widows‘ guardianship over their children granted them the 
absolute authority to possess and manage the entire inherited estate. After the death of her 
husband Mahmud Ağa, Hemrah Hatun (discussed above) had been appointed as the 
custodian of his five minor children—despite the fact that she was the mother of only one 
son and the other children were from a different mother or mothers. Five years later, a 
detailed list of her subsequent financial activities showed that Hemrah had inherited 
638,000 aspers in cash, collected some 555,000 aspers from those who owed her late 
husband, and collected the rent from Mahmud Ağa‘s real-estate investment amounting to 
166,650 aspers. In total, she had acquired the considerable amount of 1,370,350 aspers in 
this five year period. Even after the redemption of Mahmud Ağa‘s debts, she was still in 
charge of about one million aspers.214 
From the list of her expenditures, it becomes evident that Hemrah Hatun did not 
rush to sell income-generating investments such as the numerous apartment complexes, 
shops, mills, and horticultural gardens included in her late husband‘s estate. She was not 
intimidated by the fact that these investments were scattered not only in different parts of 
Istanbul, but also in Rusçuk (in modern Bulgaria) as well as in Aksaray in Anatolia. 
According to the list of expenditures she repaired and maintained the far-flung properties. 
The management of significant investments spread over a large geographic area, 
however, often came with disputes. Hemrah Hatun therefore, took necessary measures to 
                                                 
214 İŞS8: 38a-38b, 10 Ra 1071. For similar cases of widows‘ actual control and management of their late 
husbands‘ estates see İŞS9:29a, 5 Za 1071; İŞS9:35b, 6 Za 1071; İŞS9: 36a, 29 L 1071. 
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safeguard her possessions. She sent her minor son and a certain Hacı Süleyman to take 
care of ―an important affair‖ in the city of Edirne, which was now practically the seat of 
Mehmed IV. It seems that ―the important affair‖ pertained to a dispute over mills in 
Rusçuk. The case ended in an amicable settlement, according to which she retained the 
possession of the mills in return for some 20,000 aspers. After the Great Fire of 1660, she 
took care of repairing some of damaged properties in the capital. Hemrah Hatun‘s 
economic activities were not typical of Istanbulite widows in this period, who would 
usually sell their real estate in order to provide for their minor children. Hemrah Hatun, 
however, different from the majority of other widows, had to share her husband‘s estate 
with his children from another marriage. She had to prove her capability of controlling 
and managing the properties in order to maintain her status as the guardian of not only 
her minor son, but also her step-children.  
 Even in the rare cases in which widows were not appointed guardians of their 
minor children, they were their natural custodians according to Islamic law and custom. 
The custody of the children necessitated child support payments from the estate of their 
deceased father. The custodian mother was entitled to receive and spend the payment on 
behalf of their minor children. Widows used their custody-related financial power to keep 
the family and its property together. After the death of a certain el-Hac Ebubekir, he had 
left his inheritable estate to his wife and his minor son. The court appointed a certain 
Musa as the guardian of the child. Regardless, the mother remained as the child‘s legal 
custodian, for whom the court determined child support of four aspers a day should be 
paid by the guardian. The guardian now had control over the child‘s inherited estate, 
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including the residential house in which the widow and the minor child resided. Yet, the 
guardian and the custodian appeared in front of the Istanbul judge in order to record a 
mutual agreement, according to which the guardian would rent the residential house to 
the custodian for four aspers a day. It was the exact amount the guardian was supposed to 
pay for the childcare. In effect, they had agreed that the custodian mother would not ask 
the guardian for child support, and the guardian would not ask the mother for the rent. 
The widow, through her role as the custodian, had remained in control of the inherited 
house.215  
Judicial Intervention in Family Formations 
The judicial decisions to appoint guardians over minors had a direct impact on 
who controlled the bulk of the estate. The feraid rules clearly prioritized children over 
other members of the family. Therefore, whoever was appointed guardian of minor 
children would control a significant portion of the estate. The appointment, dismissal, and 
reappointment of guardians were all at the discretion of the sharia court. Gender played a 
significant role in this decision-making process. If the mother died, there was no question 
about guardianship, since the father would act as the natural veli and vasi.216  If, however, 
                                                 
215 İŞS9: 168b, 1 Ra 1072. Widows would frequently appear in front of the judge to register their right to 
child support after the death of their husbands. See for example İŞS8: 23b, 22 Ra 1071. Non-Muslims 
applied rarely to the court to settle their intra-familial issues. Yet, when they did apply, they were entitled 
to similar treatment as their Muslim counterparts. In one such case, an Armenian widow, who had been 
appointed as the guardian of her son and was already his legal custodian, applied to the sharia court to 
determine the amount of the child support. The court determined that two aspers a day could be taken from 
the inherited estate to support the child (İŞS9: 17b, 25 L 1071).   
216 Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine, 138. It was 
very exceptional for the widowers to acquire a judicial permission to control their minor children‘s 
property. See, for example, İŞS9: 121b, 15 M 1072. The term veli was used for the father‘s capacity to 
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the father died, guardianship was a matter of negotiation between the court, the mother, 
and the deceased husband‘s paternal family members. Islamic law appointed the paternal 
male family members as the default guardians after minor children‘s fathers passed 
away.217 Judicial discretion, however, meant that judges might appoint mothers rather 
than paternal male family members as guardians.218  
In Istanbul in the period under study, judges predominantly used their discretion 
in favor of mothers as guardians. Except for a few cases, whenever minor children and 
their mothers were among the heirs to the father‘s estate (i.e., if the mother was still alive 
and married to the husband at the time of his death), the court almost exclusively 
nominated mothers as legal guardians, regardless of the presence of agnatic family 
members.219 Widowed mothers, however, lost their status as the natural guardians of their 
own minor children if they decided to remarry. In such cases, the court would re-instate 
the paternal male family member of the children as their guardians. In other words, the 
remarriage of a widow would transfer the control of the majority of the property from her 
to her late husband‘s agnatic relatives, including his brothers, uncles, nephews, cousins, 
                                                                                                                                                 
marry his daughter off and vasi was used for his capacity to serve as the guardian, though they were often 
used interchangeably. Ibid., 138, n.64. 
217 Ibid., 142. 
218 Judicial discretion in the seventeenth century was in line with the contemporary jurisprudential opinions 
that viewed mothers as normal guardians. See ibid. 
219 Widows were the primary candidates as guardians of their minor children. See İŞS8: 38a-38b, 10 Ra 
1071; İŞS7: 11a, 23 M 1070; İŞS8: 12b-13b, 15 Z 1071; İŞS8: 14b, 6 Ra 1071; İŞS8: 30b, 4 R 1071; İŞS8: 
36a, 5 Ra 1071; İŞS8: 43a, 28 R 1071; İŞS8: 45a, 24 R 1071; İŞS9: 15a, 17 L 1071; İŞS9: 29a, 5 Za 107; 
İŞS9: 35b, 6 Za 1071; İŞS9: 36a, 29 L 1071; İŞS9: 72a, 3 Z 1071; İŞS9: 74b, 7 Z 1071; İŞS9: 85a, 12 Z 
1071; İŞS9: 95a, 15 Z 1071; İŞS9: 86b, 18 Z 1071; İŞS9: 109a, 25 Z 1071; İŞS9: 123b, 12 M 1072; İŞS9: 
129b, 23 M 1072; İŞS9: 150a, 9 S 1072; İŞS9: 151a, 14 S 1072; İŞS9: 152b, 15 S 1072; İŞS9: 163a, 15 S 
1072; İŞS9: 168a. A woman‘s pregnancy from her deceased husband was also sufficient for her control 
over the entire inherited estate (İŞS9: 127b, 12 M 1072). The court‘s general tendency to appoint minor 
children‘s mothers as their legal guardians applied also to the non-Muslim population. See for example 
İŞS9: 16b, 24 L 1071. 
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and grandfather. This conditional appointment of mothers as guardians might very well 
have discouraged many women from remarrying.  Such a woman could remain 
unmarried and retain the guardianship of her children and control over the possession and 
management of the family‘s property, or she could remarry and lose her children and 
property. The decision not to remarry, however, was a risky one. The mortality rate was 
high and many children died young. In such cases, the widow‘s control over her late 
husband‘s properties would pass again to his family members, and she would be left 
without any children or any means of financial support. Time and again, after the death of 
minor children, the family members of their fathers initiated lawsuits against their 
mothers, even if they had remained unmarried.220  
One solution to the problem was to marry a deceased husband‘s paternal family 
member. After the death of Ali Beşe bin Ahmed, for example, his widow Gülistan 
married her deceased husband‘s brother, a certain Mustafa Beşe bin Ahemd. This 
marriage helped her maintain her guardianship over her minor son. The court appointed 
the new husband as the supervisor over the guardian. Marrying her brother-in-law, 
therefore, had secured the widow a marriage without forfeiting her guardian status over 
her child.221  
Negotiation between the Social and the Legal 
Though the feraid rules were only infrequently applied in the division of estates 
among close family members, they nevertheless proved significant when distant family 
                                                 
220 İŞS9: 110a, 4 M 1072; İŞS9: 147b, 29 M 1072; İŞS9: 164b, 29 S 1072. 
221 İŞS9: 78b, 2 Za 1071. 
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members were entitled to inheritable estates. The feraid rules provided a concrete legal 
argument for distant relatives to claim their share of an estate. The legal basis provided 
by the feraid rules did not only specify the share of the distant relatives, they also 
determined who the actual heirs were. Regardless of how commonplace inter vivos 
arrangements for the devolution of one‘s estate were, there were cases in which the 
praepositus failed to perform his duties, for example due to sudden death. Unlike the 
nuclear and close family members who would retain the family property intact for an 
extended period, the non-nuclear family members generally rushed to the court to claim 
the portion of the estate they were legally entitled to.  
Even in such cases, the application of the feraid rules was subject to negotiation 
between different interested parties. These negotiations were the result of the 
incompatibility between two definitions of kinship: on the one hand, as defined by the 
feraid rules and, on the other, by the social practices of Istanbulites. Extended agnatic 
family members—legal heirs often at the expense of close female family members—were 
aware of the predominant social definitions of kinship. The negotiation between the close 
and the extended family members over the division of inheritance, therefore, was also a 
negotiation between law and social custom. That is why, in general, the feraid rules were 
literally applied only in the absence of close family members.  
A case demonstrating the negotiation between the legal and the social came to the 
attention of the sharia court in September 1661. After the death of a minor girl, named 
Fatma, her legal heirs were her minor sisters and a male cousin (her paternal uncle‘s son). 
The guardian of the minor girl, a third person who was most probably also the guardian 
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of her two minor sisters, controlled the deceased girl‘s estate. According to the feraid 
rules, two-thirds of the estate belonged to Fatma‘s sisters and the remaining one-third to 
her cousin. The cousin wanted to claim his share in the inherited estate, though he was 
faced with the guardian‘s protest. It was the intervention of the communal mediators 
(muslihûn) that brought the two parties together for an amicable settlement. Accordingly, 
the cousin would get 1,300 aspers and relinquish his rights in the inherited property of the 
minor children. The amicable settlement came despite the fact that the court had 
recognized the cousin‘s legal rights to a third of the entire estate.222 Regardless, neither 
the guardian nor the community members found his claim equitable or socially 
acceptable despite his sound legal argument based on the feraid rules.223 In many other 
cases, members of the extended family appeared in court to declare that they received 
their shares of inheritance without elaborating on the exact division of the state according 
to the feraid rules.224  
The Feraid Rules in Full Swing 
The feraid rules played a more significant role in the actual devolution and 
division of one‘s estate when there were no surviving nuclear family members. In that 
case, the estate would be divided among distant family members, and in their absence, it 
                                                 
222 İŞS9: 131b, 26 M 1072. 
223 See also the abovementioned case of Mustafa Çavuş who was killed in the battle of Ineu. His nephews 
immediately asked for their shares in the estate, which resulted in a ―series of disputes‖ between them and 
the deceased official‘s conjugal family members consisting of his two wives and a daughter. The dispute 
was settled by the intervention of communal mediators (İŞS7:19a, A Ra 1070). For other similar examples 
in which members of immediate conjugal family excluded the farther agnatic relatives through settlements, 
see İŞS7: 32b, 28 Ra 1070; İŞS8: 17a, 11 Ra 1071; İŞS8: 29a, 3 R 1071.  
224 İŞS7: 20a, 6 Ra 1070. See also İŞS7: 30a, 25 Ra 1070; İŞS 9: 70a, 19 Za 1071; İŞS9: 168b, 29 S 1072. 
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would belong to the state in its entirety. Competition might arise among distant relatives 
on the one hand, and between the state and distant relatives on the other. Both state 
agents and distant relatives—who had minimal, if any, interest in the integrity of the 
inherited estate—would use their legal rights based on the feraid rules to the fullest extent 
in order to maximize their material gain. The feraid rules, therefore, was more commonly 
applied when the division of an estate was a matter of simple legal deliberation between 
heirs who had legal claims but lacked the social and emotional bonds of a family unit.225 
The state, through the kassam, the public treasurer, and the sharia court executed 
the feraid rules immediately when its rights were at stake. When the state was the sole 
beneficiary of one‘s estate, there was almost no room for any kind of negotiation as there 
were no competing claimants. This was particularly the case when a particularly large 
inherited estate was involved. The state agents acted preemptively in collecting and 
appropriating the estates of the people who passed away without any ―apparent‖ heirs 
(bila varis-i maruf vefat etmekle). The phrase suggests that the state agents did not wait 
for the determination of any possible heirs.226  
The feraid rules, therefore, provided a legal basis for the devolution and division 
of inherited private properties. Yet, exact compliance with the feraid rules was a rare 
phenomenon Istanbul in this period. Members of a nuclear family almost never divided 
the estate until a disruption in the family unit took place. The deceased‘s estate would be 
divided only when the nuclear family as a unit that had retained the estate communally no 
                                                 
225 İŞS9: 160a, 22 S 1072.  
226 İŞS9: 164b, 29 S 1072. 
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longer existed. The estate was most often divided in certain situations: when the minor 
children grew up and formed their own conjugal families, or when members of the 
nuclear family died rendering distant relatives the sole heirs to the undivided estate. 
However if a member of the nuclear family passed away or got married and the rest of 
the nuclear family remained intact, the rest of the original family would generally still 
retain the remaining inherited properties intact and undivided. The application of the 
feraid rules for inheritable estates, therefore, was indeed an anomaly rather than the norm 
in Istanbul in this period. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the application of the feraid rules in the sharia court of 
law in Istanbul. My overall observation is that the feraid rules, despite their centrality 
within the normative legal texts, played a limited role in the actual division of estates.227 
To start, the feraid rules had jurisdiction only over private property, which excluded a 
large portion of most Istanbulites‘ wealth. Furthermore, many Istanbulites arranged for 
the devolution of their private properties while they were still alive, using other 
mechanisms recognized by the sharia such as bequest, gift, and more importantly family 
trusts. The feraid rules, therefore, regulated the division of a deceased persons‘ private 
                                                 
227 In this regard, my observation is very different from the scholarship on inheritance in the Ottoman 
Empire. Meriwether and Gerber find that the Islamic law of inheritance was faithfully observed in Aleppo 
and Bursa, respectively. See Meriwether, The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 
1770-1840, 153-77; Gerber, "Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-
1700," 232; "Sharia, Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman Law: The Court Records of 17th-Century Bursa," 
131-47. 
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property only for those who had not made arrangements before they died. Even the 
limited jurisdiction of the feraid rules itself was subject to negotiation.  
The sharia‘s critical role was providing the legal grounds upon which disputing 
parties could negotiate the terms of their own settlement. The final outcome of the 
division of the estate came as a result of negotiations between the prescribed legal norms 
(the feraid rules) and social practice. For small nuclear families, the inherited property 
usually remained undivided without any judicial intervention. When distant family 
members were legal heirs to a deceased person‘s inheritance, negotiation or communal 
mediation generally divided the estate. In this process, the court was used as a venue to 
register the end result of the terms of the settlement, according to which distant family 
members were paid off to leave the integrity of the bulk of the inherited estate intact, 
which would remain undivided among the nuclear family members. The feraid rules were 
literally applied in cases in which close family members did not survive and the estate 
was a matter of debate between distant family members and the state.  
The role of the sharia court in sanctioning the existing social practice and settling 
the emerging disputes proved of critical significance for the Istanbulite women in the 
period under study. When disputes emerged, the application of the feraid rules 
guaranteed women‘s minimum inheritance rights. Yet, the existence of other practices 
such as widows‘ appointments as the guardians of their minor children meant that women 
actually exercised control over a larger amount of inherited properties than their fixed 
shares prescribed by the feraid rules. Furthermore, the existence of other inheritance 
practices such as those related to the icareteyn and muktata‘a properties meant that 
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women were legally entitled to equal shares in a significant number of inherited 
properties in the capital. When faced with some undesirable outcomes under the feraid 
rules, Istanbulite women employed a wide range of strategies to negotiate and mitigate 
such legal outcomes. In the next chapter, I will analyze women‘s inheritance rights 
through examining yet another mechanism within the Islamic inheritance system: family 
trusts.    
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Chapter 4: Pious Endowments 
 
This world is the farm for the hereafter.228 
 
A woman named Elif bint Şaban came to the deputy judgeship of Balat in Istanbul 
in March 1668 to record the foundation of a pious endowment (vakıf). The ensuing deed 
(vakfiye) informs us that Elif endowed one mid-size, two-story house she owned in the 
Katib Muslihuddin neighborhood to the north of the central Fatih district. The preamble 
of the endowment deed left no doubt that Elif‘s investment was a pious act and an 
investment for the hereafter. She was introduced as a ―performer of charities and good 
deeds‖ (―sâhib el-hayrât ve’l-hasenât). In addition, she explained that she founded the 
endowment because ―this world is not eternal and its blessings are doomed to decline.‖ 
She was therefore endowing her property ―for the sake of God‖ and in preparation for the 
day when everyone would seek protection under the ―shade of his charities,‖ referring to 
a prophetic tradition about the Day of Resurrection when the sun would shine too close to 
human beings. Among the people protected from the heat of the sun, the tradition 
maintains, will be those who had given their properties in charity.  
Elif‘s stipulations about who would benefit from her endowment, however, 
indicate that her concerns were more mundane than the preamble implied. She appointed 
herself as the sole beneficiary of the house as long as she lived. After her, the three rooms 
of the house would provide residence for the three people she regarded as family: her 
                                                 
228 This prophetic tradition was frequently used in the preamble of endowment deeds. 
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husband, her sister, and her freed female slave. Her endowment was in fact a family trust 
(ehli vakıf) rather than a public philanthropic endowment (hayri vakıf). This apparent 
contradiction was reconciled at the end of her stipulations. She added a final group of 
beneficiaries, the poor of Medina, who would receive the income from the property after 
her family members and their descendants died out. 
More importantly, what modern eyes view as the contradictions or (even worse) 
as the corruption of a system of charity into a self-serving institution was viewed 
differently by Elif‘s contemporaries.229 Family trusts were commonplace among different 
Muslim societies since at least the late Mamluk period.230 Elif and her contemporaries 
viewed providing for the family as an important form of charity. Elif lived within an 
Islamic tradition that regarded supporting family members as the highest form of 
charitable deeds.231 Her contemporaries, therefore, would have viewed her trust as an 
example of a pious act because it benefited her close family members.  
In the previous chapters, I analyzed the ways in which women might receive 
property through marriage and inheritance. In this chapter, I examine one significant 
method by which women managed their own properties. Through founding endowments, 
                                                 
229 The British and French colonial rulers in India and North Africa illegalized family trusts based on their 
readings of the classical Islamic texts and ignoring centuries of the development of Islamic law, which 
came to regulate family trusts as a legitimate way of founding endowments. To the colonial 
administrations, family trusts figured as the corruption of the Islamic charity system as well as a means to 
bypass the Islamic inheritance laws. See Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British 
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David S. Powers, "Orientalism, Colonialism, and 
Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 31, no. 3 (1989): 535-71.  
230 Layish, "Waqfs of Awlād al-Nās in Aleppo in the Late Mamlūk Period as Reflected in a Family 
Archive," 287-326. 
231 A prophetic tradition maintains that supporting one‘s family was superior to feeding the poor or 
manumitting slaves. ―The Book of Obligatory Alms,‖ Sahih Muslim, accessed  September 15, 2016, 
http://www.sahihmuslim.com/sps/smm/. 
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Istanbulite women provided income and/or accommodation for their family members. 
Further, founding these endowments was an active and effective way for women to 
define and redefine kinship and family. By examining endowment deeds from the second 
half of the seventeenth century, this chapter argues that Istanbulite women in this period 
were primarily concerned about the property ownership of their female family members 
in future generations. For those of a more humble background, founding endowments 
also meant founding their own families and naming themselves as the benevolent 
matriarch for generations to come. For women of the highest socio-economic 
background, who came from well-established aristocratic households, the grand 
reputation of their households brought with it significant social capital—a reputation that 
was worth the investment of cash and real property.  
In the second half of the seventeenth century, family trusts provided an important 
method by which Istanbulite men and women could plan for the future distribution of 
their estate. In particular, Hanafi family trusts granted the founder an absolute freedom to 
assign the benefits of an endowment to herself, as well as to any other person regardless 
of their blood or marital relationship. Using family trusts as a mechanism for inheritance 
permitted founders to construct their own definitions of kinship rather than being subject 
to kinship as defined by the feraid rules. For a childless woman like Elif, founding a 
family trust was not only a method to provide housing for her sister and husband after her 
death. It was also a means to cement the kinship she had constructed with her freed 
female slave. Although the freedwoman was already married and had children, Elif still 
regarded her as a family member—close enough to be included as one of the primary 
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beneficiaries of her family trust along with her sister and husband. Elif stipulated that 
after the death of her husband and her sister, her ex-slave and the latter‘s descendants 
would benefit from the trust ―generation after generation.‖ Being a childless woman with 
a childless sister, Elif‘s best way to maintain her family was through the children of her 
ex-slave, for whom Elif had founded a family trust.   
Studies on women‘s endowments have shed light on several aspects of women‘s 
relationship with property and family. My findings for Istanbulite women in the second 
half of the seventeenth century corroborate the general observation that women were 
active founders of endowments.232 Historians have come to different conclusions about 
the impact of endowments on women‘s property rights in various Muslim societies. In 
nineteenth-century Egypt, for example, Judith E. Tucker has found that some women 
used endowments to form a matrilineal regime of inheritance.233 At the other extreme, 
Aharon Layish has found that endowments were used to exclude women from their 
inheritance during various periods and many regions of the Islamic world.234  Other 
                                                 
232 For examples of the quantitative studies see Baer, "Women and Waqf: An Analysis of the Istanbul 
Tahrir of 1546," 267-97; L. Margaret Meriwether, "Women and Waqf Revisited: The Case of Aleppo, 
1770–1840," in Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era, ed. 
Madeline C. Zilfi (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 128-52; Mary Ann Fay, "Women and Waqf: Toward a 
Reconsideration of Women's Place in the Mamluk Household," International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 29, no. 1 (1997): 33-51; Daniel Crecelius, "Incidences of Waqf Cases in Three Cairo Courts: 1640-
1802," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 29, no. 2 (1986): 176-89; Bahaeddin  
Yediyıldız, 18. Yüzyılda Türkiye'de Vakıf Müessesesi (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000); Doumani, 
"Endowing Family: Waqf, Property Devolution, and Gender in Greater Syria, 1800 to 1860," 3-41. 
233 Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, 95. 
234 Aharon Layish has studied the impact of endowments on women‘s inheritance rights in different 
regions and periods of the Islamic world. In all of his works, he found that endowments had a detrimental 
impact on women‘s rights to inheritance, though to a varying extents. See Layish, "The Family Waqf and 
the Sharʿī Law of Succession in Modern Times," 352-58; "Waqfs of Awlād al-Nās in Aleppo in the Late 
Mamlūk Period as Reflected in a Family Archive," 287-326; "The Mālikī Family Waqf According to Wills 
and Waqfiyyāt," 1-32.  
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scholars have observed a large variety of trends in the founding of endowments that had 
uneven impacts on women‘s property rights.235  
Gabriel Baer has studied Istanbulite women‘s endowments in the mid-sixteenth 
century and maintains that although women appeared prominently among the founders of 
endowments, the actual administration of women‘s endowments would fall in time into 
the hands of men. These male managers were entitled not only to the control and 
management of the endowed properties, but also to a significant portion of the 
endowment‘s income. Endowments, he argues, were therefore a method to place 
women‘s properties back into the hands of men.236 My findings corroborate Baer‘s, but 
only in the case of elite women‘s public and philanthropic endowments. Such large 
endowments left significant wealth in the hands of male beneficiaries and administrators. 
The majority of women‘s endowments, however, consisted of only one house to be left to 
close family members. Leaving a daughter, sister, or other female administrator in charge 
of these small family endowments was both practical and common.  
The records analyzed in this chapter come from several sources: all of the 
endowment deeds registered in the three Istanbul court records of 1659-1661; all of the 
endowment deeds of the Evkaf Vakfiye catalogue of the Primer Ministry‘s Ottoman 
Archives (BOA) founded in 1650-1700; and a selection of endowment deeds from the 
archives of the General Directorate of Endowments in Ankara (VGM) founded in 1650-
                                                 
235 An interesting case study demonstrates a sharp difference between the impact of endowments on 
women‘s inheritance in Triploli and Nablus in the nineteenth century. In Tripoli, 98.3% of family 
endowments included daughters as beneficiaries while in the nearby city of Nabuls the rate was only 
12.1%. Doumani, "Endowing Family: Waqf, Property Devolution, and Gender in Greater Syria, 1800 to 
1860," 20. 
236 Baer, "Women and Waqf: An Analysis of the Istanbul Tahrir of 1546," 9-28. 
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1700. From the 219 endowment deeds studied here, women appeared as founders of 75 
endowments (34.2 percent). 
One limitation of studying endowment deeds is the fact that they reveal more 
about the intention of the founder than about the actual management and administration 
of the endowment. Endowed properties sometimes became subject to disputes among the 
beneficiaries, or between the beneficiaries and third parties. The existence of numerous 
sharia courts and the proximity of the imperial divan meant that violations of stipulated 
terms could be easily litigated by interested parties. Two courts specifically inspected, 
investigated, and kept accounts of the endowments in the capital (Evkaf Muhsebeciliği 
and Evkaf-ı Hümayun Müfettişliği). In addition, many family trusts were similar to that of 
Elif in appointing Mecca and Medina as the final destination of the trusts‘ income. In this 
way, the founders integrated their endowments with the largest endowment of the empire, 
that of the Haremeyn (the two sacred places of Mecca and Medina) whose administrator 
was the incumbent chief black eunuch. The administrator had a particular office staffed 
by members of the ulema to investigate and produce reports about the properties and 
incomes of the Haremeyn endowment.237 Although negotiations among interested parties 
as well as the involvement of corrupt officials might lead to some deviations from the 
founders‘ stipulations, the existence of multiple offices to inspect endowments probably 
minimized such problems in the capital. To what extent the founder‘s stipulations were 
                                                 
237 In 1668, the chief black eunuch was in control of 313 endowments, more than a third of which were 
located in Istanbul. Ülkü Altındağ, "Dârüssaâde," in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, 9: 2-3. See 
also Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, 1517-1683 (New York: Tauris, 
1994), 83-84.  
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carried out, however, remains to be answered by further research on relevant disputes and 
complaints. 
A second limitation of studying endowment deeds is that founders were generally 
far wealthier than most Istanbulites, a fact that limits researchers‘ attempts at drawing 
generalizations about women‘s control and management of their properties. The founders 
of the endowments were those who owned properties, at least a house, which was not 
affordable for many Istanbulites. Furthermore, the data on the family trusts in Istanbul 
demonstrate that a considerable proportion of them were created for the founders‘ ex-
slaves, indicating that the founders were able to afford one or more slaves. Although 
endowed properties varied widely in size and value, this chapter sheds light on notions of 
family, gender, and property among the better-off—those who owned at least a house 
and/or slaves. These propertied female founders, however, came from a wide variety of 
socio-economic backgrounds, and their endowed properties ranged from a single-room 
house to millions of aspers and multiple large houses.   
TYPES OF ENDOWMENTS 
A vakıf is a pious endowment, consisting of some property (mevkûf) alienated by 
the founder (vâkıf) for a pious purpose. The founder would devise the stipulations for 
how the alienated properties would generate income and who or what would be the 
beneficiary (mevkûf âleyh).
238
 In Ottoman practice, endowments could legally consist of 
both cash and real estate. Regardless of the nature of the alienated properties, 
                                                 
238
 Rudolph Peters, "Waqf," in EI
2
, 11: 59-63; Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, "Vakıf," in İA, 13: 153-72. 
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endowments were divided into two categories based on their immediate purpose. A 
founder could alienate property directly to support public and philanthropic purposes, in 
which case the endowment would be ―charitable‖ (hayrî). Alternatively, founders could 
designate their family members as the immediate beneficiaries of the endowment‘s 
income; thus the endowment was called family endowment (ehlî). My analysis of the 
endowments in the second half of the seventeenth century in Istanbul demonstrates that 
despite the vast number of public services provided by the vakıfs, the primary concern of 
founders—particularly female founders—was either the financial well-being of their 
family members or the reputation of their households.  
Cash and Real Estate 
Despite serious debates among Ottoman jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries about the legality of cash endowments,239 these concerns were primarily 
theoretical. In practice, very few cash vakıfs were endowed during this period.240 Of the 
219 endowments studied here, only 17 were cash endowments and another 25 involved 
both cash and real estate (see Table 4.1). There are various reasons for such a low number 
                                                 
239 There were mainly two legal debates. One was technical and related to the perpetuity of endowed 
properties. Cash and other movable properties could scarcely be viewed as perpetual. The second concern 
was moral. The income of cash endowments was the interest on loans, which was initially inconceivable as 
a source to support religious institutions such as mosques and medreses. See Tahsin Özcan, Osmanlı Para 
Vakıfları: Kanuni Dönemi Üsküdar Örneği (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003); Jon E. 
Mandaville, "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 10, no. 3 (1979): 289-308. 
240 To compare the data from seventeenth-century Istanbul to sixteenth-century Istanbul and Bosnia see 
 mer L tfi Barkan and Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri: 953 (1546) Tarihli 
(İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970); Kerima Filan, "Women Founders of Pious Endowments," in Women in 
the Ottoman Balkans: Gender, Culture and History, ed. Amila Buturovi  and İrvin C. Schick (London, 
New York: 2007), 99-121. Filan maintains that cash formed the primary portion of women‘s endowments 
in sixteenth-century Bosnia, while in the later centuries women endowed more real estate than cash (pp. 
109-111). 
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of cash endowments appearing in the archives. Examining a survey of Istanbul 
endowments conducted in 1600, Mehmet Canatar observes that cash endowments were 
almost entirely absent from the survey. Canatar suggests that this might have been the 
result of the fact that the surveyors did not intend to include cash endowments in the first 
place.241 Similarly, I did not come across a single cash endowment for the studied period 
in the Evkaf Evrakı catalogue at the Prime Ministry‘s Ottoman Archives. The absence of 
cash endowments in the archives might be the reflection of the Ottoman officials‘ 
particular concern for the registration of endowed real properties rather than the 
representation of all the endowments actually founded.    
Table 4.1: Types of endowed properties in Istanbul endowments, 1650-1700 
  Cash  Real Estate  Mixed Total 
17 (7.8%) 177 (80.8%) 25 (11.4%) 219 (100%) 
 
Several other conditions might explain the low number of cash endowments in the 
archives. Founding cash endowments was a risky business. Although the negative impact 
of the high inflation rate of the period might have been balanced by fluctuations in the 
nominal interest rate, time and again it proved difficult for the administrators of cash 
endowments to force borrowers to repay principal capital with the accumulated interest of 
the loan. It proved particularly difficult for women, as some female founders added 
                                                 
241 Mehmet Canatar, İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri: 1009 (1600) Tarihli (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih 
Cemiyeti, 2004). 
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special stipulations about who could borrow from their cash endowments. The woman 
Hadice, for example, founded a cash endowment with the principal capital of 400 piasters 
in November of 1660. Despite the fact that having a wide range of possible borrowers 
would financially benefit her endowment, Hadice excluded two groups from among the 
possible borrowers: members of the army and non-Istanbulites, regardless of how reliable 
their guarantors might be.242 Hadice worried that members of the military could get away 
with abusing her endowment‘s funds, and that anyone from outside Istanbul would be 
hard to track if they left the capital. Such concerns might explain why many other female 
founders stipulated that their cash endowments should be turned, sometimes immediately, 
into real-estate endowments.243  
Ehli and Hayri Endowments 
Based on the immediate purpose of the foundation, endowments were divided into 
two main categories: public (hayri) and family (ehli) endowments. A third category, ehli-
hayri, emerged as a mixture of the two. Public endowments provided services through the 
construction and maintenance of facilities such as mosques, schools, hospitals, soup 
kitchens, and fountains. They also provided livelihoods for the members of the ulema and 
charity for the urban poor, particularly those living in the sacred cities of Mecca and 
Medina. Other functions of public endowments included paying avarız tax for certain 
                                                 
242 İŞS8: 8b, 27 S 1071. 
243 VGM defter 623, 236/232; VGM  defter 623, 110/120; VGM defter 623, 60/63. 
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neighborhood households244 and providing guesthouses and for other needs of artisan 
guilds and the Janissary Corps.245 The founders of public endowments also provided 
some income for family members in the form of stipends for their services as 
administrators and supervisors.246  
The second category of endowments was the family trust (ehlî vakıf). The 
founders of trusts provided accommodation and/or stipends for their descendants, freed 
slaves, family members, or others. After beneficiaries‘ descendants had all died, the 
endowed property was supposed to revert to a pious purpose such as providing for the 
poor of Medina or the functionaries of a mosque. Although such trusts would eventually 
become public charitable endowments, I refer to them as family trusts because the 
primary objective of the founders was to provide for their family members and 
descendants. The third category of endowments (ehli-hayri endowments) simultaneously 
provided for public services and supported the founder‘s descendants and family 
members. 
More than half of the endowments studied here were family trusts (56.2 percent), 
less than a quarter consisted of public endowments (17.3 percent), and the remainders 
were a mixture of ehli and hayri endowments (26.5 percent) (Table 4.2). My criterion for 
classifying an endowment as a family trust was the appointment of particular individuals, 
usually the family members of the founder, as the beneficiaries of the endowment without 
                                                 
244 İŞS9:129b, 17 M 1072. Also see Mustafa Nuri Türkmen, "Halep Para Vakıfları Muhasebelerinin Kısa 
Bir Değerlendirmesi," Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 9 (2012): 121-31; Mehmet İpşirli, "Avarız Vakfı," 
in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, 4: 109. 
245 İŞS9: 41b, 3 Za 1071; İŞS9: 48a, 5 Za 1071. 
246 Gabriel Baer, "The Waqf as a Prop for the Social System (Sixteenth-Twentieth Centuries)," Islamic 
Law and Society 4, no. 3 (1997): 264-97. 
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necessarily assigning them any duties, either administrative (such as in the trusteeship 
[tevliyet] and supervision [nezâret] of the endowment) or religious (such as preaching or 
recitation of the Quran.) 
Table 4.2: The purpose of Istanbul endowments, 1650-1700 
Hayri Ehli Mixed Total 
38 (17.3%) 123 (56.2%) 58 (26.5%) 219 (100%) 
 
Taking into consideration the fact that most of the mixed endowments primarily 
supported family members, I argue that the main purpose of endowments founded in the 
second half of the seventeenth century was to circumvent the feraid rules. Such 
circumvention occurred primarily in four ways: A) the exclusion of  ferâid heirs, such as 
wives, parents, siblings, and other agnatic heirs; B) the inclusion of those who were not 
ferâid heirs, primarily a founder‘s slaves, but also others such as more distant and non-
agnatic relatives, or even those without any specified relationship; C) the prioritization of 
certain beneficiaries over others, for example spouses over children or vice-versa, in 
contravention of the ferâid rules; and D) the egalitarian division of the endowed estate 
among male and female beneficiaries, which would also be at odds with the ferâid rules. I 
will examine the patterns of inheritance based on ehlî endowments below.  
Large and Small Endowments 
A significant portion of the properties in the walled city in the seventeenth 
century were endowed. Although it is almost impossible to ascertain the amount of 
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money invested in endowed properties and its share in the overall financial market, the 
court records (sicils) and endowment deeds (vakfiyes) provide abundant information 
about endowed real estate. In the absence of street names and house numbers in the early 
modern Ottoman urban centers, a property was identified by the name of the 
neighborhood and the properties bordering it in the four cardinal directions. The records 
also specify if the neighboring properties were endowments or private property. My 
examination of the relevant documents shows that about a quarter of the total real estate 
was alienated in the form of endowments in 1659-1661.  
The size of an endowment was related to its purpose. Family trusts were on 
average smaller when compared to pious endowments. More than 80 percent of family 
trusts consisted of a single property, typically a house with a few rooms. In this category 
of small endowments, there were only three pious and one mixed endowment out of the 
total number of 96 (less than 4 percent). Two family trusts involved two houses each247 
and two others consisted of only empty plots of land.248 There were other small family 
trusts containing a few residential rooms or a few shops.249 Only a few family trusts 
contained a saray (palace), large apartment complexes, or multiple houses and only two 
of such large endowments had non-residential, income-generating properties such as 
shops and a bathhouse (Table 4. 3). 
                                                 
247 The endowments of Ayşe Hatun bint Mehmed (VGM defter 1763, 230/214) and el-Hac Sefer Odabaşı 
bin Ali (VGM defter 581/2, 388/384). 
248 The endowments of Fatma Hatun bint Abdullah (BOA EV.VKF 13/47) and Ali Beşe bin Hüseyin. 
249 The endowments of Musli Paşa (VGM defter 582/2, 399/301), Fazlullah Çelebi bin Hüseyin (VGM 
defter 629, 698/475), Salih Efendi bin Numan Efendi (VGM defter 570, 132/84), Veli Bey bin Mahmud 
(VGM defter 1759, 307/193), Berber Süleyman bin Abdullah (VGM defter 731,120/66), and Ümmühani 




Table 4.3: The size of Istanbul endowments, 1650-1700 
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Total 103 74 25 17 219 
 
The largest endowments were mixed ehli-hayri endowments consisting of 
multiple properties, including buildings for mosques, children‘s schools (muallimhânes), 
schools for higher education to teach prophetic traditions (dârülhadîs), sufi lodges 
(zâviyes), and public fountains. They also included many revenue-generating properties 
such as residential properties, ovens (fırın), mills, bathhouses (hamâms), shops 
(dekkâkîn), workshops (kârhânes), vegetable gardens (bostâns), agricultural lands and 
sometimes entire villages, and/or large amounts of cash. A typical example is the 
endowment of Kayazade el-Hac Mehmed, who founded a large ehli-hayri endowment in 
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August 1695. His endowment consisted of nine houses in seven different neighborhoods 
of Istanbul, three shops in the Tahtakale area, two large apartment complexes named as 
yahûdihâne in Eyüb, a mill in Unkapanı, a house with an oil workshop (revganhâne) to 
produce oil in Galata, and an amount of 1,500 piasters in cash.250 
Table 4.4: Cash in Istanbul endowments, 1650-1700 






Ehli 1 1 0 
Hayri 6 10 0 
Ehli-Hayri 7 13 4 
 
 
Family trusts, consisting typically of small dwellings, rarely involved cash. Only 
in one case did a founder choose to use cash to support his family and in only one case 
did a founder add some cash to the real property in his family trust.251 In contrast to the 
low number of family trusts involving cash (1.6 percent), the founders of public and 
mixed endowments used cash in about 40 percent of cases. Public endowments had a 
higher ratio of endowments that were solely cash, while mixed endowments had a high 
rate of properties consisting of both cash and real estate. Mixed endowments not only had 
high amounts of real estate, they also involved the highest amounts of cash (Table 4.4). 
                                                 
250 VGM defter 623, 35/44. 
251 VGM defter 623, 1/1; VGM defter 623, 48/53.  
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The information about the amounts of real estate and cash in each category of endowment 
shows that family trusts were small, consisting usually of one house. Pious endowments 
were larger, involving both real estate and cash endowments, and mixed endowments 
were the largest, consisting typically of large numbers of residential and income-
generating buildings as well as huge amounts of cash.  
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS OF MALE FOUNDERS 
Male founders of endowments in the second half of the seventeenth century 
belonged almost entirely to a highly stratified askeri (non-taxpaying elite), which was 
also the case for earlier periods of Istanbul.252 Stratification within the ranks of the askeri 
themselves was at least as significant as the stratification that separated the askeri from 
the reaya (tax-paying subjects). The askeri included a wide range of the state‘s highest 
officials such as the grand vizier, the reisülküttab, the chief black eunuch, and the 
şeyhülislam, as well as the infantrymen of the Janissaries and the simple duagus (reciter 
of prayers) of some endowments with minor daily stipends. Prologues of endowment 
deeds usually describe the founders with the honorary titles that provide information on 
their social and economic status. The askeri status of seventeenth-century male founders 
of Istanbul endowments is evident in their honorary titles. Based on their titles, founders 
can be divided into four main groups: the religious elite, the military elite, non-title 
holders, and women (Table 4.5).253 
                                                 
252 Canatar, İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri: 1009 (1600) Tarihli; Barkan and Ayverdi, İstanbul Vakıfları 
Tahrir Defteri: 953 (1546) Tarihli.   
253 I use this classification based on Ergene and Berker‘s work on wealth in two eighteenth-century 
Anatolian towns. Boğaç A. Ergene and Ali Berker, "Wealth and Inequality in 18th-Century Kastamonu: 
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Table 4.5: The socio-economic background of founders in Istanbul, 1650-1700 
 Hayri Ehli-Hayri Ehli Total 
Religious Title 
Holders 
13 30 22 65 
Military Title 
Holders 
16 25 35 76 
Women 9 3 63 75 
Non-Title Holders 0 0 3 3 
Total 38 58 123 219 
 
The stratification within the group of title-holders helps to explain different 
behaviors in founding endowments in Istanbul in this period. The highest officials of the 
military, religious-legal, and administrative hierarchies, who were typically the most 
affluent residents of the imperial capital, founded the largest endowments of mixed 
purpose (ehli-hayri). Religious title-holders formed the largest group (30 out 58) in this 
category, closely followed by holders of military titles (25 out 58).  
Like mixed endowments, public endowments were founded primarily by men 
who held religious and military titles. However, public endowments were on average 
smaller than mixed endowments, a fact that is linked to the socio-economic background 
of their founders. Unlike the ehli-hayri founders, the founders of pious endowments did 
not include members of the highest military and religious elite such as the şeyhülislam, 
the grand vizier, or the kadıasker. The majority of the founders of pious endowments 
were of more modest backgrounds, including many members of the urban middle class 
                                                                                                                                                 
Estimations for the Muslim Majority," International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 23-
46. 
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such as the Janissaries and members of lower ulema, active in artisanal work and 
commerce. The number of the military title-holders who founded public endowments was 
very close to that of the religious title holders, 16 and 13 respectively. 
Among the three types of endowments, family trusts were on average the smallest 
in size. Founders of family trusts came from a relatively humble background when 
compared to the founders of the other two endowment types. Among the members of the 
reaya who founded endowments in this period, the three with no honorary title founded 
family trusts. Although there were a few prominent members of the military and religious 
title-holders among the founders of family trusts, the size of their endowments in this 
category never reflected their high religious-legal, administrative, or military positions. 
Family trusts remained primarily the domain of relatively humble men from military and 
religious backgrounds as well as tax-paying subjects, but, more significantly, of women.  
WOMEN’S ENDOWMENTS 
Istanbulite women founded 34.7 percent of the endowments analyzed in this 
study. This number corresponds to the trends in other Ottoman cities from the sixteenth 
to the nineteenth centuries which show a rate of female founders of endowments between 
11 to 50 percent with an average of 30 to 40 percent.254  The type and average size of the 
endowments founded by women were different from those founded by men. As in earlier 
                                                 
254 Meriwether, "Women and Waqf Revisited: The Case of Aleppo, 1770–1840," 131-32; Mary Ann Fay, 
"From Concubines to Capitalists: Women, Property, and Power in Eighteenth-Century Cairo," Journal of 
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and later periods in Istanbul as well as in other cities of the empire, Istanbulite women in 
the second half of the seventeenth century typically founded small endowments.255 Out of 
the 75 endowments founded by women, 62 were family trusts, which constituted more 
than half of the entire family trusts studied here. Women were the founders of only four 
out of a total of 58 mixed ehli-hayri endowments. It is noteworthy that the number of 
mid-sized public endowments founded by women, although smaller than the ones 
founded by men, was statistically significant. Women were founders of 9 out of 38 pious 
endowments (23.7 percent) 
Table 4.6: Istanbulite women‘s endowments, 1650-1700 
 Hayri Ehli Mixed (Ahli-
Hayri) 
Total 
Real Property 3 62 2 68 




1 0 2 3 
Total 9 62 4 75 
FAMILY TRUSTS 
 Founders retained the right to benefit from their endowments as long as they lived 
and would appoint one or more people as the primary, secondary, and sometimes tertiary 
beneficiaries who would benefit from the trust after the founder‘s death. Founders could 
also assign hereditary rights to certain beneficiaries. Accordingly, some of the 
                                                 
255See for example Baer, "Women and Waqf: An Analysis of the Istanbul Tahrir of 1546," 9-28; 
Meriwether, "Women and Waqf Revisited: The Case of Aleppo, 1770–1840," 128-52.  
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beneficiaries could pass the right to use the endowed properties to their descendants until 
their line died out. Family trusts, therefore, granted almost an unlimited number of 
options for the founders to not only include or exclude people from a significant portion 
of their estate, but also prioritize some over others.  
Examining the different groups of people who were the beneficiaries of these 
family trusts provides information about how these female founders regarded family and 
gender in this period. As we saw in chapter three, Istanbulite women prioritized the 
protection and continuation of their nuclear families when they negotiated their 
inheritance rights. The data on women‘s endowments clearly demonstrate that Istanbulite 
female founders in the second half of the seventeenth century were primarily concerned 
with providing for their close family members. We can see founders‘ notion of family via 
whom they included or excluded in their family trusts and how they prioritized 
beneficiaries. Family formation did not require conjugal or sanguine relationship. 
Istanbulite women appointed their children, but also their step children, adopted children, 
non-relatives, and more frequently their female ex- slaves as the beneficiaries of their 
family trusts. Such appointments reflected either an already strong bond between the 
founder and the beneficiaries, or a bond that the founder hoped to build or strengthen.  
Family trusts, therefore, can be viewed as documents that portrayed family 
formation in the making. When family bonds changed, the female founders of these 
family trusts came to court to modify their initial stipulations. The woman Alime bint 
Abdullah, for example, made such modifications in her endowment deed more than once 
over a period of twenty-one years. When she first founded the family trust in 1657, she 
 185 
was probably young and married to a certain Ahmed Çelebi. She stipulated that her mid-
size house should be alienated for her use as long as she lived. The right to use the 
property after her death would pass to her husband Ahmed Çelebi and to their future 
children. After the expiration of the line of the couple‘s descendants, Alime‘s freed slaves 
and their descendants would step in as beneficiaries. It is possible that Alime did not have 
any slaves yet, as she did not name any specifically in the stipulations of the 1657 deed. 
Her endowment served to cement her relationship with her husband, but the list of other 
beneficiaries reflected more about Alime‘s imagination of an ideal family consisting of 
the couple, their children, and her freed slaves than about the family she had at the time.  
Some twelve years later, she went to court to modify her original stipulations. By 
1679, Alime did not have any children and she was no longer married to Ahmed Çelebi, 
who had either died or who she had divorced. Therefore Alime excluded her ex-husband 
and their prospective children from among the primary beneficiaries. Alime had already 
married another man named İlyas Beg. Because she had not borne children to either of 
her husbands, and because she excluded prospective children from the beneficiaries, it is 
quite possible that she was infertile. In the meantime, she had manumitted a female slave 
named Muammere, with whom she had retained close ties. The 1679 deed, therefore, 
reflected the transformation in Alime‘s family life. According to the 1679 deed, after 
Alime‘s death, her new husband İyas Beg and her freed slave Muammere would 
simultaneously and equally benefit from the endowed house. After the death of İyas and 
Muammere, their children would equally share the right to use the house. As a childless 
woman, Alime was keen to integrate her step-children among the primary beneficiaries of 
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her endowment. Another important modification was the new way in which she 
prioritized the beneficiaries. In 1657, she had stipulated that her freed slaves and their 
descendants had to wait until the line of her own descendants expired. In 1679, Alime 
appointed her step children and the children of her freedwoman as simultaneous 
beneficiaries of the endowment. Alime, it seems, may have felt equally close to the two 
groups of children.  
Alime came once again to the sharia court some nine years later in 1688 to make 
some additional modifications. By then, her second husband had died without any 
surviving children. In the meantime, she had manumitted another slave. She therefore 
excluded her second husband and step-children as beneficiaries. The new deed appointed 
two ex-slaves, one male and one female, as the primary beneficiaries of the endowment 
after the founder‘s death. After the death of the freed slaves, who were not married to 
each other, their respective children would share the benefits of the endowment. The 
documents related to Alime‘s endowment demonstrate how, in time, she replaced her 
own imagined children with step children and freed slaves as the primary and hereditary 
beneficiaries of her family trust. As she lost hope for having her own line of descendants 
who would benefit from her legacy, she adopted her slaves as her family members so that 
they and their children would live in the same family dwelling that she had endowed.   
The most striking aspect of family formation among Istanbulite women in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, as we saw in Alime‘s story, was the integration of 
former slaves into the household. From among 66 ehli and mixed endowments founded 
by Istanbulite women in this period, 30 endowments primarily benefitted founders‘ ex-
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slaves. Indeed founders‘ former slaves made up the majority of beneficiaries of such 
endowments, followed by founder‘s children (16) and husbands (10) (Table 4.7). Among 
the 30 endowments that prioritized ex-slaves, in 26 cases the primary beneficiaries were 
female ex-slaves, in three cases both male and female ex-slaves, and only in one case a 
male ex-slave. For female founders of endowments in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, including their freedwomen as the beneficiaries of their family trusts and 
therefore integrating them within the family seemed to be a primary concern. Male 
founders also provided for their ex-slaves in their family trusts, though the distribution 
between their children and ex-slaves as beneficiaries were more even (81 to 103, 
respectively). The numbers of male and female ex-slaves as the primary beneficiaries of 
men‘s endowments were also more evenly distributed (47 to 55), when compared to that 
of women‘s endowments.  
Table 4.7: The beneficiaries of Istanbulite women‘s ehli and mixed endowments, 1650-
1700  
 Husbands Children Multiple 
beneficiaries  
 
















Many of the founders who prioritized their female slaves among the beneficiaries 
of their endowments came from slave background themselves, some with clear 
connection with the royal palace. Some of these founders were known by the title sarayi 
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(from the palace), indicating their status as either concubines or servants in the imperial 
harem. Only a limited number of these female ex-slaves continued to reside within the 
New Palace, the residence of the Ottoman sultan. The palace women were subject to a 
hierarchy depending on their proximity to the sultan. Many of these female slaves were 
married off to Ottoman officials of different ranks and started to reside in several 
neighborhoods of the capital. For these women of the palace, integrating other female 
slaves into their households probably resembled their own life story. After all, they had 
been cut off from their familial ties and were subjected to the whims of their patrons. The 
lucky ones were integrated into the household of the sultan or the high officials of the 
empire and were able to amass a significant amount of power and fortune. Regardless of 
how they contributed to the reproduction of slavery as a system, these women found 
acquiring, manumitting, and integrating other female slaves to be a way of life that they 
were accustomed to.  
Family trusts, particularly when female ex-slaves were the primary beneficiaries, 
served another purpose: circumventing the feraid rules. According to the feraid rules, a 
master‘s status was similar to that of an agnatic family member. Masters would inherit 
the estate of their former slaves, but ex-slaves could not inherit from their masters. 
Accordingly, if the Quranic heirs did not exhaust a former slave‘s estate, his/her master 
would step in to collect the residue. For ex-slaves, many of whom had no family 
members in Istanbul, the possibility that their masters would inherit their estate was quite 
high.  Palace women faced a similar problem. Time and again, the chief eunuch of the 
Old Palace appeared in front of the Istanbul judge to claim the sultan‘s share in a 
 189 
deceased palace woman‘s inheritance. Founding family trusts, therefore, formed an 
important method for ex-slaves to avoid the transfer of their wealth to their masters. It 
might explain why female ex-slaves appeared prominently among the founders of family 
trusts. Among the 66 ehli and mixed endowments founded by women, 29 of the founders 
were freedwomen.   
Circumventing the feraid rules was not only beneficial to founders from slave 
background. Freeborn women also used family trusts to exclude agnatic heirs and include 
whomever they considered to be family members, regardless of what the feraid rules 
prescribed. Female founders appointed not only their children, but also their step- 
children and adopted children, farther relatives, as well as non-relatives as the primary 
beneficiaries of their endowments. The appointment of freedwomen and those who were 
not close relatives clearly demonstrates women‘s effective role in constructing new forms 
of family bonds. A closer look at the primary beneficiaries of women‘s family trusts 
would illuminate their notions of who they viewed as family members. In what follows, I 
will examine two particular groups who appeared frequently among the primary 
beneficiaries: husbands and children.  
Husbands 
The properties of a deceased wife, according to the feraid rules, could be divided 
among her husband, children, and occasionally her agnatic family members; her master, 
if she was an ex-slave; or the state. A husband‘s share in his wife‘s estate was half if she 
did not have children, and one-fourth if she did. Therefore, half of a childless woman‘s 
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estate would belong to her natal and agnatic family members, the state, or her master. 
While the division of childless woman‘s inheritance among her husband and siblings 
would not necessarily be an undesired outcome, many women wanted to avoid the 
alternative outcomes that might entitle the state, extended family members, or their 
masters to inherit half of their estate.  
All of the 10 female founders who appointed their husbands as the primary 
beneficiaries of their endowments were childless women. In all of these cases, the 
founders stipulated that their step-children and their descendants should benefit from the 
endowment after their husbands‘ death. In seven cases, founders came from slave 
background. The close ties these childless women had built with their step-children often 
drove them to arrange for the transfer of their properties to them. These female founders 
considered their step children to be family despite the fact they were not legal heirs 
according to the feraid rules. By establishing these family trusts, women effectively 
circumvented the feraid rules in order to exclude the state, their agnatic family members, 
and their masters from the list of their legal heirs while including non-legal heirs in order 
to maintain their properties within their family.  
Children 
Children appeared frequently as the primary beneficiaries of women‘s family 
trusts. After all, family trusts were also known as vakf-i evlad, or endowment for 
children. The women who already had children or grandchildren named them explicitly 
as the primary beneficiaries of their endowments. Those who did not have children or 
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those who expected to have more children at the time they founded their endowments 
used the general term ―children‖ (evlad) to designate the first round of beneficiaries. In 
all of these cases, the founder‘s children would be followed by their descendants until the 
expiration of the line. 
With the feraid rules clearly favoring children to other heirs, one wonders about 
what incentives these women had to found family trusts in the first place. Endowments 
historically featured two general benefits: they avoided the division of family property 
among numerous heirs, and they decreased the possibility of confiscation by the state. 
Were these the only reasons for women to found family trusts for their own descendants? 
A detailed examination of the relevant family trusts demonstrates that Istanbulite women 
in this period had three additional inheritance-related reasons to found trusts for their 
descendants. One was related to the Hanafi feraid rules that did not recognize the 
doctrine of representation. Accordingly, orphaned grandchildren did not inherit what their 
late parents would be entitled to. In one such example, the woman Ayşe came to the 
sharia court in 1658 to endow a large house she had in the Firuz Ağa neighborhood. She 
appointed her two grandsons and one granddaughter and their descendants as the primary 
beneficiaries of the house.256 Under the Hanafi feraid rules, the three grandchildren were 
considered agnatic heirs who would be entitled to the residue of the estate after the 
Quranic heirs received the shares they were entitled to. If Ayşe, the founder, had a 
surviving son, all three orphaned grandchildren she had appointed as the beneficiaries 
would be automatically excluded from her entire estate. If Ayşe did not have a surviving 
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son, her grandchildren would have to compete with her agnatic uncles, nephews, and 
cousins over her estate. Ayşe, therefore, maneuvered around the feraid rules by founding 
a family trust to make sure her orphaned grandchildren received a significant portion of 
her estate.  
The stipulations in Ayşe‘s endowment deed indicate the existence of a second 
reason for women to found family rusts: the egalitarian division of their properties among 
their descendants. Ayşe had explicitly mentioned that her two male and one female 
grandchildren should have equal rights (‘ale‘l-sevâ) to the use of her endowment and that 
their male and female descendants would also be equally entitled. This was indeed a clear 
deviation from the feraid norms that clearly favored male and agnatic family members 
over female ones.  
All of the women‘s family trusts studied here consistently retained this gender-
egalitarian approach. While male founders of family trusts usually assigned equal shares 
to male and female beneficiaries, there were some occasional cases in which women were 
discriminated against. The endowment deed of the man Şeyh Mustafa can shed light on 
such discriminatory clauses. He came to the sharia court in 1661 with a large cash 
endowment worth 5,000 piasters. He stipulated that that his children should benefit from 
the income of the endowment based on what the feraid rules prescribed (‘alâ mâ faraza 
allah te‘âlâ mine’l-irs el-şer‘î).257 It clearly meant that his female descendants would 
receive half the share of their male counterparts. 
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A third reason was that family trusts allowed founders to include non-biological 
children. We saw above that childless women appointed their step-children together with 
their husbands as the beneficiaries of their endowments. There was another category of 
children who appeared occasionally among the primary beneficiaries: adopted children. 
Despite the fact that Islamic law did not recognize fictive kinship based on adoption, 
there are some pieces of evidence that indicate the Istanbulites in the second half of the 
seventeenth century adopted children and transferred properties to them. The story of a 
woman who modified the terms of her endowment deed in 1650 in order to include an 
adopted son is illuminating. Ayşe, the founder of a family trust, had appointed her own 
descendants as primary and her step-children as secondary heirs to her large endowment 
consisting of a house with eleven rooms and two shops. As in the case of Alime, whom 
we met above, Ayşe realized over time that she could not bear children. She therefore 
modified the terms of the endowment to exclude her children and instead appoint her 
step-children as the primary beneficiaries. By 1650, it became evident that her husband 
did not have any surviving children either. Therefore, she modified the terms of the 
endowment to exclude her step-children and instead appoint a certain Sührab Mehmed 
Ağa, whom she called her oğulluk (adopted son) and his descendants as the sole and 
primary beneficiary of her endowment.258 Other terms used for adopted children included 
the Arabic rebîb (rebîbe for females) or the Turkish ahiret kız/oğul.259   
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PUBLIC ENDOWMENTS 
The difference in the purposes of public (hayri) endowments and family trusts 
was not as striking as their names suggest. All family trusts had to eventually turn into 
public and charitable endowments, while almost all charitable endowments had family 
members as administrators or other functionaries and therefore benefited family members 
with a significant portion of the endowments‘ income. Indeed, almost all kinds of 
endowments supported family members in one way or another. To further blur the 
distinction, some endowments had elements of both family trusts and public 
endowments.  
Family trusts and public endowments, however, were significantly different in 
size, and generally had different kinds of founders and beneficiaries. As we saw above, 
public endowments were on average larger than family trusts, the latter primarily 
consisting of one mid-size house in the second half of the seventeenth century. Women‘s 
endowments were predominantly family trusts while men were the primary founders of 
public endowments. Although all kinds of endowments supported family members, male 
family members were the recipients of the lion‘s share of public endowments, while men 
and women were treated equally by family trusts, particularly those founded by women. 
The cash endowment of Şeyh Mustafa, whom we met above, was a mixed ehli-hayri 
endowment. He did not simply discriminate against his female descendants by assigning 
them half the share of their male counterparts, he also reserved a significant portion of the 
endowment‘s income for his male descendants by assigning them certain functions. He 
established a teaching chair at the mosque founded by Mehmed the Conqueror and 
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stipulated that the teacher should be selected from among his sons, who would hold 
regular sessions to teach Islamic law, hadith, exegetics (tefsîr), and logic. He also 
stipulated that seven of his male descendants should attend the lectures. The teacher and 
his students were all entitled to fixed daily stipends from Şeyh Mustafa‘s endowment. 
The public aspect of his endowment, therefore, primarily benefited his family members, 
but only male ones.  
It is unlikely that the female members of the family protested Şeyh Mustafa‘s 
foundation of such a public endowment. The social status of elite women was closely tied 
to that of their families, and by establishing an ostentatious chair at one of the most 
prestigious imperial mosques, Şeyh Mustafa‘s endowment was an investment in the 
family‘s reputation. Indeed, Şeyh Mustafa did not intend to exclude female family 
members from their inheritance rights. He had stipulated that his female descendants 
should receive their shares according to the feraid rules from the endowment‘s extra 
income. He had also made sure to provide a daily stipend of 5 aspers for his wife. It was 
rather the gendered division of spaces that kept women from appearing in mosques as 
professors and students that resulted in their exclusion from a significant portion of the 
endowment‘s income.  
Although some female founders of public endowments appointed women as the 
administrators of their endowments, the fact that the majority of functionaries such as 
Quran reciters, professors, imams, muezzins, and students were all men meant that their 
public endowments contributed to a net transfer of wealth from the hands of women into 
those of men. For example, an elite woman named Esma Hatun bint Abdülaziz Efendi 
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founded a large ehli-hayri endowment in 1686. The endowment consisted of 4,000 
piasters in cash, a house, and two large complexes which contained 16 two-room and six 
one-room apartments. The public aspect of her endowment created 15 posts for male 
Quran reciters in the Fethiye Mosque with a daily stipend of two aspers. Esma Hatun 
stipulated that the Quran reciters should commemorate her late father Abdülaziz Efendi 
who was the chief jurist (şeyhülislam) in 1651, her late husband Esiri Mehmed Efendi 
who also served as the chief jurist from 1659 to 1661, and her three brothers who were 
also prominent members of the Istanbul ulema.260 Clearly Esma Hatun was concerned 
about the well-being of her family members, and assigned a significant portion of the 
endowment‘s income to her two daughters and their descendants. However, the public 
aspect of the endowment excluded about 11,000 aspers a year from the endowment‘s 
income for men outside of the family. Rather than a direct investment in her family 
members, Esma Hatun‘s public charity was an investment in the family‘s reputation—the 
very source of her wealth and social status.261  
Women‘s public endowments were not substantially distinguishable from those of 
men. Many women‘s public endowments were actually attached to those of their male 
family members including their fathers, brothers, and husbands. In these cases, women 
simply added funds and retained the same functionaries who were in charge of managing 
their male relatives‘ endowed properties. The elite woman Ayşe Hatun bint Hüseyin 
Efendi, for example, provided additional funds in 1655 to an endowment founded earlier 
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by her husband. Eight years later, their daughter Rabia registered her large endowment, 
which was again an ―attachment‖ (mülhak) to that of her father.262 
CONCLUSION: CLASS, STATUS, AND PROPERTY  
It is difficult to situate these women in Istanbul in clear socio-economic 
categories. Women were prohibited from taking official positions in the military or ilmiye 
hierarchy and therefore lacked the associated honorary titles that might tell their rank or 
social status. The early modern world of Ottoman ―ostentatious inegalitarianism,‖ 
however, assigned signs to both men and women that described their affiliation to highly 
hierarchized social strata.263 Some women were referred to with titles such as hatun or 
hanım,264 and others were introduced with their particular relationship to the palace such 
as the daye (foster nurse) or the haseki (favorite) of Osman II or simply sarayi (from the 
Palace). Some had the hereditary title seyyide or şerife (descendant of the Prophet) and 
others acquired the title of el-hace through performing the ritual pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Some enjoyed the most honorable titles of muhaddere (veiled) or muvakkare (revered), 
both signs of being respectable for being veiled and/or secluded, a luxury that only elite 
women could afford.265 All of these women were referred to with the names of their 
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fathers and sometimes of their husbands, usually with their social and professional 
affiliations.  
Women‘s choice of the people to represent them in the court to register their 
endowment deeds, and their choice of the people to be the beneficiaries of their pious or 
family endowments, indicated their familial and personal ties within the larger political 
and social network. Their choice of the sites of their charitable endowments (e.g. an 
imperial mosque or a small local mosque) as well as the size of the alienated property for 
the endowments provide yet additional information on the female founders‘ socio-
economic status. The existence or absence of such titles, positions, and affiliations as well 
as markers of their social and political network clearly depicted a female founder‘s socio-
economic status. Another important signifier of status was one‘s background as a slave or 
freeborn person, which did not necessarily correspond to one‘s socio-economic status in 
the second half of the seventeenth century.  
As with male founders of endowments, Istanbulite women‘s wealth and status had 
an impact on the type of endowments they founded. Elite women, particularly members 
of the aristocratic learned hierarchy, founded large endowments with a mixed ehli-hayri 
purpose. Other elite women, of relatively more humble background, appeared among the 
founders of public endowments. The female founders of family trusts came from a 
variety of social backgrounds, though all were wealthy enough to own at least a house 
and/or slaves.  
Compared to male founders, however, female founders were more concerned 
about either establishing a new family through their family trusts or contributing to the 
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reputation of their families through charitable endowments. Male founders‘ charitable 
endowments often constructed a new public building such as a mosque, a school, or a 
fountain which would bear the name of the founders. In that sense, Doumani suggests, 
men‘s public foundations probably indicated the emergence of a new line within an 
aristocratic household.266 Elite women‘s public endowments, however, were mere 
contributions to the family lines established by their male family members.  
Female founders of family trusts used their properties to cement existing family 
ties as well as to build new ones. Many female founders of family trusts came from 
relatively humble socio-economic backgrounds when compared to the founders of public 
endowments. A common feature among female founders of family trusts was the absence 
of strong ties with their natal families. Less than half of them were freedwomen and 
others were not associated with well-established households. For these women, founding 
family trusts was not necessarily a break from their natal families but rather the formation 
of a new one from the scratch. As we see in their endowment deeds, childless female 
founders of family trusts included a range of individuals including their step-children, 
adopted children, and female slaves as the primary beneficiaries of their endowments. 
They did not grant their wealth to their husbands or other male relatives to be managed. 
Instead, they acquired the role of benevolent matriarchs who constructed their own 
network of kin and whose names would be remembered as such in future generations.  
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An important category of female founders consisted of freedwomen, whose 
patronymics were simply bint Abdullah ―daughter of God‘s slave‖ or a variation. It was 
the Ottoman tradition of calling convert slaves as the children of ―God‘s slave‖ in order 
to both avoid their real fathers‘ non-Muslim names as well as the mark of their slave 
status. Female ex-slaves as founders of endowments came from a variety of socio-
economic backgrounds depending on the splendor of their masters‘ households, including 
the imperial household. The social integration of these female ex-slaves in the society 
was not simply through the benevolence of their masters. After all, their relationship with 
their masters‘ households was a fragile one, particularly if they were attached to an elite 
household with multiple male and female slaves. The material properties these female ex-
slaves acquired due to gifts, dowers, or other means provided them with a great 








Scholarship on the social and political history of the Ottoman Empire in recent 
decades has effectively challenged the negative connotation of a ―women‘s sultanate‖ 
and its association with the decline of the empire in the seventeenth century. Recent 
scholarship moves from the negative representation of a so-called ―post-classical‖ period 
to instead document a set of social, political, and legal transformations that might even be 
described as ―proto-democratic.‖267 This dissertation has examined ordinary women‘s 
property rights in the imperial capital of Istanbul during this period of substantial change.  
Tracing the historical transformations of Istanbulite women‘s property rights 
requires a diachronic analysis of the decades before and after the period covered by this 
study. Yet, the observations presented here shed light on some similarities with (and 
differences between) Istanbulite women and their peers in other cities of the empire. In 
line with almost all other studies on women in the Ottoman Empire, this study presents a 
picture of Muslim women as active litigants, buyers and sellers of real property, 
borrowers and lenders of money, and founders and managers of endowments. The key 
differences, however, involve their access to property and their particular strategies in 
managing their possessions. A seemingly unique aspect of Istanbul in the second half of 
the seventeenth century was the egalitarian trend of inheritance in the form of perpetual 
lease of endowed properties, as well as family trusts.  
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Studies on early modern Ottoman history, similar to this current study, are 
primarily based on the sharia court records. Such studies link the social to the legal by 
examining different aspects of women‘s lives as reflected within the legal archival 
sources. The term ―transformation‖ as applied to gender relations, however, usually 
comes in tandem with discussions of modernity. An earlier generation of scholars, such 
as Anderson, Schacht, and Coulson, cherished the legal reforms as emancipatory in 
regards to Muslim women‘s rights, including their property rights.268  
Historical research on premodern Muslim women, however, has added insights 
that raise questions about the impact of modern reforms on Muslim women‘s lives. 
Islamic law was not static in regulating women‘s rights, nor did Muslim women form one 
category of people. Some reactions to an ahistorical picture of pre-modern Muslim 
women came from a feminist re-reading of the earlier history of Islam, which 
problematized a canonized and unchanging patriarchal understanding of women‘s history 
in the earlier generations of Islam.269 Due to the availability of Ottoman court records in 
the past few decades, an increasing number of studies of early modern societies have 
documented social and legal strategies available to women before modern reforms. 
Having established women‘s agency in the history of the Middle East, some historians 
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started to criticize the modern reforms which strictly regulated women‘s status within 
family and society. In the conclusion of her study of eighteenth-century Syria and 
Palestine, Judith Tucker criticizes the modern legal codifications of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries which resulted in limiting the flexibility of Islamic law, and at least 
partially, led to the deterioration of Muslim women‘s status.270  
This study on Istanbulite Muslim women‘s property rights aims to contribute to 
the ongoing discussions about legal reforms and women‘s status in Muslim societies. 
Early modern legal systems contained elements of both continuity and change, but did 
not impose a universal solution for similar issues. Male and female subjects of the empire 
chose among the available legal strategies to secure optimal solutions to their everyday 
problems. The study of the sharia court records renders it possible to document general 
trends in the lives of women. Through such studies, for example, we know that the 
seventeenth-century women of Cairo added certain stipulations to marriage contracts in 
order to allow their husbands to remain monogamous, to prevent them from abandoning 
their wives, or to permit their wives to continue their economic activities. We also know 
that women in eighteenth-century Aleppo served as buyers of real estate in more than 30 
percent of the entire cases. Similarly, women in seventeenth-century Bursa were largely 
involved in financial market as well as textile production. Women in many parts of the 
Arab Middle East had access to multiple schools of Islamic law, which provided several 
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options to secure divorce.271 This current study demonstrates that Istanbulite women in 
the second half of the seventeenth century had a much higher access to property than the 
Islamic feraid rules would appear to prescribe.  
The experience of Istanbulite Muslim women in this period, I suggest, can shed 
light on modern discussions of women‘s property rights. The introduction of the 1858 
Ottoman Land Code is viewed as the very first Ottoman reform attempt to provide a 
gender-egalitarian access to inheritance. The Code dictated that agrarian land should be 
divided equally among the sons and daughters of the owner. In the absence of children, 
the Code retained the feraid rules‘ prioritization of male agnatic kin over female family 
members. Regardless, the Code is regarded as a significant step towards the equal access 
of men and women to property.  
The Code is represented as an unprecedented and revolutionary piece of reform in 
the Tanzimat era (1839-1876). A Marxist approach might view the development of a 
capitalist economy and the relating commodification of land as an underlying motive of 
this ―bourgeois‖ reform.272 Another explanation might regard Ottoman reformers‘ 
attempts to westernize or even secularize the empire as the main reasons behind the 
reforms that gave equal rights to men and women, as well to Muslims and non-
Muslims.273 This current study argues that an egalitarian inheritance system already 
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existed in the second half of the seventeenth century among Istanbulites. While the 
cosmopolitan aspect of the city—with its highly monetized economy as well as its 
integration within the Mediterranean trade network—might have led to the 
―commodification‖ of different types of properties, therefore necessitating a further 
integration of women in the market, the cultural aspects of the ―sultanante of women‖ 
may have also played a role in viewing women as powerful figures who could run an 
empire as well as manage their properties.  
The tradition of a nuclear family that granted equal property rights to sons and 
daughters was, therefore, not unprecedented, revolutionary, or a result of top-down 
reforms. It had deep roots in the lives of Istanbulite men and women, whose rights to use 
perpetually leased properties or family trusts were transferred equally to men and women 
of the next generations.274 That is not to say that all properties in the capital were divided 
between men and women equally. There were alternative mechanisms of inheritance 
which had complicated results on women‘s access to property. More importantly, women 
were barred from taking the most lucrative economic and administrative positions. This 
study does, however, demonstrate that the egalitarian division of properties among sons 
and daughters was commonplace in this period. These trends were shaped indigenously 
within the social and cultural transformations of this period rather than being a result of 
any attempts to westernize, modernize, or secularize the empire.  
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 Through analyzing women‘s use of the sharia court, this study also analyzes the 
interconnectedness of cultural and legal biases on women‘s activities, on the one hand, 
and women‘s active role in maneuvering within the available legal options, on the other. 
Legal procedural practices, for example, excluded women almost entirely from exercising 
their right to testify in court. Women, however, benefitted from this legal practice by 
going beyond their familial ties in order to procure impartial male witnesses for their 
economic activities. These male witnesses could eventually testify in female solicitors‘ 
favor in prospective lawsuits. 
The examination of Istanbulite Muslim women‘s marital disputes in this period 
demonstrates that while nuclear families were the predominant arrangement of family 
formation, women carefully balanced their ties with their conjugal and natal family 
members in order to secure their marital rights. Their decision to exercise a certain legal 
strategy depended on the extent of their access to the support of their natal family. 
Women of well-established families used the sharia courts in order to appoint legal 
representatives who could track their absentee husbands and make them either meet their 
marital responsibilities or agree to a divorce. When their non-cooperative husbands lived 
in Istanbul, these women used their familial ties to settle their marital disputes.  
The fact that women did not have access to other schools of law besides the 
Hanafi school limited women‘s options to either add stipulations to their marriage 
contracts or to secure a divorce from their absentee husbands. Within this legal context, 
Istanbulite women used different strategies, such as securing an ―oath of divorce‖ from 
their husbands in case they failed to meet their marital responsibilities. In this way, they 
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turned what was, in essence, a manifestation of patriarchy, to their benefit by securing the 
loyalty of their husbands, making them perform their marital responsibilities, or 
divorcing them if they failed.      
Another legal limitation on women‘s access to their maintenance rights from their 
absentee husbands was the necessity to secure a judicial decision in their favor. 
Otherwise, women who borrowed on their husbands‘ behalf or spent from their own 
money in the period of their husbands‘ absence would not be reimbursed. This apparent 
limitation on women‘s access to property, however, resulted in the encouragement of 
women to actively use the sharia court, often immediately after their husbands left them. 
It demonstrates not only women‘s awareness about the niceties of the Islamic family law, 
but also their agency in turning a limitation into an opportunity. After securing a judicial 
decision in their favor, it was easier for them to litigate against their husbands whenever 
they returned to Istanbul or were found elsewhere.  
The sharia court records, however, are mostly silent in regards to the women at 
the bottom of the social ladder. For these women, the sharia court was theoretically as 
accessible as to anyone else. Favorable judicial decisions could certainly be used to 
empower these women when their husbands returned to the capital. It seems, however, 
unlikely that such judicial intervention ameliorated the lives of the very poor women of 
the capital, whose chances to borrow on their missing husbands‘ behalf were minimal. 
This is why the single story of a poor convert, and possible ex-slave woman, named 
Fatma bint Abdullah—who decided to get married to a second husband while still 
married to the first—is illuminating. When the legal system failed to secure a divorce 
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from her first husband (who went missing for a period of eight months), when the 
chances to borrow from others was limited, and when she did not have any kin support in 
Istanbul, she had to resort to the extra-judicial and even illegal action of polyandry.  
Trends of settling disputes over inheritance, which formed the most important 
source of women‘s wealth in the capital, demonstrate yet another aspect of the 
relationship between legal practice and social norms. My examination of the sharia court 
records demonstrates that Istanbulites did not allow the feraid rules to dictate their 
inheritance. The bypass of the feraid rules, however, did not lead to the disinheritance of 
women. In contrast, alternative mechanisms of inheritance were devised in order to retain 
properties within nuclear family members, including both men and women. Inheritance 
disputes usually occurred when non-nuclear family members were entitled to a portion of 
inherited properties. Such disputes, however, were usually settled through amicable 
settlements, leaving the bulk of the inherited properties to the nuclear family members of 
the deceased.  
Records about widows‘ access to the estate of their deceased husbands, however, 
demonstrate a more complicated picture of the norms regarding gender, family, and 
property. Widows usually applied to the sharia court in order to be appointed the 
guardians of their minor children, which were almost always granted. Widows‘ 
guardianship over minor children, in practice, meant that they were in control of the 
majority or entirety of their husbands‘ estates. This practice, on the one hand, 
demonstrated the faith of the legal system, as well as the society, in women‘s 
management of a considerable amount of properties. On the other hand, it assumed 
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certain gender roles the widows had to play. For one, she had to have borne children with 
her husband. A childless widow was therefore easily compensated in return for 
relinquishing her inheritance rights to her husband‘s estate. Widows with minor children 
were expected to remain unmarried in order to retain their guardianship rights over their 
children. The Istanbulite widows with minor children in this period often chose the 
integrity of their nuclear family members, retaining custody and guardianship rights at 
the expense of remaining unmarried, or marrying relatives of their husbands.  
Women‘s management of properties took several forms. Women with familial 
support usually sold off their shares in inherited real estate to acquire cash, jewelry, and 
other movable properties. After all, providing accommodation for family members was a 
manly responsibility. Yet, some women who had acquired certain properties during their 
lifetime, either through inheritance or marital rights, did not view real property simply as 
a saleable commodity for cash. Their decision to retain or sell real estate was influenced 
by their network of kin support. Kin ties provided a more secure source of support than 
marital ties. After all, divorce was commonplace and was particularly easy for men to 
exercise. Both legal norms and social practice expected kin members to extend support to 
the impoverished family members, particularly women whose access to the employment 
market was extremely limited. The absence of kin support, however, meant that women 
had to take their management of real properties more seriously. One common method of 
managing urban residential properties was turning them into a perpetual source of 
accommodation in the form of family trusts. By doing so, these women constructed their 
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own network of kin by including not only husbands and biological children, but, more 
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